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Abstract 
 
In the risk society, the public mobilization around emerging environmental and 
health risks associated with new technologies become the central challenge for a 
sustainable and healthy democracy. Ulrich Beck defines reflexive modernization as the 
ability of democratic societies to develop scientific understandings of emerging risks 
associated with new industrial technologies. Reflexive modernity is galvanized by 
progressive eco-politics that guide better ways of managing and mitigating systemic 
environmental and health risks. This thesis examines evidence of the growing scientific 
understanding of health risks associated with distracted driving-caused road accidents 
as a case study exploring Canada‘s ability to translate this risk science into progressive 
public policy that improves road safety. The study starts by exploring historical risk 
communication strategies and their role in altering drivers‘ behaviours and compliance 
with legislations limiting speed, impaired driving, and seatbelt use. It then reviews 
evidence of the new risks associated with using electronic communication devices while 
driving which has resulted in legislation prohibiting the use of hand-held devices by 
drivers across Canada and in BC. Three years into the legislation, this study found that 
at the very least 1.7% of all drivers are currently distracted behind the wheel. Through 
surveys and focus groups, the thesis explores why drivers are not willing to give up their 
communication habits despite existing legislations and sanctions. Recent crash data 
demonstrated that deaths attributed to distracted driving declined more slowly in British 
Columbia than from drinking, speeding, and non-use of seatbelts. The research 
concludes with a discussion of the importance of the lifestyle risk communication for a 
healthier reflexive modernity in British Columbia. 
 
Keywords: Distracted driving; risk society; British Columbia; observational road survey; 
legislation; risk-taking 
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Introduction  
The automobile provides an excellent example of technological innovation for 
undertaking a case study of the role of risk communication in reflexive modernization. 
Why? Because cars are regarded as the quintessential consumer technology in the 
formation of mass society. The cultural impact of cars has been unprecedented: from an 
early 20th century culture of public transportation with its infrastructure of railroads, 
trolleys, and naval travel, the 20th century saw a shift to a car culture which became 
addicted to privatized automobile use (Packer, 2008, p.2).  
Ford Motor Company‘s moving assembly line transformed the automobile into a 
product of mass consumption. The assembly line permitted a sharp increase in 
productivity and promoted price drops, making cars available to anyone willing to 
purchase one (Bardou et al, 1982, p. 61). The Automobile Revolution had a profound 
impact economy, culture, urban landscapes as well as individual lifestyles. For example, 
in Canada, cars became the second largest expense of Canadians costing 
approximately $9,500 in annual maintenance costs (CAA, 2013). The authors of special 
report on automobile and society report on the cars‘ transformation into mobile offices, 
dining halls, sound environment, and a place for socializing (Featherstone, 2004). 
For these reasons, the automobile has been called an icon of social status and 
customized lifestyle (Jacobs, 1989, p.xiv) and a symbol of national identity, as well as 
individualism – in short ―a fascinating and contested symbol of modernism, […] and 
consumerism‖ (Featherstone, 2004, p.7). Yet the automobile has always been more than 
an ordinary consumer good. John Urry coined the term automobility culture to describe 
the current state of human affairs based on the dependence of Western populations on 
their vehicles (2004, p. 26). For example, Dant reported that while in 1960 the major 
share (71%) of households in Britain did not have a car, by 1999 of 72% of all homes did 
(2004, p. 61). In Canada, vehicle ownership changed even more strikingly from 5.3 
million in 1960 to 18.2 million in 2002 (Dargay et al, 2007, p.20). Automobility culture 
combines entitled individuals with self-directed movement, unrestrained and 
surveillance-free. It allows challenges of traditional time-space relationships, and 
constitutes the realization of imagined utopic freedom (Featherstone, 2004, p.2). 
 Miller, in his book Car Cultures (2001), demonstrated the automobiles‘ 
connection to social, emotional, and cultural dimensions of human experience in the 
modern period. Building on Miller‘s work, Sheller suggested that the present car culture 
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stimulated development of automotive emotions (2004, p. 223). Automotive emotions 
include the feelings of individual empowerment associated with owning a vehicle, or a 
collective security for one's family (Sheller, 2004). Miller suggested that vehicles serve 
as an extension of human habitus (2001, p.3); Laurier applied this idea and explores the 
vehicle as an extension of work environment, a mobile office where work-related calls 
are made, emailed answered, and paper work completed (2004, p. 269). More recently, 
Gunster (2007) presented a thematic taxonomy of car commercials offering insight into 
the valorization of automobility. The taxonomy included speed-related narratives of 
escape, passing time, and freedom of mobility and presents the automobile as a 
quintessential object of post- modernity‘s utopic progressive rhetoric of neo-liberal 
market culture.  
However, the social history of cars has a negative trajectory as well. The most 
conventional car history approach includes the analysis of negative externalities 
associated with automobiles (Miller, 2001). Foremost among these are the risks 
associated with exhaust from internal combustion engines. Chanaron suggests that, 
since 1960, traffic in both urban and rural areas increased dramatically, consequently 
causing an unprecedented concentration of air pollutants. Air pollutants include 
everything from carbon monoxide and lead, to nitrogen oxides to aldehydes which are 
toxic and capable of seriously damaging organic life (Chanaron, 1982, p. 277). For 
instance, infamous Los Angeles smog is caused by organic vapors and oxide of nitrogen 
(that mostly come from car exhausts) reacting under the sunlight; the pollutants mixing 
with different atmospheric layers create a toxic, photochemical smog dangerous to living 
organisms (Bluementha et all, 1977, p. 906). Historically, Los Angeles smog was 
responsible for thousands of cases of eye irritation, lung disease, throat and brachial 
cancers, and respiratory illness among infants (Chanaron, 1982, p. 278). The 
environmental risks of air pollution have received widespread attention in the press 
recently based on numerous medical studies published by the WHO that claimed that up 
to 7 million premature deaths can be attributed to air pollution worldwide (WHO, 2014). 
In the wake of Al Gore‘s  An Inconvenient Truth, the gas-guzzling car was not only 
responsible for smog, but figured increasingly in debates about global warming, ozone 
depletion, acid rain, soil contamination, and pollution of waterways. Other major 
externalities include city traffic congestion, noise pollution, rising rates of insurance, 
changing urban landscape, and trauma to vulnerable road users (Miller, 2001). 
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Another clear externality is the financial loss associated with accidents. The total 
financial costs of injuries, emergency care, hospitalization, labour loss, property damage, 
and other accident-related expenses amount to 5% of the total Canadian Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (WHO, 2013, p.83). This approximately equates to a loss of 
$91 million USD or $258 per person annually. For this reason, critical accounts of the 
car-dependent culture have also focused on the health risks associated with air pollution, 
technological failure, speeding, and various kinds of impaired driving. Although emerging 
lifestyle risks associated with automobility – from drunk driving to obesity -- have 
received considerable attention in literature, the following case study will focus on the 
most recently evolving health risk in our car-dependent culture: the use of cell phones 
behind the wheel.  
 
Overview of Thesis 
 
 Chapter one starts with a discussion of Ulrich Beck‘s theory of risk society and 
explores the core tenets of his theory as they pertain to the growing scientific and public 
awareness of the hazards associated with automobility. Clearly, the emergence of car 
culture provides an excellent opportunity for understanding the role of communication in 
the risk society. The role of new risk sciences is to identify, evaluate, and offer mitigation 
strategies to limit the rising environmental and health hazards unwittingly forged in 
modernization (Beck, 1996). The role of risk communication is to attract attention to 
emerging risks created by technological progress itself and to galvanize a progressive, 
discursive politics of risk mitigation (Kline, 2011). Under conditions of reflexive modernity, 
the risk sciences and risk communication take complementary roles in ensuring our 
sustainable development.  
 The second half of the chapter will present arguments about the roles of accident 
science, mediated communication, and advocacy groups in the attempts to increase 
road safety during the post-war years. A review of the road safety literature since the war 
outlines how successive public health policies have reduced the health and safety risks 
that accompanied late modernity's embrace of automobility by improvements to the 
technology (such as road design, signage, seat belts, roll bars, catalytic converters, 
lead-free gasoline, airbags, and child seats), as well as imposing speed limits, and by 
restricting driver behaviours (impaired driving, fatigue). The section will discuss car-
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related issues in a historical perspective by presenting earlier driving-associated risks 
such as speeding, seat belts, impaired driving, and outlining subsequent wider lessons 
of non-compliance, community outrage, and poor enforcement. Accident data in both 
Canada and the USA show that, although the number of cars has increased from 
1,622,463 in 1946 to 31,718,809 in 2014 (Statistics Canada, 2014), the number of 
deaths has fallen significantly from in 25 death per 100,000 in 1979 to 9 death per 
100,000 in 2004 (Ramage-Morin, 2008, p.1). This development suggests that public 
policy makers have successfully improved road safety.  
Chapter two suggests that, in the 1980s, the widespread diffusion of mobile 
phones and their use in the car presented policy makers with a new threat to safety  on 
the roads. The first commercial mobile phones were introduced in 1979; over the next 
forty years the technology underwent a major transformation resulting in a dramatic 
increase in mobile coverage, unprecedented drop in prices, change in size and 
capabilities, as well as a high level of adaptation (Kalba, 2008, p.11). In Canada the 
coverage rose from 6,000 users in 1985 to 27,863,660 in 2014 (CWTA, 2014). 
Approximately 83% of Canadians owned a cell phone by 2013 (CWTA, 2014). Although 
mobile technology itself poses health risks associated with electromagnetic radiation (i.e. 
cancer, genetic mutations, as well as surveillance), this work will only be concerned with 
risks associated with the combined use of these two mobile technologies: an automobile 
and a cell phone. Among other possible activities (i.e. eating, talking to passengers, 
regulating climate control, reading billboards), the combination of these activities was 
captured by a term –distracted driving. 
  The chapter reports  on the growing scientific evidence of the hazards associated 
with the use of cell phones by drivers. Reviewing over thirty years of research, this thesis 
points to the emergence of a behavioral science of distracted driving which clearly 
demonstrates the negative effects of divided attention on both vehicle control and 
situational awareness which has motivated and justified the passage of laws restricting 
cell phone use by drivers. The psycho-social dynamics of distracted driving with its 
complex and varying approaches, methodology, and results are reviewed. The overview 
of the main actors in the field (i.e. governmental research bodies, non-profit think-tanks, 
individual researchers) analyzes the major findings to date and informs readers about 
general agreements and limitations of the field. The discussion will include studies 
conducted in naturalistic settings, on research tracks, and studies conducted using 
driving simulators. The emphasis is on identifying the factors associated with driving 
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performance degradation during cell phone use. The chapter concludes with an in-depth 
discussion of the cognitive processes behind human multitasking and the limitations of 
the human capacity for parallel task execution. 
Chapter three, sets out to explore the impact of this emerging risk science on 
both public policy makers and the general public. The chapter will include early history of 
the policy debate, early legal tests, as well as a content analysis of local news stories 
published around this risk. The chapter also presents the current state of awareness 
about distracted driving in Canada and the public policy formed around the issue. The 
first legislations banning the use of hand-held electronic devices was passed in New 
York, NY in 2001, in Newfoundland and Labrador in 2003, and in BC in 2010 (CAA, 
2014). Yet despite the legislation restricting the use of hand-held technologies by drivers 
in BC, and publicity of the risks in the media, the rate of compliance with the ban is 
limited. Reporting on a recent observational survey of car drivers in Vancouver, it is 
estimated that at any given moment at least 1.35% of drivers are using a hand-held 
device.  This suggests that compliance with the legislation is marginal. 
 Chapter four therefore presents recent findings from a survey and focus groups 
conducted in Vancouver that explore why legislation, awareness of risks, and police 
enforcement are currently not sufficient for reducing the use of cellphones by drivers. 
The survey demonstrates that distracted driving is not viewed as apolicy priority by 
Canadians and is not perceived as having the potential to impact the respondents. 
Qualitative data gathered from focus groups indicated that even BC drivers who were 
aware of the risks were not willing to give up their phone-behind-the-wheel habits. 
Additionally, the data indicated that BC drivers did not believe that distraction-related 
laws are adequately enforced. 
The conclusion explores the implications of the BC case study for lifestyle risk 
communication strategies. The good news generally seems to be that strategies of risk 
communication can be effective in reducing the risks associated with using phones in the 
car. Yet an ICBC study also indicates that fatal accidents attributed to distracted driving 
have declined more slowly than those associated with speeding and impaired 
driving,  despite the 2010 BC Act banning the operation of hand-held communication 
devices while driving a car. The bad news is that distracted driving may be a unique kind 
of risk taking behaviour that resists the kinds of social communication campaigns 
successfully used with speeding, seat belts, and impaired driving. This work will 
culminate in an application of new findings to the design of a strategy to curb distracted 
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driving. The conclusion would argue that while historically legislation and enforcement 
strategies were successful in alleviating road trauma, in risk society these strategies 
might be futile. Risk communication programs would be suggested as a necessary 
element of a risk mitigation strategy in reflexive modernity. 
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Chapter 1: Reading Automobility in the Context of the Risk Society  
Risk Society Intro 
In 1986, Ulrich Beck published his groundbreaking book, Risk Society: Towards 
a New Modernity. He posits a concept of risk at the core of emerging social order. Beck 
argues that from a system of wealth distribution that served as an organizing principle of 
the industrial society, we moved into a system organized around risk allocation (Draper, 
1993, p. 641). The shift from wealth to risk distribution transformed traditional social 
structures. Beck asserts, ―just as modernization dissolved the structure of feudal society 
in the nineteenth century and produced the industrial society, modernization today is 
dissolving industrial society and another modernity is coming into being‖ (Beck, 1992, 
p.10). Late modernity thus created a distinct social organization: the risk society.  
Under the new risk system, the life of the society revolves around the distribution 
of risk, individualization of responsibility, and the heightened importance of the media 
(Beck, 1986). From a system where risks existed as residual externality, uninteresting 
and hidden from the public eye, risks moved to the core of public debate, politics, and 
media (Adam et al, 2000). The media are playing a key role in risk society, as they 
become a platform where experts, politicians, and citizens can engage in a dialogue 
about controversial implications surrounding these uncertainties in risk science. 
The most prominent theorists of risk also note that risks cannot be understood 
outside of the cultural and social structures that they develop and exist within (Douglas, 
1992, p. x). In her book, Risk and Blame, Douglas suggests that even when risks are 
individualized, broader decision-making processes are still happening in social and 
cultural environments that cannot be ignored (Douglas, 1992). Arnoldi developed the 
idea of cultural filtering via shared values and norms, and concluded that these variables 
can influence risk perception and awareness (Arnoldi, 2009, p.106). Cultural 
amplification is one of the reasons why some risks gain prominent attention, while 
equally important others do not inspire public imagination. Additionally, researchers 
emphasize human dependency on groups, communities, and values not reducible to 
culture only. Most importantly, scientists, politicians, and media are also affected by 
values and dominant culture (Arnoldi, 2009).  
Douglas and Kline agreed that risks are always culturally situated; they are both 
―politicized and moralized‖ (Kline, 2004, p.4) by risk communication because blame is a 
pivotal part of risk reduction and prevention. In his most recent work, Globesity, Kline 
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presented a case study of the discursive politics of obesity as a lifestyle risk galvanized 
by the growing concerns about fast food culture in which fast food marketers and 
advertising became implicated in a moral panic.  Kline emphasizes three separate 
dimensions of mediated risk communication controversies in the risk society which 
contribute to the historical formation of public policy for risk mitigation. The first is the 
publicity gained by the emerging risk sciences (in his case, epidemiology) in setting the 
broader health care agenda. The second is the formations of advocacy (including 
corporate PR, advertising, and pubic relations) that emerges around environmental and 
health issues. And the third is the manifestations of the public‘s growing awareness of 
the new risks, and their willingness to support policy change mobilized around media risk 
controversies by advocacy groups, whistle-blowers, think-tanks etc. (Kline, 2011, p. 6).  
My case study is modeled on Kline‘s risk communication approach to the discursive 
politics of emerging, though this work is concerned with the lifestyle risks arising from the 
tandem use of two of modernity's most cherished technologies, namely cars and mobile 
phones. 
New Science in Risk Society 
The notion of risk is not new. Rather it is embedded in the unpredictability of 
hazards of many kinds. Pre-industrial and industrial societies dealt with famines, floods, 
pandemics, and other unpredictable hazards for centuries (Beck, 1996, p.30). These 
risks were considered external, unpredictable, and environmental; they were not a 
product of modernity per se, but of the conditions of unpredictability of the natural world. 
Arnoldi suggests that it was the Enlightenment that transformed human perception of 
risk by making them a subject of human knowledge through scientific study. He states 
that hazards could no longer be attributed to unpredictable nature or divine punishment, 
instead ―the source of uncertainty was incomplete human knowledge‖ (Arnoldi, 2009, 
p.30) in the process of empirical research. 
Enlightenment‘s thesis led to the accumulation of observations of unexpected, 
rare, individual events and thus to the understanding of patterns and the science of 
prediction based on the probability theory (Giddens, 1998, p.27). The risks were now 
about calculation, probability, insurance, and therefore, control (Boyd, 1994, p. 160; 
Giddens, 1998). Calculable and insurable risks are now known as ―old risks‖. 
The industrial society also developed systematic mechanisms for dealing with 
uncertainties ―induced and introduced by modernization itself‖ (Beck, 1992, p.21). 
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However, these mechanisms were based on three assumptions: risks have to be known, 
effective amelioration strategies have to be available, and precautionary communication 
has to be possible (Kline, 2004, p.3). Under the conditions of the second modernity, the 
nature of risks has changed (Franklin, 1998, p.1). New risks are characterized by 
unpredictability, invisibility, disregard for spatial and temporal location, potential 
catastrophic effect on the grand scale, and non-discriminatory nature (Beck, 2006; Cottle, 
1998, p.8). Systemic risks are produced by modernization processes and the 
development of technology; they escape full understanding and control because their 
impact is on the environment as a whole (Loyal, 2003, p.157). In his writing, Beck lists 
examples manufactured environmental risk (carcinogens, CFCs, radiation, toxic waste) 
depletion as well as global terrorism, economy, and other ecological risks. All of these 
risks share a single characteristic: scientists have yet to understand the full extent of 
their impact on both the environment and humans (Giddens, 1998 in Chalaby & Segell, 
1999, p. 354; Loyal, 2003, p.157).  
Elements of Discursive Politics: Contested Sciences 
Beck states, ―there are always competing and conflicting claims, interests and 
viewpoints of the various agents of modernity and affected groups‖ (Beck, 1992, p.29). 
As a result, society is forced to live in a context of ―conflicting, changeable scientific and 
technological information‖ (Giddens, 1998, p.32). In a world of scientific uncertainty, 
experts and scientists lose their truth-granting authority (Clarke, 1994, p.328). Three key 
challenges for reflexive modernity are the overwhelming amount of new scientific 
information that is made available, the contradictory qualities of  evidence produced by 
competing scientific groups,  and the inability of scientists to arrive at conclusive proof 
given the probabilistic nature of risk assessment methodology. 
In the current media environment, something called a ―risk information vacuum‖ 
develops. Leiss and Powell coined the term to signify the growing mistrust between 
experts and the public caused by the differences in perceptions of risks by these two 
parties (1997). This mistrust grew because the information is presented to the public at a 
level of complexity that the lay audience cannot grasp, and because experts are 
unwilling to look at the risk beyond technological assessments (Leiss & Chociolko, 1994, 
p.35).  
Information quality, trust and credibility of experts plays a central role in mediated 
risk communication.  With the exponential spread of information, it is getting very difficult 
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for both journalists and audiences to evaluate the validity of claims (Arnoldi, 2009, p.127).  
Just like other institutions of risk society, the media are dealing with issues regarding the 
contradictory scientific findings and the truthfulness of information. For example, Leiss & 
Powell site an instance of the media's coverage of dioxins, in which journalists 
mistakenly projected the harmful effects of a substance on humans as a result of animal 
testing (Leiss & Powell, 2004, p. 57), negatively impacting public opinion. Kline also 
concludes, ―in spite of often intense news coverage, the general public is poorly 
informed and cannot always grasp the complexity of risk issues‖ (Kline, 2004, p.3). 
Clearly, the media in risk society are not free from power struggles between 
public interest advocates and corporate flacks. For this reason, the media's coverage is   
subject to conflict over risk definition, blame, and responsibility for mitigation efforts. As 
in the case of obesity, risk producers (fast food outlets) want to hold individuals (mainly 
parents) accountable for the hazards, while the lay audience seeks to attribute the blame 
to the highly profitable corporate actor, including their extensive advertising of risky 
products (Kline 2011).  Some researchers suggest that the way out of this information 
vacuum is to create a long-term communication strategy to promote accountability and 
transparency between scientists, communication experts, and audiences (Ali, 2003, p.4). 
Social marketing and responsible corporate advertising has therefore become a method 
for addressing the misunderstandings of the extent and factors associated with risks 
perceptions (Potter, 1998, p. 162) 
Elements of Discursive Politics: Risk Agenda Setting 
 In his early work, Beck states, ―risk society is also science, media and 
information society‖ (1992, p.46). Indeed, in risk society, the media become the platform 
for information distribution  and public contestation of new hazards (Arnoldi, 2009, p. 
175). Mass media have the power to make risks visible and known to the public (Cottle, 
1998). Beck suggests that the media, mainly through news, have the power to minimize, 
amplify, dismiss or dramatize particular hazards (Beck, 1992, p. 23). He states, 
―expensive and extensive scientific investigations are often not really noticed in the 
agency that ordered them until television or a mass-circulation newspaper reports about 
them‖ (Beck, 1992, p.197). Yet the media tend to concentrate on risks that are easy to 
present visually, that have high impact consequences, that injure or kill many people at 
once, and that are short-lived (Cottle, 1998). Kline (2011) analyzed the role of media in 
setting risk agendas, framing policy debate and raising public awareness of risks 
 11 
 
concluding that the news agenda is not just dictated by the scientists' establishment of 
the prevalence of a new risk and its impact, but rather by their sensational nature, its 
―dread factor‖ and by the framing of blame and responsibility (Kline, 2011, p. 26).  
Kitzinger points out that risks persistent overtime are downplayed by the media 
because they tend to become ―old news‖; reporting also tends to be event- rather than 
issue-oriented; and, risks that can be presented with personal stories and celebrities 
tend to dominate media coverage (Kitzinger, 1999, p.62). Lastly, news stories revolve 
around issues of blame and responsibility, and in the light of the changing nature of risk, 
it is getting harder and harder to report hazards. In other words, the need to compete for 
audiences and time constrains force media professionals to present risks according to 
their spectacular appeal rather than scientific evidence. In the risk society, media play an 
important role in determining discursive politics by amplifying and playing down various 
new risks as the filter into the risk agenda (Kline, 2011, p. 34). Clearly, such selectivity in 
risk reporting might result in biased risk perceptions from the audience (Kline, 2011). 
 
Elements of Discursive Politics: Social mobilization around scientific controversy. 
 
According to Kline, this but is compounded by the fact that experts, whistle-
blowers, and risk advocates play a significant role in mobilizing public opinion and policy 
response around an already controversial science (Kline, 2011). Kline goes on to explain 
how advocacy organizations (for example, Green Peace and anti-tobacco lobby groups) 
learned the commercial art of public relations and successfully used media-spinning 
strategies to their ends. Kline coined the term ‗advocacy science‘  to describe the 
mobilizations by special interest groups struggling to bring attention to various risks (ibid, 
2011, p. 9). In the case of road safety, advocacy scientists include Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving and Remove Intoxicated Drivers groups, as well as the Insurance and 
Automobile Industry groups. In the case of road safety, such groups used media for 
outreach, but also performed intoxicated drivers‘ trial supervisions, provided counseling 
services, and increasingly conducted their own research. 
Advocacy groups used media platforms to engage in contestation and debate 
with experts, professionals, lay audiences, and politicians (Kline, 2004). Cottle suggests 
that the media become a place where social and scientific rationalities meet (1998, p.19). 
For example MADD‘s founder (Candy Lightner) conduced her advocacy work by 
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addressing TV audiences of Good Morning America and Nightline shows, the US 
Congress, as well as various professional and business groups. Indeed, Lightner served 
on multiple governmental commissions, including the major panels – the Presidential 
Commission on Drunk Driving (Hanson, 2014).  
Part II: Road Safety: A Historical Perspective 
This thesis attempts to understand road safety science in relation to distracted 
driving, that emerge as a new risk in early 1990s. Researchers of road safety have 
recently suggested four successive ways of thinking about road accidents and their 
causes:  starting with viewing accidents as an inevitable event, then focusing on driver 
error, increasing blame of the industry, and ending with a holistic road safety approach 
which strives to accommodate human error, make roads safer, build safer vehicles, and 
enforce legislation that promotes safety (Johnston, Muir & Howard, 2013).  
In the early 1900s, up until the 1930s, motor vehicle crashes and accidents were 
viewed as an unavoidable price of progress – or alternatively as an unpredictable act of 
God. However, a critical discourse on motor safety emerged from the early days of the 
road safety paradigm. The early deaths from road crashes were often attributed to 
malfunctions of the vehicles and their design (Mashaw & Harfst, 1990, p.40). This model 
was challenged in the late 1930s, when the focus of the research shifted from the road 
as an unpredictable environment, to the model in which the individual drivers, and their 
behaviors were considered faults (Johnston, Muir & Howard, 2013, p.69). Responsibility 
for crashes was put on individuals as a discourse on "human error" (Homel, 1988, p.1) 
emerged; accidents were attributed to ―a nut behind the wheel‖ (Nader, 1965). Thus, the 
solutions for road safety developed during this time period were inspired by ideals of 
personal responsibility; for example, training programs, personality tests, exclusion of 
potentially unfit drivers from the road, and ridged sanctions aimed at individuals (Helund, 
2007, p. 26). Until the 1950s little attention was paid to transportation systems, 
infrastructure, safer roads, nor safety features for motor vehicles (Johnston, Muir & 
Howard, 2013).  
The following review of historical literature on road safety sets out to demonstrate 
the increasing importance of communication strategies for mitigating the risks associated 
with road transportation since the 1950s. Technological deficiencies, impaired driving, 
speeding, and the use of the seatbelts will be discussed in turn as evidence of this trend 
towards the blending of accident science with risk communication. Four different lessons 
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regarding the discursive politics of road safety will be highlighted in this discussion, 
namely 1) the contested development of accident science arising from Nader's focus on 
the  GM Corvair's technological failures provoking improvement in safety features in 
cars; 2) the importance of media campaigns for enforcing seatbelt use compliance; 3) 
the growing importance of social marketing in addressing behavioural factors like 
speeding; and 4) the active role of advocacy groups in combating the issue of impaired 
driving. 
Lesson 1:Technology and Car Design 
While politicians and experts spoke about car safety design as the responsibility 
of the auto industry, their concerns went unheard until Ralph Nader‘s book, Unsafe at 
Any Speed, in 1964 (Jacobs, 1989). Nader was one of the first road safety advocates 
who challenged the traditional thinking of road crashes as simplistic human error. He did 
so by demonstrating that General Motors‘ defective auto designs resulted in multiple 
accidents and deaths. The Harvard-trained lawyer, Nader brought to light documentation 
that Corvair engineers were aware of the limitations of that particular car model (i.e. the 
rear-engine vehicle had instability associated with over-steering ), but still released the 
design into production, while silencing board members‘ concerns about car safety 
(Nader, 1965, p.36). Nader also demonstrated that from 1960 to 1963, GM received 
hundreds of complaints about cars swerving out of control, but the company did nothing 
to improve the design. Indeed, GM ordered their employees to replace defective parts 
during routine maintenance without informing the owners (Mashaw & Harfst, 1990, p.56) 
nor notifying drivers of defective cars. 
Nader‘s struggle with GM probably would not have had as much success as it 
had if the company had not hired a private investigator to investigate the background of 
the lawyer (Mashaw & Harfst, 1990). The bizarre ―routine investigation‖ into the life-
choices and sexual preferences of Nader framed the problem in a populist, 
melodramatic manner and attracted global attention to the cause (Jacobs, 1989). After 
Nader suggested that ―the prevailing view of traffic safety is much more a political 
strategy to defend special interests, than it is an empirical program to save lives and 
prevent injuries‖ (Nader, 1965, p.236), both the motor industry and public policy makers 
found themselves in the spotlight for ensuring road safety. Class action law suits have 
been long used to attract public attention to various risk issues. 
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Nader showed that the auto industry does not bear any costs of injuries and 
fatalities on the road, and forever challenged the classical paradigm of thinking about 
road safety (Arason, 2014, p.182). Soon after, the auto industry was forced to pay close 
attention to safety and was mandated to design safety features including seat belts, 
collapsible columns, padded interiors, airbags, and rollover protection (Aarson, 2014, 
p.ix). 
Aarson pointed out that Nader‘s effort result not only in improved vehicle safety, 
but gave a rise to the whole auto risk momentum (2014, p.180). In his book, No Accident, 
Aarson describes the attention that followed GM‘s embracement as the Nader Effect. 
After the court case, the auto industry and auto lobbyists, traditionally strong in 
Washington, faced fierce resistance from the general public, progressive politicians, and 
safety experts (Mashaw & Harfst, 1990 p.57). The rise of advocacy for automobile risks 
can be clearly viewed via the changing mandate of NHTSA that shifted from rule-making 
to the power to force recalls of vehicles that did not meet safety standards. Mashaw and 
Harfst suggested that some of these changes could be explained by the public interest in 
automobile safety issues and a number of high-profile court cases (including Nader 
versus GM). 
Lesson 2: Speeding and Enforcement  
 In 2013, a BC coach bus was impounded for traveling 110 km/h in a 
construction zone (Aarson, 2014, p. 86). Speeding is one the issues ignored even by 
drivers whose livelihood depends on being able to drive. Johnston and colleagues 
analyzed a set of US and Canadian car commercials (1998-2002) and found that almost 
half of the ads presented an unsafe speed massage (2013, p.108). One of the most 
prominent road safety researchers concluded that ―speeding is so entrenched in driving 
culture, there‘s little perceived legitimacy in efforts to control speeding‖ (Hedlund, 2007, 
p.8). 
In 1835, English Highway Law postulated that the maximum speed of horse-
drawn traffic should not exceed 4mph (Elias in Featherstone, 2004, p. 4). The legislation 
was put in place to protect vulnerable road users. However, in 1920, Great Britain 
abandoned speed limits due to their unpopularity among vehicle owners. The limits were 
reintroduced only in 1934 (Johnston, Muir & Howard, 2013, p.127). Mass production of 
automobiles gave birth to new car culture: a culture fascinated with speed, power, and 
the masculinity of vehicles (Featherstone, 2004).  Reviewing the history of speed limits 
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worldwide, Johnston and his colleagues concluded that speed limits are consistently too 
high for the levels of protection offered by different designs of automobiles (ibid, 2013, 
p.127).  
Both natural and pre-designed experiments demonstrated that decreasing speed 
limits was associated with fewer traffic fatalities and injuries as higher speeds increase 
both the severity of crashes and the likelihood of being involved in a crash (Aarts & 
Schagen, 2006, p.218).  One famous natural experiment happened in 1973 resulting in 
the US being forced to reduce speed limits from 65 to 55 mph. This change resulted in 
approximately 2,000 to 4,000 lives saved and two billion dollars in financial savings. In 
1987, when speed limits went up again fatalities attributed to speeding skyrocketed 
(Johnston, Muir & Howard, 2013, p.121). Similarly, a classic study conducted by Nilsson 
in Sweden (1982) demonstrated that ―a speed limit reduction was accompanied by a 
reduction in average speed as well as a reduction in the number of crashes‖ (Aarts & 
Schagen, 2006, p. 218). One of the leading road safety researchers, Elvik, re-analyzed 
115 speed-exploring studies and concluded that there is a clear link between speed 
limits and the number of fatalities on the road (2009).  
 Speed affects reaction time and stopping distance, and therefore the 
severity of car crashes. Johnson and colleagues concluded that the risks associated with 
speeding grow exponentially. They suggested that by driving 10 km/h over a speed limit, 
a driver doubles his risk of a serious crash, at 15 km/h over, the risk increases four-fold, 
and 25 km/h over, ten-fold (2012, p.120).  
 Despite a clear increase in the probability of crashes, enforcement of 
speed limits ran into two major issues. First, was the problem of consistently high 
ticketing procedures to ensure behavior change (Aarson, 2014). The solution to increase 
the number of tickets was found in electronic speed cameras and photo radars that can 
automatically identify and ticket speeding drivers. Unfortunately, in Canada, drivers 
viewed speed cameras as a way to generate revenue for the government instead of 
improving road safety (Aarson, 2014). In BC, the photo radar program was shut down in 
2006, as it lacked credibility and lost public support. Johnson and colleagues suggested 
that the situation could be improved by ensuring transparent revenue allocation (2013, p. 
140). 
The second major issue of speed limits is the enforcers, the police. Traffic forces 
have been historically reluctant to enforce unpopular laws, because police officers ―in 
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their capacity as ordinary drivers, tend to share the view of everyone else that low-level 
speeding is not dangerous behaviours‖ (Johnston, Muir & Howard, 2013, p.131). 
Fortunately, the issue is not without success stories. For example, Davis and 
colleagues described a successful, large-scale enforcement program in Fresno, 
California, in 2003. The program consisted of quadrupling the number of responsible 
officers, a fleet of twenty special motorcycles for radar, and speed guns. As a result, the 
number of citations went from 6% to 17% of the population, thus decreasing speed-
related fatalities three-fold and saving two million dollars in hospital and insurance 
charges (Davis et al, 2006, p.972). 
Lesson 3: Seat Belts & The Problem of Compliance 
 One of the most successfully mitigated road safety issues is the high use 
of seatbelts. In 2012, in BC, the use of seatbelts reached 96.9%; before first legislation, 
in 1977, the initial seat belt use varied from 14% to 28% (Waters et al, 1966, p.1343). In 
the early 1970s, observational studies found that only 21% of drivers in Canada used 
their seatbelts (Robertson, 1978, p. 154).  
By the late 1960s, seatbelts had become a standard mandatory feature of every 
car (TIRF, 2007, p.1). Seatbelts work by restraining a person inside the vehicle, and thus 
reducing the impact of the secondary collision with the interior of the car and the 
resulting injuries (Information Canada, 1974, p.ii). Most importantly, seatbelts prevent 
the occupant‘s ejection from the car. Statistics show that 75% of people ejected from 
their vehicles do not survive (TIRF, 2007, p. p.1). With respect to efficacy, seatbelts 
surpass airbags as the policy makers favoured way to forestall death on the roads 
(Nichols & Ledingham, 2008, p.4). 
There are two major lessons from the history of seatbelt enforcement: first, high 
visibility enforcement combined with sanctions and legislations are successful in 
addressing road-safety issues; second, no road safety promotion strategy is effective 
immediately and steadily. The seatbelt enforcement campaigns demonstrated that 
pattern of usage increases and declines in waves, making repeated enforcement efforts 
vital (Nichols et al, 2014, p. 641). 
According to Tison and Williams, Canada was at the forefront of the offense on 
seatbelt use. A number of provinces including British Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario 
launched campaigns with varied programs, and ―they all had the same core 
components: increased publicity about the importance of using seat belts, greatly 
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increased law enforcement, and publicity aimed at heightened visibility and awareness 
of the enforcement‖ (Tison & Williams, 2010, p.1). One of the earliest programs was held 
in Ottawa and consisted of four weeks of intense enforcement and additional police 
training. An example from Quebec saw ticketing increase three to four times. Meanwhile, 
Nova Scotia concentrated on nighttime enforcement and patrolling near drinking 
establishments (Nichols & Ledingham, 2008). Canadian campaigns were so successful 
in increasing seatbelt use that high visibility wave enforcement became synonymous 
with Canadian-style enforcement (Tison & Williams, 2010). Nichols and Ledingham 
pointed out that the American Click It or Ticket campaign was inspired by similar 
Canadian efforts (2008, p.21). 
Most importantly, a review of successful campaigns demonstrated that repeated 
waves of enforcement, primary legislation and sanctions, are vital in creating deterrence 
on the roads (Nichols et al, 2014). 
Lesson 4: Impaired Driving, Publicity & The Importance of Community Support 
 Drinking and driving is an issue older than the car itself. For instance, in 
1843 the New York Central Rail Road prohibited drunk employees to appear for duty, as 
the intoxicated railroad engineers created hazards on the road (Jacobs, 1998). Schmidt 
suggested that even forty years ago the issue was not even discussed, and drinking was 
viewed as a part of social and business norms (Schmidt, 2014, p.239). Drinking and 
driving was not at the forefront of public concern in the 1960s because of high rates of 
other crimes (Jacobs, 1989). In the 1970s, the issue gained prominent attention in the 
news and salience with the public. 
The most notable lesson learned from the struggle against impaired driving is the 
importance of community support and special risk interest groups. Without the lobbying 
efforts of Mothers Against Drunk Driving, the creation of progressive legislations, 
enforcement of stricter sanctions, and the growth of public outrage might have taken 
much longer (Schmidt, 2014). MADD was established in 1981 by Candice Lightner after 
her teenaged daughter was killed by Clarence Busch, a drunk driver with a record of six 
DWI convictions, resulting in two victims (Robyn, 1991). The organization had one clear 
goal: to prevent impaired driving. Starting in California, the US organization today has 
over 600 chapters worldwide (Alcohol Alert, 2014). 
The organization was successful for two reasons. First, it was based on a 
punitive ideology and not high moral grounds. One of the early functions of MADD 
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members was court monitoring. Schmidt suggested that before MADD‘s court watching 
crusade, impaired drivers often got away with a warning, probation, or a light fine (as 
opposed to mandatory jail sentence and progressive fines for repeat offenders) as 
prosecutors and judges were reluctant to sentence them (1989, p. xvi). Robyn cites a 
court case where a drunk driver, on his third DWI probation, killed a fifteen-year-old and 
was merely charged a $200 fine and a two-year probationary period, while a car thief 
was incarcerated for two years (1991, p.10). Court watchers brought pressure on the 
community. MADD‘s efforts resulted in The Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving 
(1982). The Commission enabled stricter enforcement of impaired driving, and financed 
both research and anti-impaired driving activities (Robyn, 1991, p. 13). 
Second, MADD created individual-as-collective trauma experiences where any 
driver can be both a perpetrator and a victim, and where impaired driving is about a 
single decision, not a history of criminality (Schmidt, 2014, p 248). 
Supported by MADD, The Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving was 
appointed by Ronald Reagan. The Commission made thirty-nine recommendations 
resulting in widespread anti-impaired driving improvements: a legal limit for alcohol in 
blood, sobriety tests (including breathalyzers), and media campaigns. Most notability, 
MADD helped establish an environment of deterrence and an expectation of punishment. 
For example, sobriety check-points served as a systematic and highly visible 
enforcement; unfortunately, they were not an efficient use of limited resources as only 
1% of all DWI charges was given out at a stop (Robyn, 1991, p.39). Alcohol warning 
labels and passive breath tests are among other achievements of MADD (Saltz et al, 
1995). 
Australia stands out as a country with one of the most progressive legislations 
and extremely successful risk communication campaign aimed at impaired driving. The 
BAC of 0.05 was introduced in the State of Victoria as early as 1976 and was adopted 
countrywide by 1994 (Beirness & Simpson, 2002, p. 54). Unlike Canada and the US, 
Australian road safety agencies chose random breath testing (RBT) and police 
checkpoints as the main measure to counter impaired driving (WHO, 2013, p.61). RBT is 
not allowed in Canada; a police officer is required to have a reasonable suspicion (clear 
signs of intoxication in driving behaviour) prior to stopping a vehicle for further 
investigation. Therefore, most drivers in Canada have never received a breath test; while 
three in ten of Australian drivers get to take the test every year (Aarson, 2014, p. 59). 
The high rate of RBT creates environment of deterrence on the roads (WHO, 2013). 
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ITARD reported that recently Australian road safety bodies have introduced random 
roadside drug testing in addition to alcohol (2013, p.60).  
Since the late 1960s, Canadian policy-makers chose the general deterrence 
model as a main way to combat impaired driving (Liban et al, 1986, p. 159). The 
deterrence model of road safety includes three main elements: legal threat, severe 
punishment, and media coverage. A correlational study conducted in British Columbia 
found that when the number of cars checked by police and media coverage increased, 
the number of alcohol-related accidents decreased (Mercer, 1985, p.469). However, a 
consistent number of roadblocks and stable level of enforcement in the absence of 
sufficient media coverage did not result in decreased number of impaired driving 
accidents (ibid, 1985). The study concluded that a media blitz was a mandatory element 
of successful deterrence for impaired drivers. Since 1977, BC police have organizes an 
annual roadblock strategy (CounterAttack) that aims to catch and punish impaired 
drivers (Ministry of Justice, 2014). The main idea behind the strategy is to inform the 
drivers that the impaired driving legislation is enforced and the penalties for breaking the 
law are tough.  
British Columbia is known for its ―most immediate and severe alcohol-related 
roadside administrate sanction‖ starting with a  BAC limit of 0.05% (Arason, 2014, p.57). 
The province is outstanding in that local policy makers did not follow the international 
BAC limit of 0.08% but used empirical research to guide their policy. The TIRF reported 
that at BAC as low as 0.02-0.04% clearly impairs driving abilities (2012, p.48). From 
1976, a year prior the CounterAttack campaign, to 2007 the number of deaths from 
impaired driving accidents reduced by 120 annually (ICBC, 2008). The sanctions 
currently in place are so strict that as many as 38,000 drivers a year receive road-side 
suspensions, and almost 10,000 get a 90-day administrative driving probation (ICBC, 
2008, p.2). Lastly, ICBC took additional steps to reduce the number of drunk drivers on 
the road by providing designated driver banners and education for event organizers. 
Lessons Learned 
 Three main lessons for risk communication can be learned from this 
discussion of road safety policy making: community support, highly visible enforcement, 
and sound legislation are all necessary for successful compliance. More importantly, the 
researchers of road safety named public communication campaigns as a key part of a 
―twin engine‖ approach (i.e. media and enforcement) (Tison & Williams, 2010, p.14). 
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The importance of the media as a part of high visibility enforcement is evident 
from its roles in the programs against impaired driving, seatbelt use, and speeding. For 
example, the prototype of the Click It or Ticket program in Elmira, New York used a 
week-long publicity event to promote upcoming enforcement and direct publicity 
paralleled the enforcement events (Willaims et al, 2000, p. 197). Paid and free media 
spots with newspapers, radio, signs, and TV were used as a part of the Elmira project. 
DeJong and Hingson suggested, ―mass media campaigns, primarily on television, 
have long been a central part of the US effort to prevent alcohol-related death‖ (1998, 
p.369). Most successful anti-drunk-driving campaigns included not fear-based, but 
positive behaviour messages. For example, Montana‘s campaign Most of Us 
emphasized the positive behaviours of the majority, thus disseminating accurate norms 
(Perkins et al, 2010, p. 868). The main aim of the campaign was to correct young drivers‘ 
perception of the prevalence of drunk driving in the United States using a high-intensity 
social marketing campaign and a positive message (i.e. 4 out of 5 don‘t drink and drive). 
The researchers concluded that the campaign was successful across the board; it 
increased the support for lowering BAC, decreased the percentage of self-reported 
drivers taking the wheel impaired, and increased the proportion of people who accurately 
perceived that the majority of Montana drivers does not drink and drive (Linkenbach & 
Perkins, 2005, p.1). Canada has been on the forefront of the road safety issues and 
currently provides the largest number of social marketing campaigns against drunk 
driving (Cismaru et al, 2009, p.305). Unfortunately, having an extremely successful 
enforcement history and tools to address the issue of distracted driving in BC is still 
lagging behind. 
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Chapter 2:  Distracted Driving and the Psycho-social Dynamics of Driving 
History of Traffic Safety Science  
 
Ralph Nader‘s book and his highly publicized court case, had significant 
implications for the development of road safety science. Road crashes were no longer 
just a problem of an individual ―nut behind the wheel‖ but also a responsibility of 
governmental, auto-industry and insurance organizations that had the ‗emerging risks‘ 
spotlight cast upon them. The need to address road safety concerns in this new 
framework of blame forced governments in the US and Canada to pass their first 
comprehensive vehicle safety regulations re-focusing policy makers on safety equipment 
like air bags, seatbelts and interior padding (Aarson, 2014). Thus out of private profit-
based actuarial studies of accidents  road safety research developed into a robust 
accident prevention and mitigation ‗safe system‘ science discussed by Johnson, Muir & 
Howard (2013). Thus a more comprehensive risk science grew out of this initial risk 
controversy. 
A complex multi-disciplinary research infrastructure has developed to address 
road safety concerns of the public. Organizations originally established to address 
specific issues (ex. impaired driving, driver education) subsequently transformed into 
research institutes with risk communication mandates. In Canada, the Traffic Injury 
Research Foundation (TIRF) was established in 1964 becoming the first independent 
Canadian road safety research institute. The organization is funded by research grants, 
donations and public funds. TIRF is not affiliated with any governmental ministry and is 
governed by a board of directors comprised by public and business representatives. 
Initially, TIRF‘s mandate was to address the issue of impaired driving, though the 
organization‘s expertise expanded to include aggressive driving, protection of vulnerable 
road users, anti-distraction and anti-fatigue research. Today TIRF conducts and 
disseminates high-quality scientific research on key issues on road safety (TIRF, 2013). 
The Canadian Council of Motor Transportation Administration (CCMTA) is the non-profit 
organization that ensures communication between various levels of governance on 
issues of road safety. The CCMTA operates through collective and consultative 
processes; the organization also accumulates expertise of independent bodies. Most 
importantly, CCMTA maintains communication network for government, expert and 
business representatives interested in road safety. Along the lines of research, the 
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CCMTA develops strategic, nationwide safety-promoting programs such as the Road 
Safety Strategy 2015 (CCMTA, 2013). Currently, these organizations not only conduct 
research, but are in charge of public outreach and lobbying for various road safety 
issues. 
The Automobile Association of America (AAA) Foundation for Traffic Safety was 
founded in 1947.The Foundation is an industry wide non-profit advocacy organization 
which is based in Washington, DC. Initially established as a body for driver education, 
over time the organization expanded its mandate to include diverse functions related to 
the road safety including research and public advocacy. Currently the Foundation 
identifies road safety concerns, conducts independent research and analysis, creates 
strategies for addressing road safety issues and disseminate educational materials. The 
Foundation spotlights road safety issues, conducts research, and seeks solutions to 
raising issues related to the promotion of safety (AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 
2013). 
In the US, the Governors Highway Safety Administration (GHSA), a non-profit 
research body, was established in 1966 to coordinate state based collation of research 
into traffic safety. The organization has played a key role in ensuring collaboration 
between federal, state and local governments on issues regarding road safety. The 
GHSA continues to allocate research grants and conducts research on issues of road 
safety in the US (GHSA, 2013). The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) has similarly operated under the US Department of Transportation since 1970 
as a clearing house for road safety research. The NHTSA is responsible for ―reducing 
deaths, injuries and economic losses‖ on the roads as well as for researching traffic 
safety and ensuring road safety improvements (NHTSA, 2013). By the 1990s, traffic 
safety sciences were well established in the public policy arena guiding, implementing 
and regulating car safety technologies and educating the public about seatbelts, speed 
limits and impaired driving policies. Together the aforementioned organizations provided 
a panoply of research initiatives spearheading the collection of systematic empirical 
evidence about behavioral issues, driver error, road traffic patterns and car design.  
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Developing Scientific Focus: Early Research into Cell Phones and Driving 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of Cellphone Subscribers in Canada, 1986 - 2010 
Despite this attention, the mobile phone did not at first draw the attention of these 
organizations despite the fact that mobile phones and automobiles were inseparable, as 
cell phones were not transportable otherwise (Kalba, 2008). Yet the early cell phone 
technology was used exclusively by businessman and small businesses (Agar, 2004). 
But during the 1990s the technology changed.  By 1997 ―a prospective adopter no 
longer needed a car to use a mobile handset‖ (Kalba, 2008). Subsequent changes in the 
technology which followed not only broadened the base of users, but also diversified the 
users. With falling prices younger people began to use the phone as well as adults 
generally – often justified as a safety feature when teenagers went out on dates in the 
car. The figure above demonstrates the extent of the exponential growth of cell phone 
subscribers in Canada. Starting from just 42,000 subscribers in 1985, users skyrocketed 
to over 8 million at the start of the millennium tripling to a over 24,5 million of users in 
2010 (CWTA, 2014). 
Since its rise the cell phone has ceased to be a simple object of consumption. 
The idea that the cell phone has become ingrained in the cultural fabric of our society is 
extensively discussed in communication literature and is probably best summarized by 
Sherry Turkle (2011) in her book Along Together. Turkle suggests that as a society we 
are obsessed with connectivity; cell phone, and especially text messaging, became a 
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link of choice. Turkle traces stories of cell phone separation anxieties, frustration of 
constant connectivity and our inability to re-imagine the world without our electronic 
devices. Cell phone-obsessed culture is probably best summarized by one of Turkle‘s 
respondents who claimed that ―I live my life on my BlackBerry‖ (2011, p.8). Cell phones 
indeed became inseparable from work, leisure, study entertainment, and even 
relationships. 
Today 99% of Canada is covered by wireless carriers and more than 83% of the 
household are register as cell-phone owning (CWTR, 2014). Thirty four billion dollars 
were invested on the development of mobile services infrastructure since 1985. Owning 
a phone crosses the age spectrum, with under 30s high intensity users.  Indeed, in 2013 
21% of all households were mobile only, this is 8 percent increase from 2010 (Statistics 
Canada, 2014).  
In 1997 two researchers published one of the earliest and best recognized 
studies of cell phone distraction while driving. The study conducted by Donald Tibshirani 
and Robert Redelmeier in Toronto in 1997 caused an outburst of public attention to 
distracted driving. The researchers used epidemiological method to study 699 cell-phone 
using drivers who were involved in motor vehicle collisions. The study lasted for 14 
month and included analysis of 26, 798 cell phone calls. The study is highly regarded 
became of its cross-over design. Cross-over design allows a to match and directly 
compare time-periods of the day of collision and an identical time period a day prior to 
collision; therefore the analysis would identify an increase in risk associated with the 
phone keeping all the other variables constant (Tibshirani and Redelmeier, 1997, p. 454). 
The study matched time of the crash by using call-phone billing records with police 
reports. The researchers found a four-fold increase in relative risks associated with cell 
phone use. The study was so highly-profiled in the media that four years later the 
researchers were forced to publish a commentary on their work. In their commentary the 
authors reported that following the publication of the research each of the authors 
participated in up to 50 media interviews weekly. 
 Despite being conducted in 1997, when cell phone distribution in Canada was at 
about 35%, Tibshirani and Redelmeier's findings (a quadrupled risk of crash associated 
with cell phone use) are still the most cited distraction effect in the field (McCartt et al, 
2010, p.133). McCartt and colleagues attribute this to the high scientific standards 
established by this epidemiological approach. In the follow up letter the authors stated 
that while they feel obliged to communicate their findings to the general public they ―[…] 
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are not activists on a public crusade. […] are not lobbyist with a mission‖ (Redeleier & 
Tibshirani, 2001, p. 1581). This statement was caused by misuses and 
misunderstanding of their findings; these misunderstandings were mostly caused by 
audiences inability to grasp the difference between relative and an absolute risk. 
 
The Accidental Sciences 
 
Based on this evidence other agencies began to ask about cell phone use in their 
nationwide surveys and accident attribution studies. In the US, the Motor Vehicle 
Occupant Safety Survey first conducted in 1944, and continues to be administered by 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The survey of 12, 000 Americans 
randomly selected from a nation-wide sample has undergone changes in both topics of 
research and method of delivery (NHTSA, 2013). The survey began to include cell 
phone use in 2000, after two epidemiological studies published in late 1990s estimated 
that 11% of all fatal and up to 30% of injury crashes were attributed to distraction (Utter, 
2001, p.1). 
Some cell phone researchers therefore began focusing on driver errors leading 
to accidents. One of the leading contributors to research on distracted driving is the 
Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI), a non-profit industry organization (funded by auto-
insurers) that conducts studies on collisions, road safety, and crash avoidance among 
other research areas. The institute is an affiliate of the Insurance Institute for Highway 
Safety (IIHS). Its mission is to be a scientific and educational body that also conducts 
comprehensive research by collecting crash data from multiple insurance firms that 
overall process 80% of all collision data in the US (HLDI, 2013). One of the specific 
areas of the IIHS research is human factors (i.e. alcohol, fatigue, distraction influenced 
drivers) in road collisions (IIHS, 2013). Some researchers claim that, despite their 
affiliation, the two aforementioned organizations have the best crash data available to 
researchers (Lafleur, 2012, p.3).  
Approaches to Research 
 
The 21st century saw a surge in insurance data studies, crash-reports analysis, 
attitudinal and behavioral surveys, naturalistic and simulator studies, and on-road 
observations forging accident science into a multi-disciplinary approach forging accident 
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science into a multi-disciplinary approach. The international research community has 
approached the problem of distracted driving from multiple angles using different 
research approaches highlighting various dimensions of distracted driving from risk 
perception, to frequency of phone use, to mitigation strategies, to distracted driver 
profiling. The following section aims to overview the research designs used by the 
various researchers to shed light on the problem of distracted driving. Each sub-section 
will describe an individual research method, evaluate its relative validity, highlight 
limitations, and outline consensus in the findings. Clearly, it is only in their combination 
that the role of divided attention while driving became appreciated as a complex problem. 
Surveys 
In studies of drivers‘ distraction surveys are particularly useful. There are two 
types of surveys used: observational surveys of drivers‘ behaviours and self-reported 
risk taking surveys. Observational surveys are unobtrusive roadside observations 
conducted by trained observers. Observations are conducted discretely; hence drivers 
are not likely to change the behavior as a result of being observed (Ranney, 2008, p.4). 
Simpson pointed out that observational roadside surveys are most valuable because 
they allow for direct collection of rich data from a real life environment (2005, p.4). 
As with regular surveys, longitudinal observational surveys are particularly 
beneficial since they are conducted annually, on a large scale, using standardized 
procedures. These conditions assure comparability of results from different years. For 
example, in the US, the NHTSA conducts National Occupants Protection Use Surveys 
(NOPUS) that investigate frequency of seat belt, helmets, child restraint, and cell phone 
use (NHTSA, 2013). NOPUS is conducted annually nationwide to monitor and 
investigate patterns of cell phone use by time of the day, road types, vehicle category, 
race, age, gender, and other identifying characteristics (NHTSA, 2010, p.6). The survey 
began to include observation of electronic device use (i.e. ―hand held cell phone‖) in 
2000. In 2004 the survey was expanded to include a new category (―using headset‖) to 
register drivers using hands-free devices. In 2005 a new category ―visual manipulating a 
hand-held device‖ was added to better capture distractive activates beyond cell phone 
calls, such as video games, GPS locators and texting (Pickrell, 2010, p.3). The results 
are generalizable from complex multi-stage probability samples to the general population 
(NHTSA, 2010, p.2). The results have mapped the increasing use of cell phones by 
drivers in the US. 
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 In Canada, similar information is gathered supplementary to other road 
safety information through the National Occupant Restraint Program. Trained observers 
collect information on over 250 sites annually on both rural and urban roads across all 
provinces and territories (Burns et al, 2008, p.3). First available data on cell phones use 
is dated back to 2006. However, classification categories for electronic devices remain 
unclear. In 2009-2010 an observational survey of young drivers in three provinces 
(British Columbia, Ontario, Nova Scotia) in Canada was conducted. The researchers 
found that at last 16% of young drivers were somehow distracted. While listening to 
music (54%) was the first on the list of secondary takes performed by the drivers, the cell 
phone use followed close second (44%). Vancouver, BC had the highest proportion of 
cell phone using drivers; 76% of observed youngsters were using their electronic 
devices at the moment of observation (Pike & Macpherson, 2011, slide 11). 
The data collected by the most recent NOPUS indicates that in 2010 at least 5% 
of American drivers used hand-held devices and another 4% of drivers used their 
headsets. The survey also found that the prevalence of cell phone use was the highest 
in ―16 to 24‖ age group and decreased with age. Additionally, the percentage of drivers 
registered visually manipulating an electronic device increased significantly from 0.6% in 
2009 to 0.9% in 2010 (NHTSA, 2010, p.2). Canadian observational data indicate that as 
of 2013 percentage of drivers observed using their cell phones felt from 5.9% in 2010 to 
3.3% (IRTAD, 2013, p. 107). 
The advantage of observational surveys are that they tent to be relatively cheap, 
easy to execute, use a greatly desired random sampling procedure, and reach a diverse 
audience. According to Simpson, surveys are efficient in obtaining estimates of 
prevalence of certain behaviors (2005, p.4). McCartt and colleagues pointed out that 
surveys not only help to build a profile of typical cell phone user, but also allow a search 
for patterns in phone use (McCartt et al, 2006, p.90). Unfortunately, observational 
studies‘ power is limited. They are only able to capture a snapshot in time. Observational 
surveys are unable to provide data on duration or frequency of distraction or to evaluate 
the likelihood of getting into an accident with the occurrence of a competing activity 
(McEvoy & Stevenson, 2009, p.76). Moreover, to the author‘s knowledge only one 
observational study was conducted during nighttime, therefore, if there is a difference in 
cell phone use between dark and light hours, most observational findings would be non-
generalizable.  
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Additionally, observational surveys are likely to underestimate prevalence of cell 
phone use due to observational difficulties. For example, a person who just placed a call, 
but is not currently talking, will not be recorded; so won't a driver who at the moment of 
observation was listening to the other party; or a driver whose headset is obscured by 
hair. On the opposite side, some of the drivers will be coded as talking on their cell 
phone, while in reality she was interacting with the voice activated in-vehicle system or 
conversing with a passenger (NHTSA, 2010). Lastly, naturalistic observations are 
usually conducted during light hours, on safe stops, on roads with lower speed limits and 
provide no information on distractions on highways or complex intersections (Regan & 
Lee, 2009, p.322) 
 
Surveys II: Public Perception of the Risks 
 
Both the United States and Canada also conduct annual statewide surveys of 
drivers to explore drivers‘ driving practices, attitudes towards road safety, and perception 
of policy priorities. In Canada, the major survey, titled The Road Safety Monitor has 
been conducted annually by Traffic Injury Research Foundation since 2001. Every year 
the survey reaches about 1, 200 Canadians (Beirness, 2005, slide 9). The Road Safety 
Monitor probes drivers‘ views on a variety of driving-related issues and attitudes, 
behavior, knowledge, and opinion (TIRF, 2013). Importantly, anonymity of surveys 
permits respondents to talk about potentially illegal behaviors without fear of 
repercussions. Surveys probe into drivers' own perception of their behavior that is 
otherwise periodic, brief, and hard to capture (McEvoy & Stevenson, 2009, p.73). 
In North America gathering of comprehensive information on risk perception by 
the general public and on self-reported trends of drivers‘ cell phone use in cars began in 
the mid- 2000s. These surveys included the Traffic Safety Culture Index in the US and 
the Road Safety Monitor in Canada. Both surveys use probabilistic samples, are 
conducted annually, reach their participants online or via phone and are concerned with 
self-reported data. The surveys aim to evaluate risk perception, driver attitudes, priorities, 
and risk-taking behaviors on the roads. The first set of questions regarding distraction 
was included in survey in the US in 2008 when as the researchers suggested ―driver cell 
phone use has become emblematic of driver distraction—or arguably even of traffic 
safety— in the eyes of the public‖ (AAA Foundation, 2008, p.3). In Canada first survey 
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that included a section on the perceived risks associated with distraction was conducted 
in 2006 (TIRF, 2007).  
Risk Perception  
 
The American Traffic Culture Survey is a nation-wide, representative phone 
survey that evaluates drivers' and non-drivers' perceptions and attitudes toward road 
safety. Data from the 2009 survey suggests that 34% of drivers felt less safe on the 
roads than 5 years before, and 31% of these drivers cited distracted driving as their main 
reason of feeling less safe (AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 2009, p.3). The survey 
concludes that, while the American public recognizes traffic safety as an important issue, 
―traffic safety tends to lag behind many other issues and priorities‖ (AAA Foundation for 
Traffic Safety, 2009, p.3). With regards to texting, the survey found that while ―most 
people view text messaging and emailing while driving as a very serious thereat to their 
own personal safety and consider it completely unacceptable‖, many drivers do not 
perceive these behaviors as condoned by others (AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 
2009, p.5). Interestingly, while 82% of respondents believe that texting makes them 
more likely to be involved in a crash, and 90% confirm that texting is a very serious 
threat to their safety, only a little over half of respondents consider texting unacceptable 
on the roads (AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 2009, p.6).  
With regards to phoning, the same survey finds that there is a moderate level of 
social disapproval towards conversations on hand-held devices, but hands-free devices 
are widely accepted. 67% of respondents admit to talking on their cell phone while 
driving, while half of respondents also believe that talking on a cell phone makes them 
prone to getting into an accident (AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 2009, p.6). Less 
than one in three believes that any kind of cell phone communication is unacceptable 
(AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 2009, p.7). Overall, while drivers believe that talking 
on a cell phone and/or texting makes them a more dangerous driver, and recognize 
moderate disapproval from others, only 46% of respondents support laws against cell 
phone usage while driving (AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 2009, p.11). Similarly, 
Cosgrove and colleagues find that 8 in 10 drivers support an idea that social norms are 
shifting towards finding driving while on the cell phone unacceptable (2010, p.11). 
A more recent study found that 84% of drivers are aware that their driving 
performance decreases when they are on a phone (Young & Lenné, 2010, p.329). They 
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notice that they drive less safely, miss hazards, stop signs, and turns, they react slower 
and change following distance regarding other cars. Indeed, a study by the TIRF found 
that by 2010 texting and driving is the most important road safety issue for the Canadian 
public (2010, p.37). 
An interesting study by Lerner & Boyd reveals that drivers show ―little reluctance 
to engage in most cell phone activities in any situation‖ (2005, p.1-1). The study probed 
willingness to engage with a cell phone under different conditions, from simple driving 
tasks to situations with enhanced dangers such as making a U-turn, driving with 
passengers or small children, and night conditions. Drivers were even more willing to 
engage in risky behaviors when stooped at a red light (Lerner & Boyd, 205, p.3-1). 
However, not everyone in the field agrees with the aforementioned findings. Young and 
Lenné find that studied drivers report not engaging in cell phone conversations while 
driving in poor weather conditions, school zones, and heavy traffic, as well as on windy 
and unfamiliar roads (2010, p.331). Generally, researchers are shocked by the ―lack of 
appreciation of the risk associated with basic cell phone tasks‖ (Lerner & Boyd, 2005, 
p.4-11).  
Distracted Driving & Public Agenda 
While being a leading cause of death, road crashes are clearly underappreciated 
both by the government and the general public. Most road safety scholars agree that 
road safety issues are currently not prioritized adequately, therefore it doesn‘t receive 
necessary funding nor attention and is grossly underestimated (Roberts, Mohan & 
Abbasi, 2002, p. 1107). Johnson and colleagues suggested that even expenditures on 
dental research exceed that of road safety research. The researchers citied a ratio of 
spending of 36:1 on HIV/AIDS to the road safety issues; cancer research received four 
times the funding of road safety (Johnston, Muir & Howard, 2013, p.3). Arason argued 
that with the current number of deaths on the road would be tolerated if attributed to any 
public health issue would be tolerated (2014). Yet the estimates of what is actually going 
down on the roads and how big the risks are seemed contradictory depending on 
location age and methodology.  
As with any research problem, surveys have limited explanatory power in the 
realm of distracted driving. McEvoy & Stevenson pinpointed a few important limitations 
such as self-reporting bias, low response rates, and pressure of social desirability (as 
cited in Young et al, 2009, p.75). The random sampling procedure is often skewed by 
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non-random self-selection participation patterns. A potential issue with self-selection is 
that those drivers who are involved in illegal manipulation with electronic devices are 
more likely to decline participation. Non-respondent bias again skews data towards 
underestimation of the problem (Simpson, 2005, p.4). Lennè & Young pointed out that 
some studies falsely generalize findings to the population from a qualitatively different 
sample (such as undergraduate students) (2010, p.331) 
A rephrased popular saying, ―A dull pencil is better than the sharpest memory‖ is 
ostensibly relevant to the researchers of distracted drivers. Human memory is fallible. It 
is highly unlikely that survey respondents keep track of their actual distraction patterns, 
therefore, when it comes to estimation of cell phone use, researchers are faced with 
problems of recall, as well as issues with over- and under-estimation (Beirness, 2005, 
slide 5). Lastly, surveys are very vulnerable to poor conceptualization, weak 
operationalization and deficient question design (McCartt, 2006, p.90).  
Yet longitudinal data, even if it is a ―dull pencil‖, can also provide a sense of 
changing behavior as cell phones diffused rapidly throughout North American 
populations. As far as prevalence of use statistics are concerned, in 1997 only 35% of 
Canadians owned a cell phone (CWTR, 2014). That year 16% of all drivers used their 
cell phones behind the wheel (Beirness, 2005, slide 13). In 2011, cell phone penetration 
reached 80% Canada-wide and self-reported survey data indicate that 36.3% of people 
use their phones while driving (Marcoux et al, 2012, p.2). The graph below (TIRF, 2011, 
p.2) presents a rising trend of cell phone use while driving since 2001 (4 years after 
mobile phones became portable). TIRF Road Safety Monitor report indicated that there 
is no evidence of reversed trend to date. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Respondents Using a Cell Phone while Driving by Year 
 
Naturalistic and On-track Studies 
Naturalistic studies on effects of distraction are conducted using instrumented 
vehicles. Automobiles get equipped with multiple cameras and driving parameter 
measuring technologies prior the beginning of a study (McCartt, et al, 2010, p.134). 
Naturalistic studies have the best absolute and external validity (Simpson, 2005, p.10). 
They allow researchers to generalize findings to real everyday driving scenarios. 
Naturalistic studies allow collection of real world rich data. Naturalistic studies allow 
continuity of data by ―record [ing] behavior of drivers engaged in everyday driving over 
an extended period of time‖ (McCartt et al, 2006, p.90). While naturalistic data are not 
biased by self-reporting, purposive sampling might potentially influence findings (NHTSA, 
2009, p.3).  
To date, the most recognized naturalistic research is The 100-Car Naturalistic 
Driving Study completed in 2010. The study was conducted under auspices of NHTSA. 
The main purpose of the study was to understand factors contributing to crashes in 
naturalistic conditions. The researchers collected data for a little over a year with 
specially equipped vehicles (five unobtrusive cameras and kinesthetic sensors in each) 
collecting 43,000 hours of data. The main value of the study is detailed behavior of 
drivers captured by video recording, naturalistic environment and the multiplicity of risk-
taking behaviours captured. The study captured 69 crashes, 761 near-crashes and 8, 
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295 incidents in duration of a year. The study found that cell phones are by far the most 
frequently performed secondary task performed prior to the crash, near-crash and 
incident with almost 700 occurrences. The second most popular distraction is 
passenger-related activities with a little less than 400 cases. Interestingly, cell phone use 
did not contribute to any lead vehicle conflict crashes, but manifested in following vehicle 
conflict, running off the road and single vehicle accidents (Neale et al, 2010, p. 9). In 
such cases accidents are more likely to cause injury and property damage rather than 
fatalities. Due to the huge amount of data generated by the study as well as time and 
financial constraints raw data would be posted for researchers to draw their own 
conclusions for the variables of their interest. Data is currently collected in Canada; the 
study is set in Saskatchewan and is expected by completed in 2015 (Arason, 2014). 
The main value of studies similar to 100-car study is that they allow studying 
configuration of crashes, calculating time for glances off of the road and estimating 
precisely drivers‘ reaction time. For example, one of the earlier studies estimated an 
approximate duration of glances of the road and concluded that 88% of all glances away 
are less than 1.6 seconds (Ducik et al, 2005). Precise time measurements allow to 
classify difficulty of various types of distraction (Kircher, 2008)  
Despite multiple benefits, naturalistic studies have inevitable faults. Collection 
and reduction of naturalistic data are very expensive and time-consuming. Naturalistic 
studies collect a very large volume of data that is hard to store, process, and analyze 
(Young et al, 2009, p.87). A naturalistic environment does not allow for control of 
compounding factors, sometimes making comparison impossible. McEvoy and 
Stevenson also point out that naturalistic studies usually use small, non-representative 
samples of volunteers and do not have a capacity to measure proxies such as ―a level of 
attention‖ (2008, p.81).  
 
Insurance Data & Crash Data Reports Studies 
 
Crash and insurance data are used to make sense of real life accidents using 
information from accident protocols and other statistics gathered in the reporting of 
accidents (Svenson & Patten, 2005, p.191). Insurance and crash data are gathered 
post-factum and often derived from narratives of police reports (NHTSA, 2009 p.2). 
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Insurance data are used because insurance claims outnumber police reports in ratio of 5 
to 1 since not all crashes involve presence of police (Wilson et al, 2004, p.28).  
This type of data are usually accurate with respect to time and damage done in 
the accident (Simpson, 2005, p.9), but might be imprecise since it can be potentially 
skewed by self-reporting (NHTSA, 2009, p.2). The presence of official reports permits 
random sampling of the crash cases, as well as comparison of compounding factors 
(Kircher, 2007, p.30). Additionally, recorded population parameters allow for analysis of 
different demographics (HLDI, 2010, p.9).  
While insurance and crash data have a great potential for providing researchers 
with the most accurate and rich information, the quality of data currently collected does 
not withstand rigorous empirical demands (Stutt, 2005, slide 6). For example, crash data 
revolves around the event of a crash itself, but neglects events immediately preceding 
the crash (Lee et al, 2009, p.36).  
According to NHTSA data reporting procedures are not consistent across 
jurisdictions and are often based on a narrative. Since reports are narrative-based, the 
presence of distraction is hard to confirm considering that drivers are not likely to report 
illegal behaviors, such as texting while driving (NHTSA, 2009, p.2). Additionally, even if 
police reports guarantee consistency of reporting in a given jurisdiction, these reports 
are biased towards distractions that are not illegal (Gordon, 2009, p.293). As with all 
secondary data, police reports do not have all information necessary, such as exposure 
data, to calculate additional risks associated with different types of distractions (Simpson. 
2005, p.6). 
Police reports do not tend to distinguish between different types of distraction. 
Therefore, accurate investigation into distractive crash-triggering is not possible (HLDI, 
2010, p.9). For example, while unlikely, it is possible that phone use by a driver 
decreases while other sources of distraction rapidly increase (HLDI, 2010, p.9). 
Jacobson and colleges raise a similar point in their study, stating that overall accident 
rates data tend to be used for estimation of cell phone distraction. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of laws regarding distracted driving might be overestimated (Jacobson et 
al, 20102, p. 1591). Additionally, Regan et al point out that ―technological change 
introduces new distractions at great rate and makes crash data lagging and inefficient 
indictor of the distraction problem‖ (2009, p.622). 
Police, hospital, and insurance data have a great potential for uncovering 
information regarding crashes attributed to distracted driving. Currently, police data are 
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biased towards specific types of crashes and do not report enough information on 
severity of injuries (IRTAD, p.8). Hospital data are hard to access and do not have 
reporting standardization needed for comparisons (IRTAD, p.15). Insurance data are 
also hard to access and interpret (IRTAD, p.50). Combining the three different sources 
of data might provide a better picture with information about the driver, vehicle damage, 
risk factors, and crash causes. The hardest part is to establish linkages and gain access 
to the three differed types of data. In order for that be achieved, manual, probabilistic, 
and deterministic methods of data matching need to be perfected (IRTAD, p.50).  
In British Columbia Traffic Accident System (TAS) is used for collisions reporting 
and is available online at http://www.injuryresearch.bc.ca/?idot=traffic-accident-system-
tas-data-tool. The data for TAS is obtained from the Insurance Corporation of British 
Columbia and police reports. TAS provides information on factors contributing to 
collision as well as general information of the accidents (i.e. collision type, speed zone, 
vehicle information, severity of injury). Until 2007 BC‘s law enforcement units were 
required to attend every crash scene. However, this policy was abandoned in 2008. 
Therefore, the data available in TAS information system after 2008 might not always be 
representative of the actual number of injury and accidents (BC Injury Research and 
Prevention Unit, 2014). Additionally, as of August 2014 TAS only contains injury data up 
to 2007.  
The graph below demonstrates a number of injuries attributed to three major 
injury-contributing factors: drinking, speeding and distraction from 2004 (when 
information on distraction was first collected) to 2007. From the data presented it is clear 
that distraction claims twice as many injuries as speeding and three times that of 
impaired driving. Distraction is indeed leading cause on injuries in BC. 
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Figure 3: Number of Injured in Crashes by Contributing Factors & Years 
 
Additionally the graph demonstrates decreasing number of accidents attributed to 
speeding and drinking from 2004 to 2007; yet the accidents attributed to distraction stay 
the same in 2005 and 2006 and decrease only slightly by 2007. Indeed, ICBC‘s most 
recent report suggests that death from speeding, drinking and non-use of seatbelts as 
well as the total number of accidents are going down (2012). Death count attributed to 
distraction is also on a decline yet as a proportion of all accidents the fraction of crashes 
attributed to distraction is growing (ICBC, 2012).  
In Canada, very few jurisdictions include a driver‘s distraction checkbox in the 
police reports, or else distraction is classified under a general category of inattention 
(Robertson et al, 2010, p.20). Since the crash data are primarily collected for different 
purposes, they yield no baseline for comparison and does not provide the frequency of 
distraction occurrences (Kircher, 2007, p.30). 
Simulators 
Driving simulators are by far the most popular approach to studying the effects of 
distraction on driving. Simulators vary in their design, costs, and measuring attributes 
(McCartt et al, 206, p.90). To date, a number of studies have tried to establish 
differences between distraction indicators obtained from simulators and real world 
driving situations. Young and colleagues point out that studies that examine driving 
simulators generally found them to be poor in absolute validity (completely identical 
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measurements with actual vehicles), but high in relative validity (similar magnitude and 
direction of effects). Reed & Green concluded, as early as 1999, that while the values of 
the performance measures might be different between real world and simulator studies, 
identical direction of effects make them comparable (p.1017). Young et al state that 
relative validity of driving simulators have been well demonstrated (2009, p. 291). Driving 
simulators have been improving rapidly and the more costly simulators with moving 
bases and synchronized 3D sound reaches very high sensitivity that allows to measure 
effects of distraction on driving performance, even when the effects are small (Young et 
al, 2009, p.87).Driving simulators originated as a means to test road design, vehicle 
interfaces, and influence of various human factors on driving. Distracted driving research 
distinguishes simulators by their fidelity. The higher a simulator‘s fidelity, the more it is 
able to respond as a real life vehicle. High-fidelity simulators are able to provide higher 
levels of environmental, objective, equipment, and perceptual validities that result in a 
more authentic reproduction of the world, better synchronization and haptic response, 
and general believability of the driving scenario (Young et al, 2009, p. 89). Simulators 
with the highest fidelity will use advanced computer graphics for visual display, 3D sound, 
moving base, and synchronous interaction between suspension and steering system 
(Reed & Green, 1999, p. 1016). Due to their moving base and high resolution, high-
fidelity simulators will be able to provide haptic and motion feedback to drivers, making 
the experience life-like (Young et all, 2009, p. 91). High-fidelity simulators will often be 
integrated into a body in a real car advancing the naturalism of the experience. 
Simulators with lower fidelity use a fixed base and less advanced audio and 
visual systems. However, the range of low-fidelity stimulators is vast from a 
monochrome image of only road-marks to a PC with joystick to a combination of multiple 
screens with a life-like response system. Overall, low-fidelity stimulators are less precise 
in terms of lane-keeping and speed control. The sensitivity of the measures is 
diminished but the lack of motion cues from the fixed-base (Reed & Green, 1999, 
p.1016). Being less realistic, low-fidelity simulators are also more likely to exaggerate the 
effects of distraction since the absence of immediate haptic clues makes a higher 
demand on the driver causing them to react more pronouncedly (Young at al, 2009, p. 
94). 
Simulators have a lot of advantages in studies of distracted driving. Simulator 
studies are a safe, ethical alternative to the on-road experiments. Simulators made 
possible studies of such distractions as texting, drinking, and medical conditions, or 
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workload that otherwise might have not been possible due to the extremely hazardous 
nature (Reed & Green, 1999, p.1016). 
 Simulators allow control over compounding factors; hence multiple conditions 
might be separately or simultaneously applied in a distraction study. The ability to control 
compounding factors permits the evaluation of other contributors, including weather, 
road design, and nighttime, and how they influence, exacerbate, or mitigate the effects 
of distracted driving (Simpson, 2005, p.10). Simulator studies subject all participants to 
the same conditions, making research outcomes comparable (Kircher, 2007, p.15). 
Simulators are cost-efficient since, while they do need to be realistic, they do not need to 
be road-worthy possible (Reed & Green, 1999, p.1016). Additionally, simulators allow for 
multiple indicators to be measured simultaneously, thus collecting rich data. 
Interestingly, comparison results of low- and high-fidelity simulators are 
consistent in concluding that the two types of simulators demonstrate almost no 
difference (Reeds & Green, 1999, p.1027). Young and colleagues conclude that ―the 
low-fidelity simulators offer a similar level of sensitivity and validity as high-fidelity 
simulators for evaluating the effects of secondary task on driving performance‖ (2009, 
p.94). Therefore, cheaper simulators can be used without a significant sacrifice in 
sensitivity measures. The only major difference found between low- and high-fidelity 
simulators is the effects of visuals on steering angle (Young et al, 2009, p.91). Both 
types of simulators demonstrate good relative validity and poor absolute validity, making 
lane-keeping measures less precise compared to an on-road naturalistic study (Reed & 
Green, 2009, p.19). In 1999, Reed & Green hope that the realism of simulators will be 
further improving and will include such effects as gusts or realistic vehicle noises.   
Despite being cost-efficient, relatively cheap, and safe, simulators are prone to 
vulnerabilities by their physical design. Reponses characteristics and realism are 
inevitably affected on simulators (Reed & Green, 1999, p.19). Kircher and colleagues 
suggest that the lack of motion cues and artificial environment might also affect driving 
behavior (2007, p.327). The safe environment created by simulators skews findings of 
distraction effects by allowing drivers multiple mistakes without punishing them for 
carelessness (Reed & Green, 1999, p.1032). Therefore, in simulator studies, steering 
behavior is exaggerated by high error tolerance (Young et al, 2009, p.93).  
McCartt and colleagues also point out that modification of behavior due to a 
presence of an experimenter and learning effects are rarely accounted for (2006, p.92). 
Kircher points out that, unlike real life, distraction is induced artificially at specific time-
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points leading to a decreased ecological validity (Kircher, 2007, p.15). Artificial 
conversations are additionally unrealistic, have unnatural flow or recall exercises, and 
have little emotional content (McCartt et al, 2006, p. 92). Ranney points out that 
simulator studies do not ―provide direct information about the real-world risk of a given 
secondary task, only the level of primary (driving) task degradation when performed in a 
given setting‖ (2008, p.5). Most importantly, the researcher community suffers from a 
lack of standardized methods and operational clarity. These factors prohibit comparison 
across the studies and make replication of results almost impossible (McCartt et al, 2006, 
p.92).  
 
Eye-gaze Studies and Lane-change Tests 
Eye-gaze studies and lane-change tests are the newest approaches for 
evaluating an impact of a distraction on driving performance made possible by recent 
development of technologies. Eye-gaze studies evaluate frequency and duration of 
gazes off the road towards various objects, as well as dwelling and transition times. 
Scientists were recently enabled to conduct eye-gaze studies by automated eye-tracking 
devices. Prior, such studies were hard to conduct as data collection and analysis were 
done manually. Technology nullified the need of expert data reductionists and shorten 
the time needed for experiments (Kircher, 2007, p.5).  
The lane-change test (LCT) helps to quantify drivers‘ performance degradation 
by combining the reaction time paradigm with simulation approach. The task is simple, 
under the condition of a single- or dual-task, a driver is required to make lane changes 
following the signs indicating lane-number along the roadway (Mattes & Hallen, 2009, 
p.121). Quantified degradation of driving performance is used to compare various driving 
activities to each other. At this point, the LCT is in its nascent state of development 
(Mattes & Hallen, 2009) 
Ablaßmeier and colleagues suggest that gaze studies are a valid measure of the 
visual demands associated with secondary tasks (2007, p.2251). Indeed, the 
International Organization for Standardization (IOS) created guidelines for in-vehicle 
device manufactures using glance-length analysis. Kircher finds that most glances are 
under 2 seconds long and take on average 0.7 to 1.0 seconds. The IOS recommends 
devices that allow users to perform a task under 15 seconds with glances away for no 
longer than 2 seconds each (2007). Current research suggests that repeated shorter 
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glances away have graver degrading effect on drivers‘ performance than a single glance 
of the same duration (Kircher, 2007, p.5). Kircher concludes that: ―by looking back on the 
road briefly between glances away from the road, the driver cannot fully update his 
mental image of the situation enough in order to be fully back in the loop‖ (2007, p.41). 
 
Attention to the Road 
  
Driving is an attention-demanding task (National Safety Council, 2010, p.10). 
Operating under this assumption, researchers found that that drivers distracted by cell 
phones commit more traffic violations compared to those who are not distracted (Beede 
& Kass, 2005, p.418). An early study used incidental memory as a proxy to measure 
attention, because attention is required for creating long-lasting explicit memories 
(Strayer et al, 2003, p.26). Researchers asked participants to discriminate between 
billboards that were present during their driving task versus those that were not, under 
both single- and dual-task conditions. Scientists hypothesized that if a difference occurs 
between dual- and single-task conditions, then it is likely that attention is inhibited by cell 
phone conversation (Strayer et al, 2003). The team found that ―recognition was greater 
in single-task conditions than in dual-task conditions‖ (Strayer et al, 2003, p.27) and 
concluded that cell phones disrupt driving by diverting attention into the internal context 
of a conversation.  
A follow-up study by Strayer and colleagues confirms that participants are less 
likely to create a memory of an object when conversing on a phone regardless the 
salience of the object to driving (2004, p.2216). They proposed an inattention blindness 
hypothesis suggesting that drivers look, but fail to see stimuli relevant to safe driving due 
to their attention being directed elsewhere (Strayer et al, 2004, p.2213). Researchers 
found no difference in relevance or salience of stimulus to driving. The findings regarding 
salience are important because they demonstrate that drivers do not have a high-level 
control over information processing. Drivers endanger themselves while conversing on 
the phone by missing highly relevant information from the driving scene (Strayer et al, 
2004, p.2216). 
Some scholars argue that eye movement patterns are ―among the best 
performance metrics for measuring distraction and workload‖ (Victor et al, 2009, p.142). 
While previously eye movement patterns were hard to evaluate and map out, recent 
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developments in technology have helped scientists to gain a highly sensitive measures 
of distraction in drivers. Eye movement equipment can capture anything from glances 
away from the road, to fixation pattern, to drifts, and head movements (Victor et al, 2009). 
Recent research studies find that cell phone induced distraction causes drivers to 
decrease time paid to instruments and mirrors, impair scanning patterns, and produce a 
tunnel effect. In a test-track study conducted in 2002, drivers also ―made significantly 
fewer saccades (high-speed eye movements facilitating the exploration of the visual 
field) per time unit as the phone task increased complexity‖ (Svenson & Patten, 2005, 
p.189). 
The tunnel vision phenomenon is not well understood. However, research shows 
that, while distracted, drivers tend to focus on the visual field in front of their vehicle, 
ignoring the periphery. A gaze of 100 milliseconds is considered a fixation (Strayer et al, 
2008, p.28). While tunnel vision has no costs to lateral control (i.e. lateral control is 
guided by central vision), drivers are not able to detect hazards until they are 
dangerously close to the vehicle (Ranney, 2008, p.7). More importantly, ―even when the 
participant‘s eyes were directed at objects in the driving environment, they were less 
likely to remember them‖ (Strayer et al, 2003, p.28) under a dual-task conditions. 
Situation awareness is another proxy measured in distracted driving research. 
Svenson and Patten point out that ―when drivers [are] phoning they become much less 
aware of the traffic environment and the traffic situation‖ (2005, p.188). Wickens and 
Horry point out that safe driving is impossible without correct detection, identification, 
assessment, and action upon demands of the hyper-dynamic environment (2009, p.65). 
The term "situation awareness" comes from military research concerned with complex 
tasks in aviation studies. Situation awareness involves identification of stimuli in the 
environment, their analysis, and retrieval of appropriate behavior and action (Kass et al, 
2007, p.322). Being aware of the traffic environment and perceiving driving clues are 
crucial for anticipation of future unexpected events (Tasca, 2005, slide 13). 
Earlier studies found that situation awareness tends to decrease under 
conditions of cognitive distraction. Beede & Kass suggest that a lack of situation 
awareness can partially explain the absence of difference between hands-free and 
hand-held devices (2005, p.419). Drivers are not able to process information from the 
driving scene. Strayer and colleagues suggest that a cell phone impairs drivers‘ ability to 
detect changes in the traffic environment (2003,p.23). Using the detection task paradigm, 
Lee and Reyes undertook a study asking participants to detect a hazard. Interestingly, 
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multiple hazard misses happen when a driver conversing on a cell phone, has his gaze 
directed to the part of the scene with the distraction (2008, p.397). 
Surprisingly, when it comes to collisions, researchers found that cell phone using 
drivers are prone to more collisions than both non- distracted and drunk drivers (Strayer 
et al, 2006, p.388).  
 
Multi-tasking and Divided Attention 
 
Multitasking is a complex cognitive phenomenon. No single measure can capture 
all effects of simultaneous phone use behind the wheel (Foley, 2009, p.125). This 
subsection will discuss the most popular proxies that are used to measure the effects of 
cell phone distraction on driving. Some researchers use speed to estimate effects of cell 
phone conversation on driving. The researchers found that drivers tend to driver slower 
while on the phone. They uncovered no difference between experienced and novice 
drivers on this proxy (Smahel et al, 2008, p.1912). However, researchers found that 
under a dual-task condition older drivers took longer to recover their initial speed 
(Strayer et al, 2006, p.386). 
Speed recovery was also affected by a cell phone conversation. Recovery to 
initial speed took drivers engaged in a conversation 19% more time, compared to these 
who were driving under a single-task condition (Strayer et al, 2006, p.386). A 
comparison of drunk drivers to cell phone conversing drivers revealed that while the 
former braked harder, the latter exhibited slower braking reaction (Strayer et al, 2006, 
p.386).  
Following distance is the distance between a participant‘s car and a pace car 
used by experimenters (Strayer et al, 2003, p.24). Researchers find that, in general, the 
following distance increases under a dual-task condition for all drivers regardless their 
age or experience (Strayer & Drews, 2004, p.647). Additionally, more recent research 
finds  that variability in the following distance increases by 24% under a dual-task 
condition (Strayer et al, 2006, p.386). Smahel and colleagues find an average speed 
reduction of 1.27 km/hr for drivers conversing on a cell phone (2008, p.1913). This small, 
but significant reduction might serve as a mitigation strategy that helps drivers to cope 
with increased mental workload, decreasing the need to process new information. An 
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increase in following distance and a decrease of speed is currently considered a self-
induced distraction mitigation strategy.  
The lane-keeping ability of drivers involved in a cell phone conversation suffers 
much less in comparison to their reaction time (National Safety Council, 2010, p.10). 
Smahel and colleagues‘ study concerned with lane-keeping, reports that ―there were no 
center line crossings or near encroachments‖ for drivers under a dual-task condition 
(2008, p.1912). Rakauskas and colleagues state that little change in lane-keeping 
results from the fact that a cell phone conversation does not strongly influence steering 
abilities of a driver. A recent study explains the nuances of relationships between 
cognitive distraction and vision. Humans are served by two different types of vision: focal 
and ambient. Focal vision is served by fovea and is used for object recognition, focus, 
and attention. Ambient vision is served by retina and is used for peripheral detection of 
objects (Wickens & Horrey, 2009). Wickens & Horrey pinpoint that focal vision, affected 
by distractions, is not necessary for the process of lane-keeping. Lane-keeping is served 
by retina that is not affected by distractions. Therefore, even when cell phone distracted 
drivers receive and process feedback, s/he needs to keep a car in the correct lateral 
position without interruption (Wickens & Horrey, 2009, p.63). 
The most consistent finding among various types of research is distractions‘ 
effects on reaction time. Scientists agree that drivers‘ reaction time is greatly affected by 
interactions with their cell phones (Ranney, 2008, p.13). A meta-analysis of 18 studies 
shows that both hand-held and hands-free cell phones increase reaction time to critical 
events by 0.23 seconds (AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 2008, p.4). A literature 
review of 125 studies produced by McCartt and colleagues supports the idea cell phone 
distraction increases drivers‘ reaction time (2010, p.134). 
Studies show that brake-offset time, speed recovery, and other reactions 
requiring activities are performed sluggishly while conversing on a cell phone compared 
to a single-task condition (Kass et al 2007). Reaction time is important because it allows 
drivers to respond promptly to sudden events, but reduction in data-driven processes 
results in a sluggish reaction to a potentially dangerous situation (Strayer et al 2003, 
p.30). A study conducted by Drews and Strayer finds that reaction time to braking 
slowed down by 18% of the speed under a single-task condition (2004, p.645). Smahel 
and colleagues find that both novice and experienced drivers tend to miss more near-
hazards (i.e. objects that are less than 5 seconds away from the vehicle). This is likely to 
happened because hazard identification requires immediate attention, but slowed down 
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reaction time prevents drivers from on-time hazard identification (2008, p.1912). Strayer 
and Drews point out that slower reaction response could increase the severity of a 
collision (2004, p. 648). 
Distracted Driver Profiling 
Overall distraction inhibits drivers‘ performance and vehicle control skills (Jacobs 
et al, 2012, p.1587). Cell phone induced distraction leads to inattentive blindness, traffic 
violations, increases in reaction time, decreases in visual scanning patterns, inhibits 
situation awareness, causes variation in speed and following distance, and has multiple 
other negative effects on driving performance (Finch & Hanowski 2011, p.3). While 
current research makes it impossible to create a profile of an average distracted driver, 
conclusions about gender, age, experience levels are inconsistent. The single point of 
consensus among the scientific community is that there is no difference between the 
effects of hand-held and hands-free phones (McCartt et al, 2010). 
Findings regarding age are inconsistent. Some studies found that older drivers 
suffer from a larger decrement in proxies used to measure driving skills. Younger drivers 
seem to handle double-task conditions better (Reeds & Green, 1999, p.1031). This 
difference held in both simulator studies and on the road test. One of the theories 
suggests that older and younger drivers have different cognitive abilities, attention spans, 
as well as depth and contrast perception (Koopel et al, 2009, p.356). Proponents of the 
theory suggest that the age-related decline of cognitive capacities ―leave[s] relatively 
spare capacity to deal with competing activities‖ (Koppel et al, 2009, p.259). Therefore, 
dual-task conditions are more distracting for older drivers and their performance 
deteriorates to a greater extent.  
Alternatively, studies find that younger drivers lack experience and practice and 
are less capable dealing with secondary tasks (Young & Lennè, 2010, p.330). Younger 
drivers perceive distracting activities less cognitively demanding and report higher 
willingness to engage with various distractions than older drivers (Young & Lennè, 2010, 
p. 327). One of the newer studies, by Strayer and Drews, found no significant difference 
in reaction time decrement between younger and older drivers (2004, p. 645). 
The one point of consensus is that age affects the rates of technology adoption 
and use. For example, an Australian survey study found that only 27.8% of older drivers 
admitted to conversing while driving, while 69% of younger driver stated that they 
practice this activity (Young & Lennè, 2010, p.328). When it comes to texting 87% of 
younger drivers admitted to sending or reading a text, while only 5% of older drivers did 
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(Young & Lennè, 2010, p.328). A nation-wide American survey found that the proportion 
of drivers admitting to texting decreases with age from 51% of 16 to 19 year olds, to 22% 
of 35 to 44 year olds, to 3% of these over the age of 75 (AAA Foundation for Traffic 
Safety, 2009, p.5). 
Overall, while some researchers believe that older drivers experience greater 
performance decrement under dual-task conditions (Nelson et al, 2009, p.439), others 
found no significant difference between age groups (McCartt et al, 2010). 
One major issue comes into play of age and distraction. It seems that the field 
lacks standardized age bracketing and every researcher uses his/her own ordinal 
categories (i.e.18-30 versus 16-25) (Robertson et al, 2010, p.14). Indeed, some studies 
divide drivers between ―younger‖ and ―older‖ without providing age ranges at all. This 
disconnection makes it difficult to draw generalizable conclusions based on multiple 
studies (Young et al, 2009, p.343). 
Researchers did not reach an agreement regarding gender differences when it 
comes to driving while using a cell phone. Reed & Green, in an earlier study, found no 
gender-related significant effects of distraction (p.1025). 
 An earlier case-crossover study of almost 2, 000 drivers conducted in Vancouver, 
Canada found that, out of all cases of at-fault crashes, young male drivers represented 
the highest percentage (Wilson et al, 2004, p.49). More recently, the Road Safety 
Monitor reports that males are more likely to use cell phones while driving (as cited in 
Beirness, 2005, slide 14). The Traffic Safety Culture Index of 2007 also reports that 
males are more likely to report using cell phones while driving (AAA Foundation for 
Traffic Safety, 2008, p.1).  
 One of the recent studies states that men are more willing to take a risk 
and engage in a conversation (Lerner & Boyd, 2005, p.3-1). However, both of the 
aforementioned studies are based on self-reporting. Therefore, the difference between 
genders might have occurred from the nature of self-reporting.  
The most recent self-reported data out of Canada revealed that 43% of males 
versus only 35% of females report using a phone while driving (Robertson et al, 2010, 
p.14). However, some studies from the US suggest that the actual rate of use is indeed 
higher for females (Young & Regan, 2009, p.323). Other observational studies report 
more males using cell phones (Young & Lennè, 2010, p.331). McCartt and colleagues 
summarize field findings by stating that risk of crashes and rates of use do not differ 
significantly between genders (2010, p.133). 
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Differences between novice and experienced drivers are also unclear. Svenson 
& Patten find that novice drivers tend to have longer and more varying glances away 
from the road while on the cell phone (2005, p.190). A different study demonstrated that 
experienced drivers are able to answer more questions on situation awareness correctly 
(Kass et al, 2007, p.325). Overall, studies illustrate that novice drivers are also less 
capable to follow directions while distracted and miss more turns under a dual-task 
condition (2007, p.325). Kass and colleagues argue that while novice drivers might 
demonstrate less situation-awareness, both groups  ―suffered similar decrement in 
performance during the cell phone conversation‖ (2007, p.321). Additionally, Svenson 
and Patten argue that all drivers are aware of increased mental workload under a dual-
task condition (2005, p.190). 
Crash profiling shows that distracted drivers are more likely to have a rear-end 
collision than drunk drivers (Strayer et al, 2003). Results of a well-designed Canadian 
study that involved cross-matching analysis of police reports, insurance claims and 
naturalistic observations suggest that drivers using cell phones are over-involved in a 
rear-end collision comparatively to other collision configurations (Wilson et al, 2004, 
p.51). Later research by Staryer and colleagues is in line with the idea that the relative 
risk of being in an accident while using a cell phone is similar to the risk associated with 
driving with a blood alcohol level at the legal limit (2006, p.381). Dildy realistically 
concludes that cell phone use is a bigger problem than drinking and driving, because 
―there are many more cell phone using drivers than there are drunk drivers‖ (2012, p.86).  
Lastly, findings regarding relations between levels of conversation difficulty and 
levels of performance deterioration are mixed. Some studies find that both simple and 
complex conversations have comparable effects on driving skills, since similar cognitive 
recourses are involved in both tasks (Kircher, 2007, p.10). On the other hand, more 
recent studies find that as difficulty of a cell phone conversation increased, driver 
performance deteriorated further (Drews & Strayer, 2009, p.196; McCartt et al, 2006, 
p.94). For example, Rakauskas and collaborators find that drivers engaged in a more 
complex conversation demonstrated ―higher variation in acceleration pedal position, 
drive more slowly with more variation in speed, and report a higher level of workload 
regardless of conversation difficulty level‖ (2004, p.452).  
There are might not be specific differences between genders, ages, or 
experience levels when it comes to effects of distraction; however, some of the 
researchers suggest that not all drivers are equal when it comes to willingness to 
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engage in distraction. Rakauskas and his research team state that cell phone use might 
go hand-in-hand with other risk-taking behaviors such as drunk driving, non-use of seat 
belt, aggressive driving, etc. (2004, p.452). A factor analysis by Wilson also reveals that 
there is a place for a specific category of ―risk takers‖ (Wilson et al, 2004, p.52). Wilson 
and associates conclude ―the violation pattern of cell phone users suggests that they are, 
in general, riskier drivers‖ with the difference likely to be seen through attitudes and 
personality (Wilson et al, 2004, p.52). 
 
Risk Perception 
Research shows that 84% of drivers are aware that their driving performance 
decreases when they are on a phone (Young & Lenné, 2010, p.329). They notice that 
they drive less safely, miss hazards, stop signs, and turns, they react slower and change 
following distance regarding other cars. Indeed, a study by the TIRF found that texting 
and driving is the most important road safety issue for the Canadian public (2010, p.37). 
Additionally, the Traffic Safety Culture Survey of 2009 suggests that 34% of drivers felt 
less safe on the roads than 5 years before, and 31% of these drivers cited distracted 
driving as their main reason of feeling less safe (AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 2009, 
p.3).  
The regularized and standardized execution of large-scale surveys over time 
provides researchers the kind of longitudinal data that tracks changes in risk awareness 
and attitudes. In the US and Canada surveys can help us understand how public 
attitudes and relative risks have changed over years as some traffic safety issues rise up 
the risk agenda while others fade away. For example, in 2005 only 40% of Canadian 
drivers believed that the cell phone is a ―serious‖ or ―extremely serious‖ threat to road 
safety (Beirness, 2005, slide 10). By 2010, in just 5 years, this number grew to 85% 
(TIRF, 2010, p.16)! If surveys are correct, in the past 2 years, texting while driving 
surpassed drunk driving as the main road safety concern of the Canadian public 
(Vanlaar et al as cited in TIRF, 2010, p.16). The same year, the Canadian Automobile 
Association reported that distracted driving is believed to be one of the most ―unreported 
traffic safety problems facing Canadians‖ (CAA, 2014).  
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Chapter 3: From Science to Public Policy  
Legislation 
 
As evidence accumulated in the files of insurance companies and traffic safety 
researchers, so too calls for action began to be heard in the press. Growing concern with 
the negative impact of cell phones on driving performance burst into the public domain in 
1999 when policymakers in the US started to consider a ban on hand-held devices 
(Nikolaev et al, 2010, p. 182). Early news stories reported the issue of distracted driving 
as a recent scientific discovery and speculated of the future actions by industry and 
policy makers; for example, in 1998 one of the Missouri reporters wrote ―researchers 
have discovered that cellular phones are a distraction that cause an increase in the 
number of accidents on our nation's roads‖ (Potochny, 1998). The speculation revolved 
around mandatory industry labels and possible types of legislation and enforcement. In 
December 2000 The New York Times published a lengthy piece discussing 
effectiveness of legislation and explaining why cell phones and not other distractive 
behaviours would be targeted, the journalists concluded by quoting pro-legislation 
lobbyist stating that: ―Technology has not yet allowed us a hands-free way to eat a 
hamburger, tune a car radio or turn around and yell at our kids in the back seat. But we 
can do it with cell phone.‖ (Kilgannon, 2000).  
The first ban on electronic devices while driving was passed in New York, NY in 
2001. The ban exclusively covered hand-held electronic devices. The legislation was 
implemented in three stages. During the first month police officers were only issuing 
verbal warnings to drivers. In the months to follow judges and enforcers were able to 
waive citations for law-violating drivers if the individual purchased a headset. In 2002 the 
law went into full effect and tickets were no longer waived. (McCartt & Geary, 2004, 
p.11).  
Given the publicity generated by this legislation news stories about distracted 
driving began to occur in other jurisdictions across the US. A search for the term 
―distracted driving‖ in the LexisNexis database containing articles from all major 
American newspapers reveals that the issue gained prominence by 2001. A search 
reveals total number 2, 330 articles concerned with distracted driving in 1998-2005 
period; only 50 of these articles were published in 1998. Early articles discussing the 
issue questioned effects of cell phone as drivers‘ distractor; for example, Daily News 
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Special Report stated that eating, drinking and manipulation with climate control top cell 
phone use as a cofounding factor of the accidents and concluded that ―distracted-driving 
researchers all say they need more data to draw more definitive conclusions. And the 
data are not easy to obtain‖ (Sherman, 2001). By 2001 the number of articles concerned 
with distraction quadrupled; at least 419 of the articles concerned with distracted driving 
were published in 2001. By 2005 the number of articles increased by another 25%, 
reaching 664 items.  
A variety of full and partial bans were implement across the US between 2001 
and 2014 (GHSA, 2014). To date, eleven American states, Puerto Rico, Guam, DC, and 
the Virgin Islands imposed some kind of legislation prohibiting use of a hand-held cell 
phone while driving. However, not all legislations allow primary enforcement and 
ticketing (McCartt & Hellinga, 2007). The legislation varies from state to state: Iowa and 
Florida, for example, only allow for secondary enforcement for texting and hand held 
electronic devices use violations; Louisiana and Oklahoma only regulate behaviour of 
new and novice drivers. Currently, a number of states are enhancing existing legislations 
to allow primary enforcement (i.e. allowing to stop drivers for cell phone use without any 
other violations present). Thirty-seven states as well as DC prohibit use of a hand-held 
cell phone to novice drivers. Legislation prohibiting texting while driving is in place in 
more than 40 states (GHSA, 2013). No state bans all types of cell phone use for all 
drivers. Additionally, American states tend to specifically regulate the most vulnerable 
categories of drivers such as novice drivers and school bus drivers (GHSA, 2010, p.48).  
In Canada too, the pressure to regulate phone use in cars gained traction. In 
2003 Newfoundland and Labrador became the first Canadian province to pass laws 
limiting cell phone use by drivers. The early legislation prohibited the use of electronic 
hand-held devices and imposed mild fines of $45-180 dollars. The legislation was 
amended and enhanced in 2010; a set of sticker fines reaching $400 was introduced.  
The first international conference with a focus on distracted driving was hold in 
Toronto, Canada in 2005. The sole purpose of the conference was to define what 
exactly does distracted driving entails. The rise of academic interest in the issue was 
accompanied by mounting press coverage of the issue throughout the first decade of the 
millennium. Over twenty different news outlets, including major publications such as The 
Vancouver Sun, The Toronto Star and The Gazette published thirty new stories covering 
the 2005 International Conference on Distracted Driving. While the journalists pitted 
different points of view on the issue against each other (ex. anti-legislation, pro-
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legislation, extent of negative effects of distraction and comparison to other road safety 
issues) yet almost every article referred to, quoted and cited ―experts‖, ―leading 
researchers‖, ―road safety professionals‖ present at the conference. Indeed, in 2009, the 
Webster dictionary named ―distracted driving‖ as its word of the year (Robertson, 2011, 
p.11). As cell phone use rose up to displace drunk drivers as the number one traffic 
safety issues of Canadians in 2010 a legislation to curb the problem appeared as a 
logical next step to politicians, public health practitioners and policy makers. 
Nova Scotia and Quebec followed the lead set in Newfoundland in 2008. Prince 
Edward Island initially regulated only behavior of young drivers, but by 2010 switch to a 
more inclusive legislation. In British Columbia the law banning use of hand-held 
electronic devices for all drivers was introduced in January 2010. The legislation 
regulates behaviour of novice drivers more strictly by enforcing complete ban of all 
devices, including hands-free sets. Talking on a hand-held phone was now punished by 
a fine; dialing, emailing and texting drivers also receive tree demerit points. 
The remaining provinces passed a legislation between 2010-2011. Today, 
Northwestern Territories have the strictest financial sanctions in the country. Law 
violating drivers are required to pay over $300-dollar fine. The only province to have 
progressive fine system for multiple-time offenders in Nova Scotia with fines increasing 
from $164 dollars for the first offence to fines over $337 dollars for subsequent violations. 
British Columbia punishes violators with one of the most modest financial sanction (i.e. a 
fine of $167 Canadian dollars) (CAA, 2014). Three provinces explicitly prohibit texting 
and emailing while driving, while other judiciaries prohibit hand manipulation with 
electronic devices (Transport Canada, 2012). Novice drivers of British Columbia, 
Saskatchewan, and Yukon are prohibited to use any hand-free means of communication 
as well, while other provinces do not have any specific legislation aimed at novice 
drivers (Transport Canada, 2012). As of January 2012, all Canadian provinces (except 
Nunavut) have some kind of law addressing distracted driving in place. 
In 2012, Atchely and his team replicated an experiment conducted in 1970 to 
understand blame attribution and sanctions choice for drunk driving. In the later version 
of the experiments, Atchley‘s team kept the same baseline accidents with no specific 
cause, but added distracted driving to the exploration list. The researchers gave their 
participants a number of road crash scenarios and asked them to ascribe an appropriate 
punishment (i.e. jail time, fines, etc.) for the accident, as well as to attribute a portion of 
blame to the driver(s) (Atchley et al, 2012). The researchers concluded that texting 
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drivers were viewed as the most responsible for the accidents, and drunk drivers 
received the highest level of punishment. Furthermore, they concluded that while 
recognizing the risks associated with distracted driving, this risk-taking behaviour was 
perceived as normative, and so did not receive higher level of punishments relative even 
to the baseline (Atchley et al, 2012, p.280). The team concluded that there is a clear 
―disconnect between knowledge of how risky the behaviours is, and the willingness to 
find people at fault for violating rules against it‖ (Atchley et al, 2012, p.281). 
White et al suggested that such disconnect might be explained by the way we 
think about regulations. Our decisions affect our preferences in policies in two ways. 
First, research clearly demonstrated that people are more concerned with regulations of 
uncontrollable risks (White et al, 2007, p.743). For example, an individual would be more 
likely to support stricter regulations on air travel over road transportation. The preference 
is explained by the fact that air travel is perceived as being outside of individual control 
and legislations as having a huge social benefit. Thus, the general public is likely to 
support action on a societal level (Slovic et al, 1982, p.91). Unfortunately, when it comes 
to driving, the activity is experienced individually, and is perceived as being under one's 
own control. 
Second, earlier studies demonstrated that individuals tend to evaluate policies in 
terms of comparative utility for themselves (White et al, 2007). Thus, the more benefits 
of mobile phones experienced by a driving individual, the less likely they would want to 
see the action regulated. Johnston, Muir, and Howard concluded that if we want to 
change such attitudes, the public health message should be that ―the societal risks of 
daily road use remain in the top rank of public health problems‖ (2013, p.145). 
Historical lessons learned from enforcement of impaired driving, seatbelt use and 
speeding demonstrated that legislation banning an activity is not enough to produce 
substantial behavior change. In order to shift drivers behavior and public perception of 
risk a set of more comprehensive communication strategies as developed in both the US 
and Canada. Comprehensive strategies for behavior change included a combination of 
driver education, safer technology and social marketing strategies. The strategies to 
promote road safety in the wake of driver distraction are discussed in sub-sections below. 
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Education & Media 
 
As far as education is concerned, 23 states in the US have a special Distracted 
Driving section included into their learners‘ guides (GHSA, 2010, p.9). In 2003, this 
section existed in only 5 states (GHSA, 2010, p.9). Regan and colleagues consider the 
fact that the driving public knows little about the relative risks associated with different 
distracting activities (2009, p.560). Cosgrove and colleagues point out that public 
education and community outreach will help to create social norms that support an idea 
that ―using cell phones and texting while driving are unacceptable‖ (2011, p.9). Reinfurt 
warns that experiences from earlier programs demonstrate that education does not work 
(2004, p.181). Celebrities, like Oprah Winfrey and Karl Lagerfeld, attract a lot of attention 
to the issues of road safety and they might be the best way to reach specific audiences. 
Allsop suggests that values are central for human decision-making since they 
motivate and endure over time (2012, slide 5). Using a media campaign to create an 
idea that driving should be done in a certain way might help to promote attentive driving 
over its distracted alternative. If we seek a solution to the problem of distracted driving, 
building on the TPB, then media campaigns that disabuse drivers of false norms, while 
simultaneously emphasizing the costs of distraction, seem like a good option (Riquelme 
et al, 2010, p.127). In order to change, normative endorsement media campaigns should 
not only target drivers but their families, peers, and friends (Riquelme et al, 2010, p.131). 
Reinfurt suggests that innovative media and persuasive messages are needed for the 
successful enforcement of attentive driving (2004, p.181). As in the HVE discussed 
above, paid TV commercials and public announcements are likely to pay off in a 
proportion of less distracted drivers. According to Neale and his research team, 
education is needed alongside the laws to solve the problem of distracted driving in 
Canada (2006, p.2). 
Research suggests that the perception of norms can affect drivers‘ actual 
behaviors. Robertson and colleagues conclude that ―people are more concerned about 
unsafe driving behavior when they believe others are concerned. Thus, through social 
marketing and focusing on feelings of concern, a bandwagon effect can be created that 
could help rectify this false norm‖ (2010 p.19). Inspired by the TPB, Nemme and White 
suggest using a multi-strategy approach targeting attitude norms and intentions 
simultaneously. Nelson et al argue that risk perception might have little impact on drivers 
who mentally justify the safety of a cell phone, therefore the media should convince them 
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of the detriments of the conversation on their safety (2009, p.442). In comparison to laws, 
education and media campaigns can be implemented on a shorter timescale. 
 
Technology 
 
Ranney suggests that environmental factors, such as rumble strips, can serve as 
reminders of distraction (2008, p. 21). Driver assistance technologies have a role to play 
in curbing distraction. Current engineering progress allows multiple strategies to mitigate 
distraction from locking the phone in a moving vehicle to alerting a driver when s/he is 
distracted without taking any actions themselves. Various auto companies have come up 
with different solutions to countermeasure distraction from blinking diodes that are aimed 
to attract drivers‘ attention back to the road, to filtering strategies that only allow certain 
information though. These systems can be integrated together and work according to 
different situations (Kircher, 2007, p. 46).  
Regan and colleagues create a taxonomy of distraction countering mechanisms 
starting from real-time distraction prevention and information scheduling, to adaptation of 
information format (such as, outputting a map or text message via voice system) and cell 
phone function lockouts (2009). Engstrom & Victor discuss a real-time distraction 
countermeasure (RDC) as a prevention strategy that can prioritize and schedule 
information for a driver according to the driving situation. The RDC can help drivers to 
manage their workload by making less distracting information available, redirecting 
drivers‘ gazes, and limiting functionality of devices, thus making driving safer (2009, p. 
469). The RDC causes LEDs, sounds, voice messaging, and vibrations to redirect 
drivers‘ attention and help them to realize they are being distracted. Such companies as 
Volvo and SAAB are working on anti-distraction assistants that would analyze drivers' 
scanning behavior and, upon detecting that scanning patterns are low, will alert the 
driver through auditory content (Regan et al, 2009, p.590). 
Unfortunately, all technological help comes with a usability paradox: the driver 
might be giving in more to a distraction by relying on a device for help (Ranney, 2008, 
p.21). Technologies need to try to avoid drivers' becoming dependent on a concurrent 
feedback by anti-distraction systems (Donmez et al, 2009, 529).  
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Enforcement  
The researchers suggest seeking distraction-curbing strategies in earlier road 
safety campaigns that dealt with the issues of seat belts and driving while intoxicated. 
Campaigns launched to address these safety concerns were similar in that they 
employed ―widespread, methodological, and sustained application of enforcement 
programs‖ (Williams & Wells, 2004, p.175). Researchers argue that, while the public 
needs to be educated about the dangers of distracted driving, people often already have 
all the necessary information to make an informed decision (Williams & Wells, 2004, p. 
175), but they are not convinced that they might end up in an accident due to the use of 
a cell phone. The struggle against this belief is hard because the audience already 
knows that they should not be using their cell phones, but ―people tend to minimize the 
possibility of bad outcomes; the tendency to minimize risks that are supposed to be 
under their control‖ (Williams & Wells, 2004, p. 175). Therefore, McCartt and colleagues 
suggest that ―vigorous, well-publicized enforcement campaigns are needed‖ to curb 
distracted driving (2010, p. 139). 
Another dimension of enforcement needed to curb distracted driving is the 
development of a traffic safety culture. Some researchers believe that reprobating 
distracted driving as we did drunk driving would be an effective strategy (Betkey as cited 
in GHSA, 2010, p.5). 
Enforcement efforts are also vital to the sustainability of the law. Williams and 
Wells state that ―if people believe they are not going to be detected and meaningfully 
punished for violations, they will be more likely to comply‖ (2004, p.176). Pencheon 
points out that, after a brief period of compliance, risk perception of getting caught 
diminishes, when not supported by high publicity. Without high publicity and visible 
enforcement, people tend to downplay the risk of being caught breaking the law 
(Pencheon, 2006, p.395). 
Clayton and colleagues suggest that positive reinforcement will have an effect on 
drivers‘ behavior as much as putative campaigns through fines. Their research finds that 
drivers are receptive to signs such as ―Please Hang Up-I Care‖ that will change to 
―Thank You‖ as soon as driver obeys the law (2006, p.347). A different research camp 
suggests that demonstrating how responsibility and danger come together with the right 
to drive, will be more effective than taking an optimistic approach (Allsop, 2012, slide 6). 
Allsop posits that drivers should be ―persuaded by reason‖ and ―motivated through 
emotion‖. She proposes to target drivers via messages of people just like them who 
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have been impacted by distracted driving, as well as causing people to feel the emotion 
of guilt associated with taking a life or injuring another person (Allsop, 2012, slide 28). 
Between the two aforementioned camps there is a group of scholars who saw 
through the complex nature of multitasking and offered a practical solution to the 
problem of distracted driving. Hancock and colleagues suggest that the international 
community should stop playing ―the blame game‖ (2009, p.24). They point out that, in 
blaming drivers for being distracted, we fail to realize that distraction is an inevitable 
consequence of being human and that drivers are facing thousands of distracting cues 
such as billboards, signs, LED lights, and pedestrians, during their every trip. 
Additionally, presenting distraction as a single task irrelevant to a driving activity can 
oversimplify the problem because drivers have to engage in secondary and tertiary 
driving related activities (Lee et al, 2009, p.36). 
One of the recent articles explains that our ability to be distracted and easily 
reallocate attention is an attribute of earlier human survival strategies that helped us 
identify immediate dangers (Regan, 2009). Researchers state that ―there is a biological 
advantage in having the human mind unwittingly orient itself towards objects, events, 
and activities that signify danger […] or to those that might be instrumental in 
perpetuating the species‖ (Regan et all, 2009, p.3). While understandable from the 
position of law enforcement and their need to find someone to take responsibility for the 
crash, looking to find a guilty driver will not make roads safer since you cannot prohibit 
drivers‘ exposure to distracting events and objects (Regan et al, 2009, p.548).  
A far more rational approach is to recognize that the human ability to process 
information and pay attention is limited (Regan et al, 2009 p.3). Indeed, Victor and 
colleagues point out that it is impossible to attend to all the information you receive while 
driving (2009, p.135). Regan points out that distractions cannot be completely eradicated 
(2009, p.621). Therefore, instead of looking to achieve perfect attention from drivers, we 
should be seeking to minimize the possibility of distraction. This assumption opens a 
completely different perspective on ways to solve of the issues related to distracted 
driving. 
Comprehensive Strategies  
To improve the quality of laws, education, and media campaigns aimed at risk 
mitigation, the research community first needs to gather more reliable data. For example, 
the state of Florida has introduced new crash reporting forms in 2011. Florida‘s forms 
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include a specific subsection for distracted driving that allows police officers to tick one 
of 8 distraction categories (GHSA, 2010, p.8). Implementing similar data gathering in 
Canada and throughout the US would allow for a more precise and generalizable data 
set. Regan points out that we need to improve not only the reporting of data, but also the 
processing of raw data via means of training experienced coders (Regan et al, 2009, 
p.538). Lastly, existing distraction prevention strategies, legislation, and enforcement 
practices need to be evaluated and measured (Regan et al, 2009, p.533). Ranney points 
out that the analysis of the willingness to engage in distracting activities will benefit the 
future of the field (2008, p.22). Analyzing the effectiveness of the legislations also 
remains a priority. 
With this in mind, Canada recently launched its third nationwide Road Safety 
Strategy 2015 (RSS 2015). The ultimate goal of this national strategy is to reduce 
injuries and fatalities on Canadian roads to 0. A more realistic goal of the campaign is to 
achieve demonstratable downward trends in fatality and injury on Canadian roads, as 
well as improve education, communication, research, and public awareness regarding 
road safety issues (CCMTA, 2011, p.1).  The RSS 2015 slogan is ―Rethink Road Safety‖ 
and it is partly aimed at younger drivers, as well as vulnerable road users (Road Safety 
Canada Consulting, 2011, p.3).  
The AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety in the US has been working on safety 
culture research since 2006, hoping to create a ―social climate in which traffic safety is 
highly valued and rigorously perused‖(AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 2009, p.1). 
National traffic safety organizations suggest that federal governments should be funding 
more road safety research, as well as media campaigns targeting distracted driving 
(GHSA, 2012, p.26). 
On a provincial level, High Visibility Enforcement (HVE) campaigns demonstrate 
positive effects. The HVE campaigns include a combination of a strict enforcement 
period, paid media messages, and an emphasis on education (Cosgrove et al, 2010, 
p.1). Successful HVE campaigns were conducted in the states of New York and 
Connecticut. More than 121,000 vehicles were observed on four sites (2 control, 2 
experiment). The sites were observed before and after the campaign and compared to 
each other, as well as to themselves. Control sites did not receive any paid 
advertisement or special wave of enforcement. On the opposite side, experimental sites 
were inundated with anti-distraction ads on digital billboards, easy to remember tag lines 
on the radio, extra coverage on the news and outreach materials available through the 
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DMV (Department of Motor Vehicles). Media time included earned as well as paid time 
on both national and local channels (Cosgrove et al, 2010, p.2). The main aim of the 
campaign was not to issue tickets, but to create an environment in where there is ―a high 
certainty that  [if drivers violate a particular law] they will receive a ticket‖ (Cosgrove et al, 
2010, p.7). Both experiment sites in New York and Connecticut saw a significant drop in 
use of hand-held phones, 15% and 32% respectively. In Canada, the province of Alberta 
presents a great example of enforcement. The whole month of February is dedicated to 
specific campaigns targeting distracted drivers (Hammond, 2012, slide 16). 
The HVE campaigns popularize the issue via national news coverage. The 
reports on distracted driving find their ways onto news channels and newspapers such 
as Good Morning America, ABC News, Boston Globe, the New York Times, Fox News, 
CBS and the Oprah Winfrey Show. The study shows that the recognition of such slogans 
as ―No Phone Zone‖, ―Hang Up or Pay Up‖, ―A Phone in One Hand, Ticket in Another‖, 
and issue familiarity increased from 31% to 71% in Connecticut, and from 5 to 29% in 
New York (Cosgrove et al, 2010, p.7). The authors of the research suggest that ―high 
public awareness most likely reflects the influx in media discussing the issue" (Cosgrove 
et al, 2010, p.9). Media campaigns also seem to provide an effective, though brief, public 
awareness raising instrument. 
On a corporate level, some firms prohibit their employees from using electronic 
devices while operating a company vehicle. Some companies do not discriminate 
between hand-held and hands-free devices, and urge their employees from initiating or 
receiving calls and text messages (GHSA, 2010, p.42). Regan and colleagues indicate 
that private organizations can also help mitigation by providing educational recourses, 
strict enforcement, and training (2009, p.548).  
A Reflection on the Role of Legislation in Risk Agenda Setting 
In order to understand more completely how the risk agenda changed in the 
lower mainland a news analysis was conducted on print media in the Lower Mainland. 
Different combinations of the following search terms "public health", "transportation", 
"driving" were used for article selection. A corpus of 425 articles was obtained referring 
to both transportation and health. Major provincial and local newspapers were included 
in the search (ex. Burnaby Now, The Province, The Tri City News). Articles from May 
2004 up to May 2014 were reviewed and coded according to a protocol developed for a 
study of public health coverage of transportation health related issues. The time frame 
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was further delineated into four separate three-year periods (i.e. 2004-2006, 2007-2009, 
2010-2012, 2013-2014). 
 The content analysis of stories about health issues associated with 
transportation between 2004 and 2014 suggests increasing reporting of cell phone 
distraction as a cause of death and injury on the road- especially after the legislation 
banning electronic devices was passed in 2010. 
After the articles were collected, a set of pre-determined codes was applied to 
every item in the population. The codes covered various issues of concerns such as a 
spin of the story (positive or negative coverage), issue discussed (ex. impaired driving, 
distracted driving, speeding), agencies involved (ex. public health authorities, the 
government, non-for-profit organizations), and statistics reported (ex. costs, number of 
injuries, fatalities). The coding was completed by four trained undergraduate research 
assistants. 
A software program for mixed method analysis (Dedoose) was used to interpret 
the data. After the coding was completed, duplicate and irrelevant articles were deleted, 
leaving a population of 271 articles for analysis. 
Of all transportation-related health issues, an equal number of stories had 
positive and negative spins. The public health perspective was applied to only 0.04% of 
articles in the population. And, 88% of the articles were at least partly concerned with 
legislation and policy making. In short blame and mitigation had replaced risk 
assessment as the primary agenda framing element. 
The table below presents the number of stories by theme. Approximately 80% of 
all stories reported on one of these six issues. Clearly, drinking and  
weather/environment related driving stories dominate in the discussion. The 
issue of distracted driving ranked third on the list with 16% of stories in the population 
discussing the issue. Interestingly, within the distracted driving stories, reports on food 
consumption behind the wheel dominated the coverage. Only 4% of all stories discussed 
cellphone use as distraction.  
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Table 1: Number of Stories per Driving Safety Issue 
Issue Number of Stories 
Weather/ Environment  59 (21%) 
Drinking & Driving  53 (19%) 
Distracted Driving 45 (16%) 
Eating or Drinking 17 
Cell & Texting 11 
Other Distraction  8 
Age/Disability 36 (13%) 
Speeding 18 (6%) 
Technology 5 (1%) 
 
As pointed out by Kline, the extent of coverage does not always reflect the 
magnitude of the problem (Kline, 2011, p.25). This is clearly evident in the proportion of 
stories dedicated to impaired driving (19%) versus distracted driving (cell phones, 4%), 
while the number of deaths from the causes are almost identical on average, with 96 
attributed to former and 91 to latter, annually (ICBC, 2014).  
The issue of cell phone as a distractor for drivers was not present on public 
agenda until 2006. Three distraction-related articles in the time frame of 2004-2006 
present distracted driving as a driving error (i.e. just a confounding crash factor) and 
discussed distraction as a human condition rather than drivers‘ action. For example, one 
of the journalists suggests: ―Now, Canada's crash rate cannot be blamed entirely on 
substandard highways. Driver error, distractions, impairment and unsafe speed also play 
a big part‖ (Acres, 2005).  
A total of eleven distraction related articles appeared in the data set in 2007-2009 
window. Interestingly only two of these articles referred to the cell phone as a distractor. 
In this time period calling while driving was initially described in terms of rising road 
safety science. For example The Province reported: ― You don't need a lab coat to know 
that a distracted driver is more likely to overlook the yield sign. Studies confirm the 
connection between cellphone use and inattentive driving. That's why more and more 
jurisdictions are making it illegal to yak on the phone while driving.‖(Macpherson, 2008). 
The rest of the articles referred to distracted driving as one of the problems public health 
professions would be facing in the future. Distracted driving was presented in this set 
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both as road safety risk (along with impaired driving, seat belts and speeding) and as a 
lifestyle risk (on par with smoking and unprotected sex). 
Almost half of all distraction-related stories were published between 2010 and 
2012 –that is after the law was passed. A review of 16 TV news stories sampled from 
local CBC and CTV newscasts between 2010 and 2013, the moral framing of the 
distracted driver issue became more apparent. Moral framing ascribed blame  
exclusively to phone users. The media presented them as irresponsible, young, and cell 
phone dependent.  
For example, CTV news story presented distraction as an issue affecting young 
drivers. Much of the concern was focused on the young drivers involved in fatal crashes. 
As CTV news story develops: ― they [teens] are already inexperienced and more likely to 
cause an accident. Now there is new evidence that young drivers in our province are 
doing something that makes them even more dangerous. John Woodward reports on the 
alarming number of young drivers who don‘t put down their cell phones when they get 
behind the wheel‖. The sentiments of print media are similar: ―Well, moms and dads, you 
need to say a few choice words to your newly licensed teens about the perils of dialing, 
texting or doing anything else besides driving when they are behind the wheel […] That 
behaviour is particularly devastating for new drivers: They increase their risk of crashing 
or having a near-miss seven-to eightfold when reaching for a phone (or other object) or 
dialing, and quadruple it if they're texting […] explain to them why distracted driving is 
reckless‖ (The Province, 2014). The issue of a distracted generation of youthful 
multitaskers speaks of a minor moral panic that galvanized the issue. 
A second frame justifying the legislation and promoting enforcement penalties 
and shame for non-compliance were also in evidence. For example, after the state of 
New York banned hand-held phone use The Province published an editorial applauding 
new American legislation and asking for public support for the pro-law lobby effort 
initiated by BC doctors (The Province, 2001). The articles concluded that: ―the prospect 
of a stiff fine or driving ban can sure get the attention of the average cell phone 
delinquent‖ (The Province, 2001, p.16). Similar sentiments can be found in later articles: 
―ICBC is wrong in stating that cell-phone use while driving should be dealt with by 
education, not legislation. Some people cannot and will not be educated. So the only 
way to deal with them is with legislation.‖(The Province, 2001, p.33) 
A total of twenty-one press articles were included in the analysis for 2001-2012 
period. The articles from this period have clear legal framing. Five articles discuss 
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legislation in different provinces of Canada directly. As the Vancouver Sun reports: 
―Alberta is currently working on a law very similar to B.C.'s -- it calls for a $172 fine for 
talking, texting or engaging in several other distracting behaviours behind the wheel, 
such as grooming, reading and writing. However, Alberta's bill still allows motorists to 
talk on hands-free phones while driving.‖ (Rassel, 2010). The media artifacts of this time 
period also emphasized recent scientific discoveries related to distracted driving, quality 
of the legislation and costs of enforcement. During this time period other distracting 
activates are downplayed and cell phone as distraction emphasized. The increase is 
likely associated with the anti-distracted driving legislation that was passed in BC in 
2010 and established the legitimacy of the issue. Increased reporting of cell phone 
distraction as a cause of fatalities and injuries after the legislation suggests that the 
legislation might have been used by the media as a form of blame legitimization. As a 
part of reflexive modernization risk of distracted driving was individualized rather than 
attributed to a specific insurer (Beck, 1996). 
From the content analysis it is evident that there is a bias in the coverage of 
―distraction and inattention‖ as a cause of accidents. Cell phones were identified as the 
major problematic activity of drivers and strict enforcement of the law as the central 
means of encouraging compliance. 
Laws That Don’t Work 
A major assumption under any legislation is that the law will address an issue 
deemed important by the public. Operating under this assumption, multiple road safety 
laws, including the aforementioned ones were introduced – and in reducing the number 
of accidents and injuries on the road—were largely successful. Unfortunately, the laws 
do not seem to fulfill their safety promises all the time. 
 62 
 
Figure 4: Fatality rates between 1992 - 2011 
 
It is wrong to assume that with the increasing number of cell phones, and increasing 
numbers of cars in the road, that the number of injury crashes or deaths on the road also 
increases. But the reality is to the contrary, as crash rates have been falling for the past 
two decades. Data from the US demonstrate that from 2004 to 2008 the number of 
crashes went down from 38,444 cases to 34,017 cases (GHSA, 2010, p.11). A similar 
trend is present in Canada. For example, recent Canadian Motor Vehicle Traffic 
Statistics (graph above) report suggests that both fatalities and injuries have been 
declining annually. The graph above demonstrates a clear downwards trend: if in 1992 a 
reported number of death was at 3,073 and the number of collisions was 249,823 by 
2001 the number of death felt to 2,413 and injuries to 216, 463. In 2011 the number of 
death and harms reached its historic low claiming 1,834 lives and resulting in 166,725 
cases of injuries (Transport Canada, 2013, p.3). British Columbia shows similar trends in 
the number of fatalities that decreased from 385 in 2001 to 291 in 2011 (ICBC, 2012, 
p.5).  
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Figure 5: Injuries in BC by Contributing Factors 
 
Figure 6: Fatalities in BC by Contributing Factors 
 
Using BC data set on fatalities and injuries we can calculate the proportions of 
death and injuries attributed to three major contributing factors (human action, human 
condition, environmental condition). Accidents due to Human Error consistently account 
for about 68% of all motor vehicle accidents causing injury and 57% of all death from 
motor vehicle accidents in BC (BC Injury Prevention, 2014). Driver distraction (that can 
be classified as both human action and human condition) therefore can potentially 
contribute to 80% of all deaths and injuries on the road.  
However, the number of crashes attributable to distraction is increasing. The 
GHSA‘s statistics show that, while in 2004 only 11% of all the crashes were attributed to 
distraction, the percentage rose to 16% in 2008 (2010, p. 18). A study out of Canada 
points out that if laws were working, we would expect to see a reduction in traffic 
collisions and fatalities attributed to distracted driving (Lafleur, 2012, p.2). Lafleur makes 
an interesting discovery studying crash data from Manitoba. He points out that while 
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fatalities associated with drinking and driving, speeding, and non-use of a seatbelt went 
down from 2009, the collision and fatalities attributed to distracted driving are still 
climbing up (2012, p.2). In British Columbia the proportion of injuries due to distraction 
increased from 35% in 2003 to 48% in 2007, despite overall decrease in the number of 
injuries in the province (BC Injury Prevention, 2014). The data on injury attribution is not 
available in BC after 2007 as the legislation mandating obligatory presence of the police 
on a crash scene was abolished in 2008. On the bright side, the number of deaths 
attributed to distraction is declining from the peak with 115 death in 2005 to 101 lives lost 
in 2010 (the year legislation went into effect) to its historical low of 81 death in 2012 
(TAS, 2014).  
Multiple research bodies find that laws banning cell phone use while driving are 
inefficient to achieve the goal of eliminating the risk taking behaviour. For example, the 
Highway Loss Data Institute‘s study in 2010 concludes that there is no reduction in 
crashes after cell phone laws go into effect (2010, p.1). Most of the distracted driving 
legislation related studies coming out of the US. Some of the studies were conducted 
over a span of ten years, giving a great longitudinal perspective on the effectiveness of 
the laws. 
The earliest observational studies associated with cell phone bans were 
conducted by McCartt and colleagues in New York. The ban on hand-held phones was 
introduced in that state in 2001, and it was the very first ban to be introduced in the US. 
The ban immediately halved the use of hand-held devices in comparison with the control 
state (Connecticut). However, in just twelve months, rates of cell phone use climbed 
back up in NY, and the differences with Connecticut completely disappeared (McCartt et 
al, 2010, p. 134). A similar study in DC indicates that after the introduction of a ban in 
2004, the use of hand-held devices fell. After 12 months, some parts of the decrease 
were sustained, but only due to strict enforcement (McCartt et al, 2010, p.134). A more 
encompassing study of texting, by the HLDI, compares insurance claims from 2007-
2009 from a dozen of states. Researchers conclude that the pattern of frequency of 
claims fluctuations in states with a ban was almost identical to that in control states 
(2010, p.3). The overall conclusion for the law studies is that ―after a brief period of 
compliance with the ban the drivers return almost completely to their pre-law period 
behavior‖ (Jacobson et al, 2012, p.1587). While effectiveness of laws is more than 
dubious, we must consider that laws take years to establish, and paying attention to only 
short-term findings might be short-sighted. The HLDI report concludes that month-to-
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month fluctuations in collision claims for study sites with a cell phone ban do not differ 
from those of jurisdictions without a ban. Additionally, researchers find that fluctuations 
in rates of collision claims do not change after the law is established (HIDL, 2010, p.1). 
Studies by the IIHS find that laws regarding texting might have an opposite effect.  
In general, legislation evaluation studies tend to draw conclusions by comparing 
observational data from two study sites. These sites usually share major demographic, 
economic, and geographic characteristics but differ in legislation status (i.e. sites with a 
cell phone ban vs. sites without a cell phone ban). For example, the state of California is 
compared to Arizona, Nevada, and Oregon; while the state of New York is compared to 
neighboring Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and DC. The best existing studies are far from 
perfect. Most of the studies do not account for unknown compounding factors, do not 
have a longitudinal dimension to them, and mostly do not consider population density 
(Jacobson et al 2012, p.1587). But these studies are the best currently available to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the laws for road safety.  
 
Observational Road Survey BC 
 
In order to establish a prevalence of distracted driving in British Columbia three 
and a half years after the legislation was passed, a roadside observational survey was 
conducted in June 2014. During the observation period 8,332 cars were examined in 
three separate locations during three time slots in the City of Vancouver. 
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Procedure 
 
 
Figure 7: Filming Location Day 1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Filming Location Day 2 
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Figure 9: Filming Location Day 3 
 
 
A trained observer gathered nine hours of video recording from three vantage 
points on roads‘ overpasses. The observations were conducted on three consecutive 
weekdays (Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday) in three separate time slots. The time 
slots were selected to maximize the flow of traffic. Thus, morning rush hour (8:00-9:00 
am), an hour in the afternoon (noon to 1:00 pm) and evening rush hour (4:00-5:00 pm) 
were recorded. The times were the same for all three locations in order to observe both 
peak and non-peak traffic flows (Sullman, 2012, p. 273). The observations took place at 
two major intersections along SW Marine Drive (at Oak St on day 1, Knight St, day 2) 
and an uninterrupted, straight stretch of road (Boundary Rd, day 3) (Young et al, 2010). 
These locations were chosen because they are major arterial routes in Vancouver with 
relatively high traffic flows. Each observational session lasted for about an hour. For 
every location, all lanes of traffic in one direction were recorded. For the analysis, drivers 
were observed from a fixed point by the researcher. For the purpose of this study, any 
hand manipulations of an electronic device were coded as ―handheld phone‖ (including 
GPS, texting, and any other phone manipulations); and every other type of distraction 
was coded as ―other‖. The ―other‖ category included such activities as eating, drinking, 
putting make up on, changing clothes, and reading maps; however, conversations with 
passengers were not recorded as a distraction (Townsend, 200, p. 749). All moving 
vehicles excluding public busses were observed. The observer was located on the 
overpass of the road in order to maximize the researcher‘s safety, reduce potential 
distraction to drivers, and maximize visibility inside cars. 
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All phone use was recorded when the observer could see clear a cell phone 
device in the drivers' hands; drivers who were otherwise distracted were recorded into 
the category of "other". Cases where it was hard to see if the driver was on the phone 
were marked as "not distracted" (Young et al, 2010, p.556). 
Results 
Of the 8,332 drivers observed, a total of 122 (1.35%) were seen using their 
handheld devices. Another 111(1.24%) drivers were engaged in other distracting 
activities. Table 1 presents the number of observed drivers per day and hour of 
observation. Many more distracted drivers were observed during day 1 (1.75%) and day 
2 (1.66%) relative to day 3 (0.64%). Such drastic difference in observational count can 
potentially be attributed to two different factors.  
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Table 2: Number of Distracted Drivers per Day for Every observation Window 
 
 
 Day 1 – 
AM 
Day 1 - 
Noon 
Day 1 - PM Day 2 - AM Day 2 - 
Noon 
Day 2 - PM Day 3 - AM Day 3 - 
Noon 
Day 3 - PM Average 
Observation 
Length (min) 
60 56 30 53 43 58 60 60 21 49.00 
Cars Count 1378 1029 986 726 756 1639 744 806 268 925.78 
Number of 
drivers on held 
hand cells 
33 (2.39%) 17 (1.65%) 12 (1.22%) 11 (1.52%) 18 (2.38%) 18 (1.10%) 7 (0.74%) 5 (0.62%) 1 (0.37%) 13.56 
(1.35%) 
Drivers 
otherwise 
distracted 
35 (2.54%) 19 (1.85%) 4 (0.41%) 12 (1.65%) 13 (1.72%) 16 (0.98%) 3 (0.40%) 7 (0.87%) 2 (0.75%) 12.33 
(1.24%) 
Combined % 68 (4.93%) 36 (3.50%) 16 (1.62%) 23 (3.17%) 31 (4.10%) 34 (2.07%) 10 (1.34%) 12 (1.49%) 2 (1.12%) 25.89 
(2.59%) 
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 Table 3: Summary of Averages for Phone Use and Other Distractions per Day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, on day 3, the observer was forced to move to the roadside for recording, as 
the overpass position did not work due to weather conditions. Consequently, drivers 
could have confused the researcher with a police officer on a raid for distracted drivers. 
A few drivers were clearly seen on the recording dropping their phones at the sight of the 
observer.  
Second, unlike the observer‘s position of the two previous days, the location of 
observations was not in the vicinity of a traffic light. A presence of a regulating light 
affects the patters of traffic flow. As pointed out by previous studies, drivers are more 
likely to use their phones in heavy, slow traffic and red lights, rather than in free-flowing 
traffic (Young & Lenné, 2010). Thus, is it likely that, in free-flowing traffic, drivers 
naturally engage in fewer distracted activities. Very few studies to date have examined 
the difference between rates of phone use at traffic lights and away from traffic lights. 
Existing studies demonstrated the former receiving higher rates than the latter (Drury et 
al, 2012, p.8). 
Discussion 
The prevalence of handheld phone use was found to be 1.35% and distraction 
from other causes about 1.24%. Combined about 3% of drivers in BC are somehow 
distracted on the road at any point in time. The rate of phone use observed by the 
researcher differs greatly from averages provided by official statistics, but are similar to 
other studies. For example, Sullman (2010), who observed 7,168 vehicles, reported 
distraction by mobile phone at 2.2% and distraction from other factors at 3.1% (p.274). 
Other observational studies out of the United Kingdom and Australia suggested that the 
range of distracted drivers falls between 1.5% to 1.9% (Horberry at al, 2001; Taylor at al, 
2007). However, in this study, the rate of distraction is almost two times lower than the 
 Day 1  Day 2 Day 3 Total 
Phone  (%) 1.75 1.66 0.64 1.35 
Other (%) 1.6 1.45 0.67 1.24 
Total (%) 3.35 3.11 1.32 2.59 
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most recent global report which stated the rate of distracted driving at 3.3% of drivers 
Canada-wide (IRTAD, 2013, p.107).  
The data also indicate that handheld cell phones might not be the primary source 
of distraction among drivers, as the category of "other distractions" demonstrates a very 
similar percentage of activities. In order to account for observer error a parameter for 
observational accuracy was calculated. The researcher observed a 100 cars randomly 
estimating that the number of drivers that were not clearly visible because of obstructed 
view were 7 out every 100 cars establishing 0.93 accuracy of observations. The 
differences between this recent BC estimate and Canada-wide data may arise from the 
way the data for this study were gathered and the where survey was conducted. It is 
unclear how IRTAD gathered the data, but if it was a survey at controlled intersections, it 
might mean that most of the cars were stationary (when drivers are more likely to be on 
the phone), thus we can expect to see fewer distracted drivers in the moving vehicles 
(Johnson et al, 2004, p.6). 
When different times of day were compared for the rate of distraction, Sullman 
found a significant difference: in his study, more people talked on the phone in the 
morning compared with other time periods (2012, p. 272). Current observations did not 
indicate such a difference. The difference for people talking on the phone during different 
times of day was not statistically significant at any conventional significance level [chi-
squared (8, 332)=6; p=0.199]. The non-phone related distraction did not vary 
significantly either (p >0.1).  
As reported by one of the largest naturalistic 70-car studies out of the United 
States, as well as Johnson's et al study of 2004 (who collected 40,000 digital images of 
drivers), activities including eating, drinking, and smoking might surpass the rate of cell 
phone use as the number one distraction behind the wheel. In Stutts and colleagues‘ 
study, 71.4% of drivers were seen eating or drinking, while less than half of the observed 
(34.3%) were using their phones (2005, p.1096). Unfortunately, studies of other types of 
distraction that drivers engage in regularly are largely absent from the literature (Stutts et 
al, 2005, p. 1093).  
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Limitations 
 
There are clear limitations to the roadside observational survey. First, the quality 
of video recording wasn't able to record inside some vehicles, thus increasing the 
chance of uncounted distracted drivers. Additionally, the observational power was 
obstructed by tinted windows (Taylor et al, 2007, p.433) and sunny weather conditions 
that created reflections on windshields. Second, the study does not record any socio-
economic indicators of drivers, thus the roadside survey presents very limited data on 
the distracted drivers (Townsend, 200, p. 750). Third, the observation is not 
generalizable to any other part of the province, namely the less populous and rural parts 
of BC (Young et al, 2010).  
Most importantly, the researcher was not able to account for drivers using 
headset devices, as a momentary recording is not likely to capture talking drivers 
because at the moment of observation a driver might be listening to the other speaker. 
Young, Lee and Regan pointed out that ―hands-free phones can not be adequately 
quantified using roadside observations, with the likelihood that the observations could 
underestimate or overestimate exposure because it is often not possible to tell if a driver 
is using a hands-free device or not‖ (Young, Lee & Regan, 2008, p.76). Therefore, there 
is a possibility that a number of drivers on headsets is underestimated in this study as 
well.  
Lastly, a major issue on day 3 of observations was when the observer had to 
change positions and move into the visibility of the drivers. Simpson pointed out that 
observer has to be unobtrusive ―otherwise, the process of measuring the behavior can 
itself change the behavior‖ (2005, p.6). On the footage, a few drivers clearly confused 
the researcher with a police officer and were observed dropping their phone. Such 
incidents indicate that the drivers‘ behavior was affected by the process of observation. 
The benefit of an observational roadside survey is that it provides a realistic 
picture of behavior patterns which is not distorted by self-reporting (Simpson, 2005, p.5). 
Additionally, to the researcher's knowledge, this is the first time a roadside observational 
survey was carried out in BC. There are number of ways the study can be improved in 
the future, including longer hours of observation, multiple locations, better camera 
positioning, and an increased number of data coders (Drury et al, 2013). A general 
criticism is that the observations ―solely concentrated on the prevalence of one type of 
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distracter, the mobile phone‖ (Sullman, 2012, p. 272). As of 2012, there were only two 
studies available for other types of distraction (Sullman, 2012, p. 272). 
 
 
Why Aren’t Laws Working? 
 
As in other jurisdictions, these observations of Vancouver drivers suggest the 
ineffectiveness of a law banning cell phone use while driving. In the literature one finds 
numerous reasons why current legislation is failing to produce a more significant impact 
on drivers' behavior from lack of knowledge about the risks to a belief in individual 
vulnerability. Some studies have also found that drivers do not feel that the law is really 
being enforced (HLDI, 2010, p.4). For example, a study out of Northern Carolina where 
young drivers, aged 18-21, are prohibited from using any form of electronic devices, the 
law seems not to have an effect because only 22% of teenagers and 13% of their 
parents believe that they actually will be caught and punished for the offence (McCartt et 
al, 2010, p.134). A more recent study finds that drivers believe that, on a scale of 1 to 5, 
they are "unlikely" or "somewhat likely" (3.39 on average) to be caught by the police 
(Young & Lenné, 2010, p.329).  
A further reason why the law is ineffective is a phenomenon of false compliance. 
False compliance manifests itself in drivers who try to hide their devices further under 
the dashboard or their laps to avoid punishment (Jacobson et al, 2012, p.1588).  
Additionally, ―drivers perceive hands- free sets to be far less dangerous than 
hand-held phones‖ (Riquelme et al, 2010, p.128). However, experiments find no 
difference between hand-held and hands-free devices. Unfortunately, currently existing 
legislations only target hand-held devices. Therefore, even if drivers switch from hand-
held to hands-free devices, the law is inefficient because the effects of cell phone 
conversations come from the internal cognitive contest associated with conversation, not 
the manual component of distraction (Strayer et al, 2003, p.31). Therefore, legislations 
that discriminate between forms of electronic devices are useless in increasing road 
safety. 
For the rate of actual compliance to go up, two things are missing: a good data 
set to evaluate rates of phone use before and after the law; and, visible enforcement 
campaigns. According to the most prominent figures in road safety research, the main 
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jurisdictions in the US and Canada lack ―well-publicized, sustained enforcement 
campaigns directed at cell phone violations‖ (McCartt et al, 2010, p.139). The earlier 
study that compares the rate of compliance between New York and DC after 12 months 
of the law's being in effect attributed differences to enforcement and number of citations 
given per 10,000 drivers (McCartt et al, 2010, p.139). 
Jacobson and colleagues point out that the effectiveness of the laws must be 
evaluated over time by monitoring a gradual drop of rates in fatality and collision claims. 
Therefore, it is possible that the effects will be seen only over a longer time frame (2012, 
p.1591). A follow-up study in New York, conducted by McCartt and colleagues, uses 
Poisson regression to compare estimated differences between actual observed rates of 
cell phone use with those that would have been expected without a ban (2010, p.133). 
The time span they studied was from 2001 to 2009. The researchers conclude that, for 
DC, after five years with the ban, the rate of cell phone use is 43% lower than it would 
have been without a ban in place. For New York, the phone usage was 47% lower 
immediately after the ban, and 24% lower within 7 years after the ban. For Connecticut, 
the usage rate would have been 65% lower compared with no ban in place (McCartt et 
al, 2010, p.133). So too, the Highway Loss Data Institute‘s study in 2010 concludes that 
there is no reduction in crashes after cell phone laws go into effect (2010, p.1). Most of 
the distracted driving legislation related studies coming out of the US. Some of the 
studies were conducted over a span of ten years, giving a great longitudinal perspective 
on the effectiveness of the laws. The overall conclusion is that if there were no law 
banning cell phone use while driving, the rate of observed cell phone use would have 
been higher for all three studied states. So, while the laws might not ban use of cell 
phones once and for all, they might have been efficient for preventing usage rates from 
blooming. 
According to many researchers, currently existing legislations might not only fail 
to have a positive effect, but actually deteriorate safety even further. For example, 
Lafleur states that making an activity illegal is not the same as stopping the activity at all. 
He states that it is likely that drivers just hide their activities further, making cell phones 
even more dangerous to driving (Lafleur, 2012, p.2). If this is true, Lund‘s dilemma of 
observed hand-held phone-use reduction, coupled unreasonably with no reduction in 
crash rates, would be explained (as cite in HLDI, 2010, p.1). A 22-month study of the 
state of New York finds an increase in collision frequency claims when the law banning 
texting went into effect (Jacobson et al, 2010, p.1588). A study by the HLDI suggests 
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that insurance data do not show a decline in collision claims associated with the texting 
ban because drivers responded to the law by hiding their devices further down the 
dashboard, making driving even more dangerous (2010, p.8).  McCartt and colleagues 
also suggest  that passing laws which prohibit only hand-held communication might be 
sending the message that hands-free communication is safe, while empirical evidence 
screams that this distinction is not true (2006, p.90). As of today, it is necessary to 
continue to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of legislations regarding distracted 
driving. 
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Chapter 4 
Lifestyle Risks and the Lessons of Distracted Driving in BC 
 
A recent ICBC report indicates that deaths on the road due to traffic accidents 
have steadily decreased in the last five years, continuing the downwards trend started in 
the 1950s when the scientific study of accidents began being applied to the development 
of policies that could reduce the harm associated with automobility. Deaths on the road 
have dropped by 30 % since the 1975s due to improvements to safety technology and 
road engineer, speeding enforcement and impaired driving campaigns (Transportation 
Canada, 2013). The good news story implicit in this thesis then is that science and risk 
communication combined should be an effective method of reducing the risks associated 
with distracted driving too. Yet the ICBC study also indicates that fatal accidents 
attributed to distracted driving have declined more slowly over the last five years than 
those associated with speeding and impaired driving, despite the 2010 BC Act banning 
the operation of hand held communication devices while driving a car. This suggests that 
distracted driving may be a unique kind of risk taking behaviour that resists the kinds of 
social communication campaigns successfully used with speeding, seat belts and 
impaired driving.  
Aarson estimated that, over the past ten years in Canada, the combined number 
of people who were killed from assaults, wars, and acts of terrorism would only make up 
15% of the lives lost in land-based transportation accidents (Arason, 2014, p.3). The 
risks of automobility are considerable. Moreover Robertson pointed out that by 2010 
distracted driving has become a ‗perceived risk‘ over the past decade across Canada: in 
2002, only 40% of respondents believed distraction to be an issue for road safety; in 
2006, the issue gained prominence with 69% of respondents identifying it as a pressing 
concern; the issue peaked in 2010, as it was named the most important road safety 
issue of the year (Robertson, 2010, p.7).  
Unfortunately, research also shows that, despite the self-awareness of 
performance decrement, prohibitions, and dangers associated with distracted driving, 
drivers still make calls and send text messages. A recent research report, for example, 
indicates that young divers in Vancouver are twice as likely to be distracted than an 
average Canadian counterparts (Pike & Macpherson, 2011, slide 10). The study found 
that 25% of all high school age drivers were engaged with at least one distractor (ibid, 
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2011, slide 11). This subchapter will explore the current attitudes of young BC drivers 
towards texting and phoning behind the wheel. It will go on to explore the reasons 
drivers still choose to engage in these behaviors as well as the problems of 
communicating the risks associated with using the cell phone in cars.  
Survey: Objectives & Procedures   
 
Growing awareness of a new risk by the general public is a part of reflexive 
modernization.  In order to gain insights on how British Columbians perceive distracted 
driving and the associated risks and the impact that it has on behaviours, a survey was 
designed using Simon Fraser University's web-survey tool. The questionnaire was 
posted online and the invitation to participate was distributed via social media platforms 
as well as SFU's webmail. The survey was active for three weeks from June 4th until 
June 25th, 2013. No personal identifiers nor contact information was collected from the 
respondents. However, basic demographic information was gathered as part of the 
analysis. Throughout the three weeks, 104 responses were collected. Out of 104 
submissions only a hundred were deemed worthy for analysis. The other four responses 
only provided demographic data, and left the majority of questions unanswered, thus 
were excluded from the analysis. 
The aim of the survey was three-fold. First, to gain insight on how road safety 
issues are ranked among other lifestyle and environmental risks. Second, to explore 
where the issues of road safety stand on the public agenda. Third, to identify the 
prevalence of various risk-taking behaviours in everyday life. Since the first objective of 
survey was to gather data about roads safety risks relative to other risks, road safety 
issues were presented as just-another-risk-among-multiple- other-issues. The general 
categories of risk-taking behaviours included nutrition (―I eat five fruit and vegetable 
servings a day‖, ―I buy genetically modified foods‖), hygiene (―I was my hands before 
cooking and eating‖), safe sex practices (―I have unprotected sex‖) as well as financial, 
online, and narcotics related risks. Out of nineteen possible risk-taking behaviours, a 
quarter were related to road safety issues. For each issue, four possible responses were 
listed, as well as a non-applicable option. 
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Analysis & Discussion  
 
One of the objectives of the survey was to explore the views of Canadians on risk 
perception and policy priorities. Three matrix questions were constructed in order to 
explore these issues. The first question dealt with likelihoods of various risks impacting 
respondents and their families. The second question explored the views of Canadians 
on the policy priority of the country. The third question inquired about the likelihood of 
different global risks in the next twenty-five years. The participants were asked to 
evaluate a total of twenty-three potential risks including environmental, health, and 
behavioral. Respondents prescribed a numerical score from one (low) to ten (high) for 
every risk in the three questions. The table below summarizes the opinions of the 100 
respondents. The data are analyzed and discussed separately for each question. 
 
Table 4: Average Score for Health, Environment and Behaviours Risks 
 Potential Risk Increasing 
Likelihood in 
Next 25 Years 
Could 
Significantly 
Impact Me 
Should 
be Policy 
Priority  
1 Climate Change 8.83 8.00 8.58 
2 Major Earthquake 7.45 6.91 6.84 
3 On-Line Fraud 7.40 6.20 6.81 
4 Food Born Illness 6.84 5.43 6.60 
5 Skin Cancer 6.81 5.60 5.71 
6 Obesity 7.40 5.08 6.70 
7 Depressions and Suicide 7.11 5.95 6.83 
8 Food Shortages 7.72 6.84 7.50 
9 Bicycle Travel Accidents 4.85 3.93 4.21 
10 Diabetes 6.78 4.95 6.35 
11 Motor Vehicle Accidents 6.16 5.61 5.50 
12 Viral Epidemic 6.80 5.34 6.13 
13 Antibiotic Resistant Bacteria 7.88 5.98 7.04 
14 Online Prescription Drug 
Purchasing 
6.51 4.41 4.68 
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15 Sleeping Disorders 6.52 5.30 4.81 
16 Radiation Exposure 6.20 4.91 5.19 
17 Smoking 5.49 4.86 5.85 
18 Air Pollution 7.80 6.79 7.26 
19 Narcotic User and Addiction 6.50 3.99 6.17 
20 Oil Pipeline Leaks 7.40 5.32 7.51 
21 Drinkable Water Shortage 8.00 5.91 7.73 
22 Wildlife Attacks 4.33 3.52 3.46 
23 Birth Control Pill Risks 5.38 3.75 4.97 
 
The data from the survey demonstrates that in terms of relative risks, 
environmental disasters such as climate change and major earthquakes top the list as 
priorities, whereas lifestyle risks generally take lower positions. At 6.16, motor vehicle 
accidents were ranked low on the lifestyle risk scale too, as 17 out of the 23 risk issues 
below risk of skin cancer, but above risks associated with the birth control. Interestingly, 
most of the respondents feared being affected by major earthquakes and climate change. 
However, in 2011 accidents were ranked as the leading cause of death for people 25 to 
44 years old and the fifth leading cause of death among all age categories (Statistics 
Canada, 2014). According to Statistics Canada, the other top causes of death included 
heart disease, strokes, and cancer. In this case, risk perception and the actual chances 
of being affected by a particular risk do not correlate. Johnston and colleagues pointed 
out that ―our daily road use is overwhelmingly accomplished without adverse events‖ 
(Johnston, Muir & Howard, 2013, p.143). Therefore, our risk perception of road 
accidents might be subjected to low-probability event bias (Slovic et al, 1982, p.84). 
Hence, driving is perceived and experienced as an activity where errors do not 
necessarily result in an adverse life-threating event. When perceived as a low-probability 
event, the risks associated with driving tend to be disregarded and underestimated by 
individuals. Young people seem to be buffered from the risks regardless of their 
presence in the media. 
Table Presents the Difference in Risk Perception when Evaluated to Self versus 
to Others 
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Table 5: Average Score for Health, Environment and Behaviors Risks 
 
 Potential Risk Difference  
1 Major Earthquake 0.54 
2 Motor Vehicle Accidents 0.55 
3 Smoking  0.63 
4 Wildlife Attacks  0.81 
5 Climate Change  0.83 
6 Food Shortages 0.88 
7 Bicycle Travel Accidents 0.92 
8 Air Pollution 1.01 
9 Depression and Suicide  1.16 
10 On-Line Fraud 1.2 
11 Skin Cancer 1.21 
12 Sleep Deprivation  1.22 
13 Radiation Exposure 1.29 
14 Food Born Illness 1.41 
15 Viral Epidemic 1.46 
16 Birth Control Pill 1.63 
17 Diabetes  1.83 
18 Antibiotic Resistant Bacteria 1.9 
19 Oil Pipeline Leaks 2.08 
20 Drinkable Water Shortage 2.09 
21 Online Prescription Drugs 
Purchasing 
2.21 
22 Obesity 2.32 
23 Narcotic Use and Addiction  2.51 
 
Risk to Self 
 
When asked about the likelihood of the impact of various road risks on individual 
drivers and their family, motor vehicle accidents received an average score of 5.61. This 
ranks the risk of motor vehicle accidents ninth among various risks to self, including 
depression and suicide, shortages of drinking water, and skin cancer. The table above 
demonstrates that the difference between relative risk perception and immediate self-risk 
assessment. Yet regardless of the relative risk it is noted that the difference between the 
general risk percept and immediate self-risk, road accidents are among the least 
different right behind earthquakes – which are expected in Vancouver. The other side of 
the scale are risks associated with obesity, shortage of drinking water and oil pipeline 
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leaks – risks that however likely many people are unlikely to impact them or their families 
significantly. These risks have higher prevalence, but young individuals see themselves 
as personally protected from obesity and oil pipeline leaks in some ways – certainly less 
so than from accidents. This suggests that the psychological distancing from driving 
accidents is not based on a ‗blanket immunity‘ 
 
Where Does the Issue Rank as a Policy Priority?  
 
One of the most interesting findings of the survey is the rank of motor vehicle 
accidents on the policy priority list. When asked how important it is to prioritize policy for 
addressing road safety risks, respondents agreed on an average score of 5.5 out of 
possible 10. Motor vehicle accidents are thus number 17 out of the 23 risks explored in 
the survey. Supporting findings of Johnston, Muir & Howard, (2013), the survey indicated 
that motor vehicle accidents are not perceived as  as a global priority for the future. 
While being a leading cause of death, road crashes are clearly underappreciated 
both by the government and the general public. Most road safety scholars agree that 
road safety issues are currently not prioritized adequately, therefore it doesn‘t receive 
necessary funding nor attention and is grossly underestimated (Roberts, Mohan & 
Abbasi, 2002, p. 1107). Johnson and colleagues suggested that even expenditures on 
dental research exceed that of road safety research. The researchers citied a ratio of 
spending of 36:1 on HIV/AIDS to the road safety issues; cancer research received four 
times the funding of road safety (Johnston, Muir & Howard, 2013, p.3). Arason argued 
that with the current number of deaths on the road would be tolerated if attributed to any 
public health issue would be tolerated (2014). 
In 2012, Atchely and his team replicated an experiment conducted in 1970 to 
understand blame attribution and sanctions choice for drunk driving. In the later version 
of the experiments, Atchley‘s team kept the same baseline accidents with no specific 
cause, but added distracted driving to the exploration list. The researchers gave their 
participants a number of road crash scenarios and asked them to ascribe an appropriate 
punishment (i.e. jail time, fines, etc.) for the accident, as well as to attribute a portion of 
blame to the driver(s) (Atchley et al, 2012). The researchers concluded that texting 
drivers were viewed as the most responsible for the accidents, and drunk drivers 
received the highest level of punishment. Furthermore, they concluded that while 
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recognizing the risks associated with distracted driving, this risk-taking behaviour was 
perceived as normative, and so did not receive higher level of punishments relative even 
to the baseline (Atchley et al, 2012, p.280). The team concluded that there is a clear 
―disconnect between knowledge of how risky the behaviours is, and the willingness to 
find people at fault for violating rules against it‖ (Atchley et al, 2012, p.281). 
White et al suggested that such disconnect might be explained by the way we 
think about regulations. Our decisions affect our preferences in policies in two ways. 
First, research clearly demonstrated that people are more concerned with regulations of 
uncontrollable risks (White et al, 2007, p.743). For example, an individual would be more 
likely to support stricter regulations on air travel over road transportation. The preference 
is explained by the fact that air travel is perceived as being outside of individual control 
and legislations as having a huge social benefit. Thus, the general public is likely to 
support action on a societal level (Slovic et al, 1982, p.91). Unfortunately, when it comes 
to driving, the activity is experienced individually, and is perceived as being under one's 
own control rather than an abstract risk that impacts others. 
Second, earlier studies demonstrated that individuals tend to evaluate policies in 
terms of comparative utility for themselves (White et al, 2007). Thus, the more benefits 
of mobile phones experienced by a driving individual, the less likely they would want to 
see the action regulated Johnston, Muir, and Howard concluded that if we want to 
change such attitudes, the public health message should be that ―the societal risks of 
daily road use remain in the top rank of public health problems‖ (2013, p.145). 
Part II: Self-reported Risk-taking 
 
In 2010, as a part of their regular Road Safety Monitor survey, the TIRF 
conducted a poll of public opinion of Canadian drivers on distracted driving. Overall 
73.5% of Canadians reported that distracted driving is either a very or extremely serious 
problem for road safety (TIRF, 2011, p.5). Indeed, distracted driving changed its position 
on the public agenda relative to other road safety risks surpassing impaired driving by 6 
percentage points (ibid, 2011, p.5). However, compared to other lifestyle risks the 
ranking of distracted driving on policy priorities and likelihood of future impact seems to 
be quiet low. The mismatch between risk perception and risk mitigating priority might 
indicate that while public is aware of that risks exits, in the aftermath of legislation is that 
they see little reason for further regulate and police it.  
 83 
 
Robyn Robertson, the CEO of the Traffic Injury Research Foundation identified 
the three main issues contributing to Canadian road deaths as alcohol, accounting for 
30-40% of road fatalities; non-use of seatbelts, 35-40%, and speed, amounting to 20% 
of all fatalities (Robertson, 2010, p.5). Two of these three issues were explored in the 
survey, alcohol and seatbelts. 
Question twelve of the survey was concerned with the prevalence of various 
types of risk-taking behaviours in daily life. The question inquired how frequently 
different activities were performed by the respondents.  The bar graphs below present 
the frequency of self-reported behavious of the road safety issues.When it comes to 
protective safety precautions, the use of seatbelts resulted in the highest self-reported 
score of regular users. Indeed, 93.9% of respondents reported using their seatbelt 
regularly and only 4% of drivers suggested that they use seatbelts rarely or never. The 
response on other mandated safety equipment is more heterogeneous, with 43% of 
respondents wearing a helmet regularly while biking or snowboarding. Equal proportions 
of respondents totaling to 24% reported never using helmet or using it only on some 
occasions. 
Figure 10: Safety issue - Seatbelt Use 
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Figure 11: Safety Issue - Helmet Use 
 
Figure 12: Safety Issue - Driven by a Person with BAC over 0.08 
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Figure 13: Safety Issue - Impaired Driving 
 
 
Another set of risk behaviours on the road explored issues around impaired driving. 
While 72% of respondents reported that they never drive impaired, just 2% reported 
doing so often or regularly. When asked how often a respondent would agree to be 
driven by a driver with a blood alcohol concentration over 0.08% the picture changes 
drastically. One in five reported agreeing to a ride with a legally impaired driver 
sometimes, while one in twenty respondents accepted such rides often or regularly. With 
fifty-six BC lives taken in impaired driving accidents, the number of people agreeing for a 
ride with a legally drunk driver is worrisome (ICBC, 2012, p.1).  
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Figure 14: Safety Issue - Texting & Driving 
 
Figure 15: Safety Issue - Phone Use 
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For the purpose of this survey, talking on the phone and texting while driving 
were separated into two individual questions. When asked about talking and driving 
habits, only 53% of people reported not using their cell phone while driving. This is ten 
percentage points lower than the data gathered in a Canada-wide survey on distracted 
driving (TIRF, 2011, p.1). Almost one in ten respondents reported using their cellphones 
often or regularly.  
 
Interestingly, when asked about texting and driving, almost 27% of people 
reported engaging in texting behind the wheel at least sometimes. This result is 7 
percentage point that reported cell phone use for calls. The number of occasional texting 
drivers is higher than the number of drivers occasionally talking on their cellphones. 
Approximately 9% of drivers reported texting often or regularly. These findings are quite 
similar to the TIRF‘s 2010 and 2011 surveys of texting drivers (2011, p.1). 
 
 
 
Table 3 presents the frequency of using a mobile phone (calling) while driving 
with similar percentages of males (50%) and females (54.7%). A slightly higher percent 
of females reported using the phone at least sometimes; the difference between genders 
is a mere 2.5 percentage points. Interestingly, when it came to regular use of a phone, 
five times more men admitted to the behavior compared to women. However, chi-
squared test indicated that men are no more likely than women to engage with the 
phone while driving (�2=2.83, d.f=4, p=0.585). The age of respondents was coded as a 
categorical variable with six response categories from 18 to over 61 years old. The 
analysis shows that age and cell phone use was statistically independent for 
respondents in our sample (�2=18.49, d.f.=20, p=0.555). Although majority of the 
respondents were young than 35 years old. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 88 
 
Table 6: Frequency of Cellphone Use while Driving Conditioned on Gender 
Gender * phone Cross tabulation 
 
phone 
Total Never Sometimes Often Regularly N/A 
Gender Male Count 18 7 2 3 6 36 
% within Gender 50.0% 19.4% 5.6% 8.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
Female Count 35 14 3 1 11 64 
% within Gender 54.7% 21.9% 4.7% 1.6% 17.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 53 21 5 4 17 100 
% within Gender 53.0% 21.0% 5.0% 4.0% 17.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 4 presents the conditional percentages of frequency of texting for both 
genders. When it came to texting, women were less likely to never engage in texting 
compared to men (53.2% of females versus 36.1% of males reported ―never‖). Males 
were more likely to engage in texting sometimes and often  (33.3% males versus 24.3% 
females; 8.3% males versus 3.2% females). Non-applicable response option was kept, 
as some of the participants might have used N/A category when they did not want to 
give an answer. However, chi-squared analysis revealed that there is no statistically 
significant difference between texting drivers of different genders (�2=3.43, d.f.=4, 
p=0.448). Therefore, the data reveal no association between the frequency of texting 
behind the wheel and gender (�2=21.4, d.f.=25, p=0.67). 
Table 7: Conditional Percentages of Phone Use Behind the Wheel for Males and 
Females 
Gender * Texting Crosstabulation 
 
Texting 
Total Never Sometimes Often Regularly N/A 
Gender Male Count 13 12 3 1 7 36 
% within Gender 36.1% 33.3% 8.3% 2.8% 19.4% 100.0% 
Female Count 33 15 2 2 10 62 
% within Gender 53.2% 24.2% 3.2% 3.2% 16.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 46 27 5 3 17 98 
% within Gender 46.9% 27.6% 5.1% 3.1% 17.3% 100.0% 
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Limitations 
 
A word of caution generalizing from this modest survey is advised of course, as 
some of the tests‘ assumptions have been violated namely response counts for 
individual cells. However, the more general assumptions of the chi-squared tests are 
met: for every analysis all variables are categorical and of an appropriate level of 
measurement (pragmatically, the level of measurement does not play a role in cross 
tabulation analysis) (Kuha, 2013).  
The major limitation of the survey was the number of responses. The sample size 
of a 100 is also appropriate, as it is over thirty responses and large enough for an 
appropriate sampling distribution of the chi-squared (Stares, 2014). The limited number 
of responses made some analysis possible (i.e. descriptive statistics, chi-squared). From 
more specific assumptions, only gender-conditioned behaviours meet stricter 
assumptions of the test. As it is evident from the tables, the number of cells with counts 
lower than five is less than 20% of the overall cells.  Cell counts of age-conditioned 
behaviours violate the most lenient rules of the test by having at least one cell with a 
count of zero (Stares, 2014).  
However, the most interesting types of interferential analysis were not feasible, 
as the data did not meet the minimum assumptions of interference tests. For example, a 
comparison of perceived importance for the state‘s policy of distracted driving compared 
to other risks between non-users, occasional users, and frequent users was not possible, 
because the number of cells with counts lower than five exceeded the maximum allowed 
threshold (20%) reaching 45% of the table. Such comparison would be interesting as 
some studies found that ―frequent and infrequent users significantly differed on half of 
the normative beliefs‖ (White et al, 2010, p.22). Second, if the survey were to be used on 
a larger scale, it would be helpful to add a number of prominent risks, such as financial 
debt, stroke, respiratory diseases, and risks associated with air travel for comparison. 
Third, a better way to reach older participants should be used as the age category of fifty 
and over was underrepresented. This shortcoming can be attributed to the online 
platforms used for the recruitment of participants. This strategy attracted mainly younger 
people (65% versus 29% middle aged, and 6% older adults), thus making age-related 
interferences and comparison difficult. 
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Why Engage: Choice or Lack Of Awareness 
 
There are multiple reasons of why drivers choose to engage in distracting 
activities, despite knowing the risks. One very controversial study out of Harvard 
University lists the potential benefits of using a cell phone while driving. These benefits 
include personal, community, household, and security gains. Indeed, cell phones allow 
for better emergency responses, save time in geographical orientation, might expand 
both privacy and productivity, help to accomplish errands easier, and permit leaving the 
work place earlier. They also help to identify and report drunk drivers and criminals 
(Lissy et al, 2000, p.47). Drivers choose to text and call because they perceive their 
personal benefits as greater , and the risks lower than those of other drivers. 
Optimism regarding personal driving skills is one of the other reasons why drivers 
engage in cell phone conversations and texting behind the wheel. The problem can be 
summarized by an old joke: every day more than 9 out of 10 drivers consider themselves 
above average drivers. The Traffic Safety Survey finds that 65% of the drivers believe 
that their driving ability is above average or much better than that of other drivers; 75% 
of interviewees report that they are more careful than other drivers; 66% of informants 
are also sure that they are a much safer driver than other drivers on the road (AAA 
Foundation for Traffic Safety, 2009, p.4).  
In 1997, drivers ranked the risks associated with cell phones on the roads as 2 
out of 10, 1 being not dangerous at all. While today there is an observable shift in risk 
perception, drivers still believe that ―it is safer for them to talk on the cellular phones 
while driving than for others to talk on the cellular phone while driving‖ (Nelson et al, 
2009, p. 431). Willingness to engage in a cell phone conversation while driving 
decreases with age while perception of risk increases (Lerner & Boyd, 2005, p.3-1) 
Much too often drivers are overly optimistic about their own driving skills and about the 
risks associated with distracted driving (Svenson & Patten, 2005, p.193). 
The second reason for drivers to engage in distracting activities is the forgiving 
nature of driving coupled with the increased utility of technologies.. Hancock, Mouloua, 
and Senders brilliantly point out that our social existence attributes us with multiple roles. 
The role of a driver does not require an individual to be ―perfect‖; indeed, most of the 
time being just ―good enough‖ will suffice (2009, p.14). Our other social roles are more 
demanding, therefore drivers are likely to use a chance to talk while driving as a 
productivity-enhancing, time-saving opportunity (Riquelme et al, 2010, p.129). 
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Additionally, Nelson and colleagues find that even if drivers recognize the risk of 
driving distracted, s/he is likely ―to initiate a cellular conversation if [s/he] believe[s] that 
the call is important‖ (2009, p.438). Rakauskas and colleagues state that in order to 
cope with the extra workload of secondary tasks, drivers usually reduce their 
performance goal. Their tolerance of performance decrement results in higher risk 
acceptance (2004, p. 460). Nelson and his team also suggest that risk perception is 
simply outweighed by the perception of the importance of a call (2009, p. 442). 
Another reason why drivers opt to engage in an obviously risky behavior is 
explained by the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) in combination with rates of social 
acceptance around this particular risk. The TPB determines an individual‘s chance of 
engaging in risky behaviors. According to Nemme and White, behaviors are determined 
by attitudes (ex. favorable/unfavorable), subjective norms (ex. social pressure), and 
behavior control (i.e. how easy/difficult is the performance of a task) (2010, p.1258). The 
study concludes that group norms and past behaviors were the strongest predictors of 
engagement in a behavior.  
The TPB, when applied to distracted driving, states that drivers are more likely to 
engage in texting or phoning behind the wheel if they consider this behavior accepted by 
their closest friends and family (Nemme & White, 2010, p.1265). Similar findings derive 
from an earlier study. Drivers show more willingness to engage with a phone in the 
presence of peers and rate distraction risks as the lowest in their presence(Lerner & 
Boyd, 2005, p.3-18). Riquelme et al elegantly summarize findings from multiple studies 
by stating that ―the greater the perceived social approval (normative beliefs), the greater 
the likelihood of engaging in the behavior‖ (Riquelme et al, 2010, p.129). 
However, there is an alternative explanation to why drivers engage with their cell 
phone. It might be that drivers actually fail to see the performance decrement associated 
with driving distracted. Participants of some studies report that they did not find it harder 
to drive while on a cell phone, and that they did not notice any decrement in their driving 
performance. Strayer and colleagues suggest that distracted drivers do not have a 
capacity to process information that ―would provide evidence that their driving is 
impaired‖ (2003, p.31). Lee et al posit that feedback on poor driving performance is not 
evident to drivers because distraction rarely materializes in the form of harm, and having 
a cell phone conversation has no immediate consequences. The forgiving nature of 
driving and poor feedback perception result in perpetuation of risky behavior (2009, 
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p.53). In other words, drivers are not sensitive to their own impairment, and so 
dangerous driving habits continue.  
 
Focus Groups Data 
 
As part of an exploration into British Columbia drivers‘ knowledge and perception 
of distracted driving, three mixed-gender focus groups were conducted. All of the focus 
groups investigated four separate aspects of the issue: 1) attitudes towards distracted 
drivers, 2) knowledge and stance on the current BC anti-distraction legislation, 3) 
individual motivation for using the phone behind the wheel, and 4) individual distraction 
mitigation strategies. 
Focus groups were chosen over other inquiry methods as they allow the 
qualitative researcher to explore the topic in a less pre-determined way and to gather in-
depth insights about informants‘ attitudes (Furlham, 2002, p. 42). Focus groups were 
preferred to individual interviews because they access collective memory not accessible 
otherwise (Fontana & Frey, 2005, p.696) and bring out issues that might not emerge 
from individual discussions (van Zyl et al, 2013, p. 479). 
Focus group research has been previously used to study transportation road 
safety related issues. For example, NHTSA explored older drivers‘ beliefs about seat 
belt use via focus interviews, and TIRF talked to groups of female impaired drivers (Levi 
& De Leonardis, 2008; Robertson et al, 2013). Unfortunately, the researcher was able to 
locate only two studies that employed focus groups for the exploration of distracted 
driving. One such study is American Teens and Distracted Driving Research conducted 
by Pew Research Center in 2009, the other is a study done by Donmez and his 
colleagues in 2006. 
 
Procedures 
Eleven young people (5 females and 6 males) were recruited to participate in 
three separate focus groups. The participants‘ age ranged from 22 to 28 years old. Two 
individuals were self-identified as non-phone-users behind the wheel, while the rest of 
the participants admitted to using their electronic devices while driving. Purposive 
sampling strategy was used to recruit the participants for the study because the 
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researcher was looking for informants who are open about their experiences of driving 
distracted, as well as their attitudes towards this risk-taking behavior (van Zyl et al, 2013). 
The only other criterion for selection was a valid driver's license and some driving 
experience in BC. Each of the focus groups ran for approximately forty minutes. The 
interviewees were given a participation incentive of free dinner and drinks. An option to 
receive a final version of this paper was also presented to all participants. Each of the 
groups met only once.  
The discussions were moderated by a semi-experienced facilitator who received 
training in focus group moderation, as well as gained experience through past group 
facilitation. The moderator completed ORE‘s graduate students ethics training and was 
versed in ethical dimensions of qualitative research. The conversations were recorded 
using a Zoom H4n device with multi-dimensional microphones. The high sensitivity of 
the microphones, as well as the 360-degree recording coverage were vital to ensuring 
that, even when participants talked simultaneously, individual utterances remained 
distinguishable (Liamputtong, 2011, p.84). 
 Both the consent form and the pre-session briefing stressed the voluntary 
nature of participation and provided the study‘s details in full (Christians, 2005, p.144). 
The form stated that the participants' data will be anonymized and stored on an 
encrypted hard-drive and would not be accessible to anyone but the researcher (Carey 
& Asbury, 2012, p.48). 
In the beginning of each focus group, the moderator explained the purpose of the 
study and explicitly stressed the voluntary nature of participation (Morgan, 1998). The 
facilitator also emphasized the participants‘ right to withdraw from the study at any time 
without repercussions. The moderator then discussed issues of data protection and 
storage and explained the planned confidentiality protecting procedures. Additionally, to 
ensure internal confidentiality, the researcher strongly urged participants to not disclose 
opinions and stories raised during the discussion to the outsiders (Carey & Asbury, 
2012). After the study briefing, the participants were asked for consent to being 
interviewed. 
After the focus groups were completed, the participants were debriefed to reduce 
any possible discomfort and offered refreshments. The debriefing included a second 
round of discussion of the data protection. The recordings were later transcribed by the 
researcher. Thematic coding was applied to every transcript (Gullifer & Tyson, 2010). Six 
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main themes emerged from these discussions. Each of the themes is discussed 
separately below. 
 
Discussion 
Perception & Behaviour 
 
Multiple studies and several meta-analytical articles confirmed that distracted 
driving is associated with slower reaction time, reduced situational awareness, and 
increased breaking time, among other things (Jacobson & Gostin, 2010; Horrey & 
Wickens, 2004; McCartt et al, 2006). Interestingly, a survey conducted in 2007 revealed 
that 84% of drivers are aware that their driving performance deteriorates when engaged 
in a distracting activity (Young & Lenné, 2010). A team of Australian researchers 
suggested that drivers self-report slower reaction to events, missing hazards, changing 
speed, another driving behaviour changes (Lenné & Young, 2010, p. 329). 
The findings from the focus group similarly indicate that every driver interviewed 
was aware of his/her own performance depreciation and reported its manifestation. For 
example, some participants reported missing road signs, not looking around, breaking 
much slower. Three of the participants reported personal accidents attributed to slower 
reaction time while on the phone. In their own words: 
 
Don: I was driving to meet somebody I was suppose to hire…I was 
texting them to let them know that I am gonna be late. I was 
looking at the phone…I was approaching a stop sign, I saw that 
the car in front of me was slowing down, so I was also slowing 
down. I looked to read the text message from them…when I 
looked up the car in front of me has already stopped. I hadn’t. So, 
I hit the break, but I was too slow and I ended up rear-ending it 
[the car] 
 
Donna: This is how three of us- two of my bosses and myself- got in an 
accident. We were driving to have lunch with our client and so we 
just crossed the street and the guy was making a U-turn in the 
middle, literally- middle of intersection! And he was on his 
phone…Younger guy with an N [new drivers stickers for drivers 
with less than 2 years of road experience], so making a U-turn, 
so he crashing into us and I saw him, I saw that look in his eyes, 
in his face where he wouldn’t even drop his phone and he was 
just going “No, noooo”. Like he wouldn’t let go of the phone! That 
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guy! I saw that! And than he turns around with his left hand and 
drives away! Still holding the phone! 
 
While the interviewees with accidents and near-accidents reported being both 
mentally distressed and even treated for light physical injuries, none of them was willing 
to give up their phone-behind-the-wheel habits. 
 
Don: After that I stopped looking at my phone while moving, because 
keeping eyes on the road is important, but talking on the 
phone…I still do, it is just like talking to passenger. 
 
Nelson and colleagues pointed out that often drivers criticize others for engaging 
in distracting behaviours, yet they ―underestimate the degree of distraction imposed by 
the devices‖ on themselves (Nelson et al, 2009, p. 438). For example, Donna admitted 
to regular cell phone use behind the wheel and praised her multitasking abilities. 
Interestingly, while viewing her own distractions as beneficial to her driving, she 
questioned other drivers‘ skills to engage in the same behaviours: 
 
Donna: I feel like I am actually being extra careful because […] I need 
to listen to the conversation and also need to concentrate, and so 
it actually focuses my mind. So… I would say I believe, I can…I 
don’t know about everyone, but I can certainly multitask when I 
am driving. 
 
Ironically, Donna also reported being ticketed for distracted driving on two 
separate occasions. Overall, while acknowledging the risk of distracted driving, the 
participants showed little regard and fear for potential accidents. 
Motivation  
 
In a recent study, Nelson and colleagues (2009) found that people tend to initiate 
and answer phone calls behind the wheel if they perceived themas being important. The 
researcher also pointed out that drivers who consider distraction risky might choose not 
to answer calls perceived as less important. When asked about preferences for call 
making and taking, one of the participants stated jokingly: 
 
Donna: I take ALL calls unless it is 1-800 number…I’ll not take that, 
otherwise I will take them ALL [emphasis from intonation] 
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Other participants reported initiating phone calls depending on the mood or need. 
Another pointed out that her partner would only take phone calls from family and a small 
group of friends and only calls he expects. Unlike participants of the Pew Institute study, 
the participants did not have specific motivations like searching for directions, keeping in 
touch, nor appearing cooler (Madden & Lenhart, 2009, p.5).  
While 9 out of 11 participants found it very acceptable to engage with their phone 
themselves, when asked ―how do you feel seeing fellow drivers engaging in 
conversations/texting while driving?‖, most of the participants reported that they feel 
unsafe, act more cautiously around people on the phone, and try to see if the drivers' 
eyes are on the road. Still, others suggested that they feel anger and disrespectful – 
morally condemning other drivers for behaviours they themselves do: 
 
Donna: I feel…I am very curious… I am always always very curious 
about what they are talking about and who are they talking to and 
why is that so important to talk to that person RIGHT NOW 
[intonation stressed]; you know, when you are in the middle of 
the intersection turning left. You know it is very difficult, right, 
there is no like green arrow pointing , so you have to wait for 
everybody to pass. So why is it that you think that it is very 
important to talk to someone else?  
 
Jack: So if you take yourself completely out of that [situation on the 
road] by putting your head down and looking on at your phone, 
focusing on something else, as oppose to [gestures of looking 
around] You now are the only person out of that group of people 
who have the same common goal, but who says “You know what, 
Fuck You guys! I am taking a second here, I am just going to 
take care of my own stuff and then I will get to doing whatever 
else I was doing” 
 
When, it comes to being driven by someone who is texting or talking on the 
phone, some teens in a Madden & Lenhart study reported being ―adamant and angry‖ 
(2006, p. 9). The participants of this research also indicated that being driven by a 
distracted driver causes some tension. For example, one of the participants 
acknowledged getting annoyed at her partner‘s habit of talking behind the wheel: 
 
Claudia: My partner is really bad in multitasking so when he is on the 
phone. I start looking at his driving just to make sure that he is 
not doing anything stupid. And I get annoyed and if it is his friend 
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I say “just hang up because that call can last from 30 minutes to 
an hour & you are driving”. So I get annoyed when my partner 
does that, because he can’t… for some reason he can’t multitask 
 
Overall, none of the participants indicated any selective priority decision making 
in their choices of answering or initiating phone calls. Even though the participants, 
themselves, were not hesitant to take the calls, they expressed mixed feelings about 
other drivers‘ performance while engaged with their phones.  
Legislation 
 
Unlike the participants of an earlier Donmez et al study, drivers of BC indicated 
that they are not willing to give up their phone-behind-the-wheel habit even when 
required by law (2006, p.396). The interviewees‘ opinions seem to be clustered into 
three separate categories: these who think that the law is appropriate, these who think 
that current legislation is a stunt that benefits government and big business, and these 
who would like to see tougher regulations on the issue.  
The members of the first camp pointed out that they think that the law is 
appropriate. They perceived the present sanctions and the legislation as being 
―reasonable‖ and stated that if distraction was not a real issue, the government would 
not have implemented a law against it. For example,  
 
Harold: I like the legislation we had right now, I think it is decent. 
People get tickets, fines and they  are reasonable, I think its 140 
[dollars], right? It is a reasonable fine. 
 
Members of the second camp fell into a ―nanny state‖ line of thinking. This view 
of the legislation as being overly protective was typical of anti-legislation advocates for 
earlier road safety issues, such as seat belt enforcement. As predicted by earlier 
literature, they ridiculed regulations and cried out for more personal responsibility 
(Johnston et al, 2013, p. 69). One of the participants declared his disdain with the law, 
stating: 
Pete: I don’t think it should be enforced. […] I disagree with the 
government being this controlling in terms of what you are 
allowed to use in the car or outside the car, or whatever…I 
actually think that the whole thing- control of devices- to degree it 
only benefited people selling the hands free…whatever, 
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speakers… cause all sales made thought the roof.[…] If anything 
it is just a marketing thing, a way to make money. 
 
Claudia: Umm, I think.. what ever happened to giving people a 
discretion to make their own decisions, right? […] It should be up 
to drivers digression… 
 
Donna: Yes! And it [the law] is stupid! But you can talk to your 
passengers, right?! And engage in whatever the conversation the 
hell you want, right! 
 
Anti-legislation views sprang from the idea that the legislation was passed not in 
order to protect road users, but to make money that goes into government pockets and 
benefits big corporations. Additionally, road users fairly pointed out that other distracting 
activities, such as eating, reading maps, and using entertainment systems are not 
prohibited by law and suggested that the exclusion of other distraction is arbitrary and 
inadequate. Reportedly upset drivers of the anti-legislation camp saw their fellow drivers 
eating wonton soup with chopsticks, studying maps, and even reading books while 
driving! 
The last category consists of more conservative drivers, including a professional 
bus driver. While drivers in this category seemed to agree that the legislation is not strict 
enough, they did not agree on the legislation‘s advancement. While some of the 
interviewees proposed to give permission to use all electronic devices depending on 
ones‘ driving experience or age, others proposed to fully ban all electronics from 
vehicles. Most originally, Jack the professional driver, suggested: 
 
Jack: In my opinion, there should be a restriction on the license. Which, 
with additional situational awareness training and additional 
driving lessons and stuff like that , were you can get a higher 
level license that allow you to use your devices under certain 
conditions.[…] That’s exactly what they do for police, firefights 
and ambulances- they go though training, so that they are able to 
drive and use radio at the same time… and laptops 
 
Interestingly, some of the information regarding legislation presented by the 
participants was inaccurate. Misperception of the current legislation demonstrates that 
more work is required to inform British Columbians about distracted driving. 
 
 
 99 
 
Mitigation Strategies 
 
 Young & Lenné (2010) pointed out that drivers develop various distraction 
mitigation strategies to outweigh possible driving performance losses. Their informants 
listed increasing following distance, reducing speed, and pulling over as some of the 
most popular strategies, but about quarter of all respondents did not change their driving 
behavior in any way (p.329). The participants of my focus groups reported similar 
strategies, as well as some innovative solutions. For example, some of the drivers have 
their friends look out for the police, pull over, and leave their phone on the dashboard for 
better visibility. As one of the participants reported: 
 
Claudia: when my partner is stuck on the [phone] I am on a look out. I 
put on my glasses, and I m on the look out. [the group laughs] 
And if I see a white car that kinda resembles a cop cars, he puts 
his hand down. But now we are smarted we got like a stand thing 
for the phone… 
 
A few participants stated using only voice-controls while driving, such as Siri or 
in-car voice systems, as it was perceived as a safer way to communicate, as well as 
being legal in British Columbia. All but three interviewees suggested that the best 
mitigation strategy is to only use their phone when their vehicle is fully stopped at a red 
light. As one of the respondents states:  
 
Harold: Though if you are seeing a red light…I can still somehow justify 
it in my head. Ok, so you are on the red light, for example, it just 
changed, and you know that it takes a minute to change 
it…Nothing absolutely nothing is going to happened within this 
minute. So you are fully stopped, you can actually change your 
gear from drive to parking and then, you know, quickly reply to a 
text if you need to  or quickly do whatever you need to and then 
just keep going… 
 
Of the people who reported to use their phone at red lights, only John did it as a 
way to not get caught by the police. He urged the group: 
 
John: So you guys use your phones at red lights? [group agrees] You 
know, that this is THE MOST [stress with intonation] effective 
way to catch you guys! I specifically don’t use it at red lights 
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because I know that police use them specifically to catch you 
people! Because it is the easiest way to catch… 
 
While other studies available to the researcher did not cite any anti-phone-
behind-the-wheel proponents, a focus group member reveled that he does not pick up 
his phone while driving and alleviates the pressure of answering calls by informing his 
relatives and friends that he will not do so: 
 
Jack: All my friends and relatives know that I am not going to answer 
the phone if I am driving, so I don’t feel guilty if somebody is 
calling me, because I have voice mail and they can leave me a 
text message, and I will get back to them. 
 
Overall, as suggested by earlier studies, every driver has a distraction mitigation 
strategy. Unfortunately, as predicted by the Highway Loss Data Institute some of the 
strategies were aimed at not getting caught, rather than behaving safer on the road 
(2010, p.8). For example, two informants reported hiding their phones under the 
dashboard in order to avoid tickets. As pointed out by both the participants and 
academics, such behaviours usually result in longer glances away from the road, as well 
as complete loss of peripheral road vision (Lafleur, 2012). 
Fines & Demerits 
 
When asked about methods to prevent drivers from engaging with their phones 
while driving, the participants offered multiple solutions. One of the most prevalent 
suggestions was to increase fines. For example, a participant suggested:  
 
Donna: I think it should be the first strike should be free of charge so to 
say… just a notice, a warning, you know strong working, then the 
second strike a definite of a heavy fine, now it is what? 159 
dollars, I think…or a 169 
 
Claudia: But you got it TWICE [accented by intonation], but it is still not 
enough 
 
Donna: Yeah 
 
Claudia: But if it was a 300bucks fine, you would probably have 
stopped 
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Donna: If it was the first time- they warn me, the second time they 
caught me and it is a 500 dollar charge…I would be like the hell 
no, I am not doing it anymore! It is a worthless investment. […]It 
is cheap, honey, it is cheap![…] I am afraid of the money charge, 
not because it is illegal. 
 
The arguments about higher fines stands perfectly in line with a lesson learned 
from seatbelt enforcement. A summary report on sanctions, HVE, and legislations 
suggest that increasing fines, especially if publicized, leads to increased impact of the 
legislation  (NHTSA, 2008, p.45). At the same time, the participants honestly pointed out 
that it is not the letter of the law that scares them, but the monetary punishment. Others 
suggested that accumulating demerit points as well as progressive financial sanctions 
might suede more drivers to put down their phones. Only one driver would agree to 
comply with the legislation knowing that his car might be towed for breaking the law. 
More realistic drivers maintain that  
 
Betty: With increased fines I would still use it… 
 
Moderator: What would it take for you to stop using the phone? 
 
Betty: Nowadays, NOTHING! [stressed by intonation] 
 
One of the radical opponents of legislation in general and current BC law in 
particular proclaimed: 
 
Pete: No I would not stop [if you were to get a 600 fine]. It is hard to 
catch me, so good luck! 
 
One of the most innovative enforcement/education ideas came from an informant 
with a long ticketing record. She pointed out that drivers don‘t learn from books or stories, 
but from experiences and suggested that:  
 
Donna: Another thing that can be done is when you take the test 
[driving text], and most of the tests, like 99% are digital. You just 
stand there in front of the kiosk and punch in the numbers. So I 
think they should give you a headset and in that headset one 
particular exercise or a couple should be done when somebody 
is talking to you...and you are trying to solve your thing, and you 
will be absolutely distracted by all that shit that is being told to 
you. And you ill be like “Fuck, I cant, like, clearly concentrate!” 
That should trigged something in you… 
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Ultimately, the members of the focus group agreed that it is not the fines or 
enforcement but the possibility of being ―ratted out‖ by other drivers that would 
discourage them from using their phones behind the wheel. To the researcher‘s 
knowledge, none of the studies explored this method of social norm change, however in 
an in-person interview, a representative of ICBC pointed out that the organization was 
hoping to create an environment where other drivers are able to call on each other, just 
like it happened with smoking. ICBC hopes that a critical mass of drivers would be able 
to say ―we don‘t want you doing that around us‖ (ICBC Personal Interview, June 6th, 
2013). 
Enforcement 
A lot of focus group time was dedicated to the discussion of enforcement of the 
distracted driving laws by both the RCMP and municipal police departments. Vancouver 
police forces. As pointed out by an ICBC representative the corporation hopes to make 
enforcement as visible as possible to create an environment where drivers can feel that 
punishment will follow if the law is broken (Personal Interview, June 6th, 2013). In 
general, the participants reported that they feel that little is currently being done to 
enforce the law. Their attitude towards enforcement can be summed up as:  
 
Don: With the current level of enforcement it feels like you can quiet 
easily get away with it! 
 
Harold: Never seen that [enforcement], never experienced that, none 
of my friends got any tickets…While in Canada we are all 
suppose to be super safe, but then there is absolutely no 
enforcement 
 
While only one of the participants received tickets for using a cell phone while 
driving, a few reported that they had seen other people being ticketed or had heard 
stories from their friends. For example, the professional driver reported specific places in 
the city where motorcycle police fine drivers from particular gas stations, while pointing 
out that only some places in the city receive such treatment.  
The most fascinating finding comes from a female informant who received two 
tickets for driving distracted: 
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Donna: Yeah, and they still bust me! Still bust me! No, one time, […] I 
was talking to my mom actually on the phone. And she was 
telling me a story about my grandma [the mother] was almost 
tearing up and I was in the middle of the intersection, but I was 
just going straight in my commute from work to home. And so it is 
just straight, you know, and down one pass and I don’t have to 
turn anywhere and I don’t even have to turn or change lanes, so 
it is all super safe and I am well aware of my surroundings…but I 
was just at the stoplight and there was a little mall and cops were 
hiding behind trees around that mall. And so they saw me… 
 
When asked by another participant if she regrets getting ticketed, Donna said 
that she is not, because fines are cheap and a conversation with her family is worth a lot 
more to her than monetary punishment. 
When it came to mass media and enforcement campaigns only four participants 
were able to recall any anti-distracted-driving commercials. Interestingly, only two people 
cited a local BC‘s Give Them The Thumbs campaign, others referred in high regard to 
Australian ads. Two thumb-givers pointed out that they mock texting drivers every time 
they see them. Surprising was a number of references made to the popular culture 
situated around the practice of distracted driving. One of the participants cited a film 
starring Will Smith; the plot of the movie revolves around the protagonist trying to make 
up for the seven lives he took in a texting and driving accident. 
 
Reflections 
 
While the overall focus group strategy for the exploration of beliefs and attitudes 
can be considered a success from the richness of the data collected, some 
improvements might be necessary for a larger study. First, the moderator should receive 
additional training in focus group facilitation as she was inexperienced with periodic 
silences. As a result, the facilitator tried to fill pauses with possible answer options or 
moved the discussion along in an expedited manner. As recommended by the literature, 
a five-second pause rule should be adopted in order to elicit additional opinions without 
rushing or pressuring the participants (Kruger, 1998, p.28). 
Second, commenting on evaluation of the data, Fern suggested that a group‘s 
composition and cohesion might directly affect the quality of discussion (Fern, 2001, 
p.14). Some aspect of focus group composition can be improved by grouping dominant 
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participants together, and keeping shy interviewees in a separate discussion. In the 
course of the conversations, it became clear that individuals like Donna or Pete tended 
to dominate the discussion, thus discouraging quiet respondents from talking. Otherwise, 
the similar ages and social demographics of the participants mixed amiably and did not 
appear to be intimidating for anyone. 
Third, the locations of the focus groups could have been improved. They were 
held at a participant‘s house. A special ―research party‖ was organized for the 
interviewees. During the night the participants were asked to join the researcher in a 
special room for a group chat. While ―research party‖ created an relaxed aura of 
engagement and curiosity (Morgan, 1998), the party‘s distractions, such as music or 
momentary interruptions, influenced the flow of the discussions. If further research is to 
be conducted, a designated location with a private, quiet space and comfortable furniture 
in order to ensure conversation flow, would be necessary (Carey & Asbury, 2012). 
Finally, a printed version of the Interviewees Guide might be beneficial for 
directing the flow of the focus group discussion. While the facilitator consistently used a 
structured question guide from one group to another (Morgan, 199, p.47), the 
participants in every group asked for written topics or a question outline to aid them with 
the structure of the exercise and discussion. 
Summary of Qualitative Findings 
The focus group methodology allowed the researcher to gather in-depth insights 
about peoples‘ controversial attitudes towards distracted driving. Inconsistencies in 
comments clearly indicate ―the other drivers' problem‖ mentality among interviewed BC 
drivers. To summarize then, this qualitative data indicated that current enforcement 
strategies and legislation are not very effective as deterrents for distracted drivers. Only 
two of the eleven are willing to abstain from cell use in the car. The majority have 
developed a rationale for a managed risk approach to phone use in the car. The 
justifications for a managed risks strategy are various: Both sanctions and fines were 
considered by some as a ploy to benefit rich corporations and the government, while 
others viewed the current levels of fines and enforcers as arbitrary and weak. Every 
participant suggested an alternative anti-distraction strategy including heavier fines, 
vehicle impounding, and social shaming. Even though they suggested alternative 
enforcement strategies, the participants indicated that it is unlikely that they would be 
giving up their phone behind-the-wheel habits. The participants, that did not use cell 
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phones while driving, were better informed about current legislation and more critical of 
distracted drivers. However, the majority of the participants concluded that individual 
benefits of using the cellphone behind the wheel outweigh public health risks. The 
researcher regards the focus groups as being successful because group members 
engaged in the process of collective sense-making and, instead of complying with one 
another, ―constructed, expressed, defended and occasionally modified‖ their own 
opinions (Furnham, 2002, p.43).  
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Chapter 5 
 Conclusion: The Road Ahead? 
 
Approximately a hundred lives a year are currently lost due to driver distraction 
on British Columbian roads (ICBC, 2014). The extensive review of observational and 
epidemiological studies, cognitive experiments, and observational and self-reported 
surveys demonstrated that multitasking behind the wheel leads to slower reaction time, 
loss of situational awareness, and decreased driving performance. A roadside survey of 
8,332 cars in Vancouver found that at minimum1.35% of all observed drivers were using 
their phone behind the wheel, and another 1.33% of people were distracted otherwise. 
The data gathered from focus groups clearly demonstrated a mismatch between 
risk perception and risk-taking, as the majority of the drivers was aware of driving 
performance decrement and yet chose to engage with their phones. Interviewees 
reported that while aware of risks, they justify using their devices, as personal benefits 
from using a cell phone behind the wheel outweighed the perceived risks. Even the 
drivers with distraction-attributed accidents reported not changing their cell phone and 
driving habits. The drivers reported that current legislations and sanctions are too mild to 
prevent them from engaging with their phones. The failure to enforce the legislation 
might potentially result in two serious issues: first, poor enforcement sends the message 
that legislation is not important; second, inconsistent enforcement might be perceived as 
a waste of recourses that could have gone to other road safety campaigns (GHSA, 2011, 
p. 5).  
 
The Canadian Policy in the Context of Risk Reduction 
 
While the RSS 2015 has the noble aim of making Canadian roads the safest in 
the world, the program is highly problematic. Unlike previous RSS plans, the new 
program leaves every Canadian province to battle distracted driving with its own means. 
The nationwide RSS 2015 plan does not provide hard targets for provinces to meet in 
terms of casualties reductions, leaves provinces to operate within a short timeframe (5 
years), and proposes no national solutions on how to curb the problem of distracted 
driving (CCMTA, 2011, p.1).  
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Under a slogan of flexibility and holistic approach, the RSS 2015 is vague and 
utterly useless. The RSS 2015 speaks the language of ―best practices‖, ―own 
frameworks‖, and ―local responsibility‖. The bottom line of the RSS 2015 is that every 
jurisdiction ―will have the responsibility for their respective plans and also have the option 
of developing their own quantitative targets for specific casualty reduction during the 
five-year time-frame, if they wish to do so‖ (CCMTA, 2011, p.7).  
Additionally, the RSS 2015 is concerned with multiple road safety issues; 
however, distracted driving does not even receive its own category! According to the 
program, distracted driving is classified under impairment, in line with driving under the 
influence. Such treatment of distracted driving contradicts general research paradigms 
around the problem. It does not emphasize the causes of distraction. Considering that 
distracted driving affects every group of road users, the author of this thesis finds the 
Canadian RSS 2015 highly problematic. 
Unfortunately, the RSS 2015 is not the only program that is dysfunctional due to 
a lack of hard commitment from federal governments. Wilson and colleagues suggest 
that ―we live in an era where there is pressure on government to deregulate‖ (2005, 
p.45) and deregulation obviously shapes governmentally mandated programs. 
Unfortunately, it is not realistic to fight deregulation quickly and successfully, therefore 
the program has to be supplemented with elements that can make the RSS a success. 
Some researchers suggest that ―good laws coupled with tough enforcement can 
reduce deadly distracted driving behavior‖ (LaHood in Cosgrove, Chaudhary & Regan, 
2011, p.1). Others argue that laws and enforcement are not enough and that legal 
strategies have to be supplemented with education, public awareness campaigns, and a 
cultural shift in perspective on distraction (Cosgrove et al, 2011). Roy LaHood, Director 
of the IIHS, voices the research community‘s general consensus of methods of curbing 
distracted driving: ―decades of experience with drunk driving have taught us it takes 
consistent domination of education, effective enforcement, a committed judiciary, and 
collective efforts in local state and national advocates to put a dent in the problem‖ (as 
cited in GHSA, 2010, p.5). Cosgrove and colleagues suggest that 20 citations per 
10,000 drivers are needed for a campaign to be effective. They argue that drivers will 
change their behavior only by seeing that ―motorists will receive a ticket when they 
violate a traffic law‖ (2010, p.10). HVE comes in handy when enforcement wants to take 
advantage of the fact that people will try to avoid citations and demerits by complying 
with the law. More recently, Hammond concludes that, ―internationally, these 
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jurisdictions who continue to run post-legislation public awareness campaigns and who 
have strict, publicized enforcement campaigns tend to have better, long-term compliance‖ 
(2010, slide 5).  
The international community has recognized that distracted driving is a problem 
worldwide and the most important challenge we are currently facing is the fact that 
drivers who are aware of the risks and supportive of anti-distraction laws are still willing 
to engage in texting and phoning because they see themselves as safer drivers. 
Cosgrove, Chaudhary & Regan summarize the problem: ―changing driver‘s assessment 
of the risk associated with their own behavior presents a challenge‖ (2011, p.10). 
 
On the Down Road 
 
There are three possible steps to take in order to improve curbing distracted 
driving on the roads. First, the legislation and sanctions need to be more stringent. 
Currently, BC has one of the weakest legislations and the third lowest fine ($167) after 
Quebec ($115) and the Northwest Territories ($100). Further, the province should follow 
Nova Scotia‘s lead with progressive fines and demerit points (CAA, 2014). Unfortunately, 
as of 2010, BC had not considered re-evaluation of distracted driving laws, nor used 
targeting enforcement, nor conducted observational road surveys,  nor examined the 
efficacy of the legislation (Robertson, 2011, p.7).  
The second step in addressing the issue is to overcome a mismatch between 
risk-awareness and risk-taking behaviours. In the context of risk society where risk 
communication plays a major role this problem is best addressed by the change of social 
norms which guide risk-taking behaviours (Atcheley et al, 2012). Social marketing 
campaigns are one of the ways that can affect normative behaviours directly. A lesson to 
address the issue might be learned from a similar road safety issue: drunk driving. Social 
marketing campaigns were part of the tremendous effort that moved impaired driving 
from being perceived as an aspect of modern life (DeJong & Hingson, 1998) to being 
understood as irresponsible, unacceptable behaviour. Successful strategies from the 
past should be used to transform social norms around distracted driving.  
A number of major internal barriers would have to be considered when 
developing the social marketing campaigns. For example, gathered data indicated that 
―the other-guys-problem‖ type of thinking is currently prevalent among drivers in BC. The 
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AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety summarized the well-known problems as: ―many 
drivers discount their own behavior and view distraction as a significant problem that 
applies to other people‖ (2011, p.1). The campaigns would also have to address external 
barriers to behavior change including clear lack of balance between social costs and 
personal benefits of phone use (ex. time-saving, convenient,  being connected) (Norman 
et al, 2005, p.83).  
Social marketing campaigns have two additional benefits: fiscal efficiency and 
sustainability. For example, evaluating a road safety campaign against impaired driving 
in Kansas City, Tay found that a $322,660 investment in social marketing saved 
approximately $3,676,399 in costs of medical bills, emergency care, property damage, 
days of lost labour, and other negative externalities of the crashes (Tay, 20009, p.26). 
The sustainability aspect of social marketing was demonstrated by seatbelt use 
enforcement, where the pattern of change demonstrated wave patterns, increasing with 
every repeated media effort (Tison & Willians, 2010, p.23). 
These social marketing successes might be applied to anti-distraction campaigns. 
For example, alternative action messages rather than fear messages should be 
preferred, as fear-based approaches can potentially cause message rejection, 
avoidance, or dismissal (Tay, 2005, p. 25). Perkins and his team suggested that fear-
based approaches also tend to create a misperception about the prevalence of the 
problem (2010, p.867). Cismaru and colleagues suggested that ―higher level of self-
efficacy and response efficacy and lower level of perceived costs can produce a 
significantly greater change in protection motivation and persuasion‖ (2009, p. 297). The 
researchers cite designated driver campaigns that instead of moralizing drinking 
behaviours, suggested a low-cost, easy-to-administer solution.  
The third step towards curbing distracted driving is high-visibility enforcement. 
Most of the drivers in the focus groups pointed out that they do not feel that the present 
legislation is adequately enforced. Historically, high-visibility enforcement was applied to 
impaired driving (road blocks, checkpoints, impairment testing), seatbelt use (roaming 
patrols, high visibility ticketing), and speeding. Especially outstanding is Fresno‘s high-
intensity enforcement experimental project that quadrupled the number of enforcement 
officers, and thus deceased speed related fatalities three-fold (Davis et al, 2006). 
In short, best practices demonstrate that road safety issues are more likely to be 
heard and respected by drivers through a combination of legislation, enforcement, and 
repeated media campaigns. The problem of distracted driving in BC is no exception. The 
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author of the study hopes that the project might initiate a conversation about this issue, 
so vital to the livelihood of British Columbians. 
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